Niger’s economy is heavily dependent on mining exports and royalties, roughly 40% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Nigerien-produced uranium accounts for nearly 8% of world production. It is this lucrative uranium sector that also faces the greatest security threat from non-state actors seeking to disrupt production or to target international personnel to achieve political or financial goals. In one notable incident, seven employees of the French nuclear energy company Areva were kidnapped from their homes in the town of Arlit by Islamist militants.⁽²⁾ That kidnapping and subsequent ransoming of some, but not all, hostages echoed an earlier incident where the Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ), a local anti-government organisation, kidnapped four Areva employees, also from Arlit.⁽³⁾ In the most recent incident, on 23 May 2013, a vehicle laden with explosives was detonated at an Areva-owned uranium mine near Arlit, killing two (including the vehicle driver) and injuring 14 others at the site.⁽⁴⁾ These incidents illustrate the types of risks faced by the uranium mining sector in Niger.

This article is extracted from the October 2013 edition of CAI’s Africa Conflict Monthly Monitor (ACMM) – the brainchild of award-winning journalist and columnist, James Hall.
The 92 page report dissects conflict trends within the African continent, with articles authored by ACMM’s team of African conflict experts. Subscribe to ACMM here.

Niger’s domestic security challenges related to internal factors

Niger faces significant challenges that manifest in poor Human Development Index (HDI) rating and a high Global Inequality Index (GINI) rating. Among these many challenges, Niger is geographically and environmentally handicapped by its landlocked position on the Sahel band, which consists largely of inhospitably scrubland and desert. Several coup d’états since independence and a pervasive political culture of corruption have left the country with a lack of infrastructure and a poorly educated and poorly governed populace. The ‘resource curse’ of an economy dominated by one export (uranium), particularly during the uranium boom of the 1970s, has exacerbated Niger’s economic and political troubles. A political culture of patronage and a sense that the ‘winner takes all’ has contributed especially to the shaky democratic traditions of the country. Moreover, the citizenry of Niger have grown despondent about the inability of the government to provide for it. These factors are directly relevant to the topic of mining sector security as they define the internal security landscape. Niger’s large, youthful and despondent population makes for a potential recruiting pool for anti-government non-state actor groups and roving Islamist militant groups alike.

Further notable characteristics of Niger’s internal security landscape relate to its population demographics. The population fertility rate in Niger is extremely high. Despite probably the highest infant mortality rate in the world, nearly half of Niger’s population is under the age of 15. Such a large youth bulge carries with it significant economic and political consequences. Significantly, large numbers of uneducated and likely despondent youths also make for willing recruits for militant organisations and revolutionary groups.

Demographically, Niger follows the West African regional norm of a north-south split between northern nomadic or pastoral groups, and southern dwelling sedentary farmers. In Niger’s case, the southern population is comprised largely of the country’s demographic majority, the Hausa. A minority mix of Fulani, Arab, Tombou and others inhabit the less arable north. Again, in common with other countries in the region, conflict is common between nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists and sedentary agrarian communities. In the case of Niger, religion plays less of a role in driving conflict. Over 98% of the population are Muslim (with an estimated 95% of which follows Sunni or Sufi Islam). Although there is less demographic and sectarian tension to capitalise on compared to, for instance, Nigeria, Niger remains at risk of internal agitation by non-state actors.

Niger’s economic weakness and limited ability to provide economic and developmental support across the country has manifested in feelings of victimisation and abandonment amongst inhabitants of the Agadez region. The local populace feels that it is not receiving a fair share of the wealth generated by the uranium sector. The minority status of the nearby populace compounds this view. The harmful impact of uranium mining on both the environment and the health of the nearby populace adds further to this feeling.⁽⁵⁾ Groups of anti-government militants have used violence in the past to express this frustration, killing government and security forces, and periodically targeting uranium infrastructure and personnel. The MNJ is one such anti-government group seeking a greater share of the revenues from northern Niger's uranium wealth to be invested in the region. MNJ was responsible for the kidnapping of four Areva employees from Arlit in 2008, and the 2007 kidnappings of a Chinese nuclear engineer who had been prospecting around the town of Teguidan Tessoumt, in the Agadez region of Niger. This internal threat, in many ways similar to violence in the Niger Delta in Nigeria, is a significant source of risk for the uranium industry in Niger. It can also serve as a local anchoring point for external threats. Militant groups outside of Niger could potentially cultivate relationships or working partnerships with local anti-government groups.

Fig 1: Map showing SOMAIR and COMINAK facilities at Arlit ⁽⁶⁾

After the 2013 international military intervention in Mali, militant Islamist fighters were expelled from northern Mali. These groups of militants have subsequently scattered across the region, some heading north into southern Libya, and west into Mauritania. It is unclear if any groups have re-established themselves specifically in Niger, although the borders of the Sahel region are largely academic and such groups are effectively free to traverse the region as they see fit.

The Mali intervention appears also to have prompted an evolution of some of the Islamist militants, who may now have radicalised further and seek to target international actors for their role in the intervention. Since its leading role in the intervention, French interests are considered a desirable target for Islamist militants. The presence of large numbers of international personnel, coupled with the political currency attached to the industry itself, makes the uranium sector in Niger a high-priority target for Islamist militants. Uranium, though essentially harmless in its non-enriched form, is inextricably associated with nuclear fuel and the spectre of nuclear non-proliferation. This is not a realistic threat in the case of Niger, with neither Islamist militants nor local anti-government groups having shown any sign of interest, nor any realistic capability, for attempting to steal and resell uranium ore or yellowcake (the refined and processed form of uranium ore that is shipped overseas for enrichment). Nevertheless, the targeting of the uranium industry does result in significant international attention. The Areva facilities are also of strategic importance to France, which relies on Niger for a sizeable portion of its nuclear fuel requirements. Some 18% of France’s nuclear fuel comes from Niger.

Niger’s uranium sector is comprised of three mining sites, all in the region of the towns of Arlit and Akokan, north of the Agadez region. Two of the sites are operated by the Société des Mines de l'Air (SOMAIR) and Compagnie minière d'Akokan (COMINAK). Both companies are partly owned by the Office National des Ressources Minieres du Niger (ONAREM), but the major shareholder in each instance is Areva. The third site, Imouraren, is in the process of coming online. Although it sits on a lower-grade ore body than the other sites, the Imouraren deposit covers a vast area and is expected to double Niger’s uranium output.⁽⁷⁾ Arlit’s location, isolated in the vast emptiness of the region, and relatively close to the Algerian and Malian borders, has contributed to its ease of targeting in the past.

Nigerien uranium facilities are primarily at risk from attacks by two types of non-state actor groups: Islamist militants and local anti-government groups. In the former case, al-Murabitoun is the primary concern, in the latter case, the MNJ. Al-Murabitoun is a recently-formed amalgam of two other groups known for their activities primarily in Algeria, Mali and Mauritania, the al-Mulathameen and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Al-Mulathameen (The Masked Ones Brigade), also known a s the Signed in Blood Battalion, is led by the infamous terrorist and transnational trafficker, Mokhtar Belmokhtar. MUJAO is an offshoot of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and was heavily active in northern Mali during the occupation of the cities of the north of that country by Islamist militant in 2012. Al-Murabitoun is the result of the formal merging of these two groups in September 2013, although they had previously cooperated extensively. Belmokhtar is believed to be responsible for the January 2013 hostage crisis at the Tigantourine natural gas refinery at In Amenas in Algeria. He is also believed to have been instrumental in the planning and execution of the 23 May 2013 simultaneous attacks on a military barracks at Agadez, and the SOMAIR uranium mine in Niger. Notably, the attacks in Niger were carried out by MUJAO personnel.

Nigerien uranium sector vulnerabilities can be catalogued

Niger’s uranium sector, vulnerable as it is, has a limited infrastructural footprint in the country. Aside from the three mining areas (COMINAK, SOMAIR and Imouraren), Areva has offices in Naimey and Arlit. The mining facilities and processing plants are relatively self-contained, and do not encompass large logistical tails such as with the pipelines of the oil or natural gas sectors. As such, a list of potential or viable targets can be formed and securitisation measures can be enacted. It is further possible to mitigate the risk posed to such targets because much of the uranium sector infrastructure is self-contained, bearing in mind the capabilities and characteristics of the likely attackers.

The likely attackers, discussed above, would be interested in achieving one or both of two goals: funding and exposure. In the case of the former, kidnappings for ransom would be the means of securing funds necessary to pursue their respective campaigns. Al-Murabitoun’s constituent groups, MUJAO and al-Mulathameen, both have significant experience in this regard. The granting of ransoms is discouraged politically amongst the international community for their obvious role in aiding and further encouraging terrorist or insurgent groups. Nevertheless, ransoms are regularly paid and remain a major source of funding for non-state actor groups. There is evidence that the 2013 attack on the Tigantourine natural gas facility in In Amenas was a complex and large-scale kidnapping raid that bogged down early on in its execution, and was not designed specifically to disable the facility or to kill foreign personnel. In the case of the MNJ or other like-minded local groups, kidnappings and small-scale attacks are also necessarily limited by the need to avoid provoking a full-scale military crackdown by the Nigerien Government. Executing hostages or attacks that are designed to blatantly harm foreign personnel are less likely because they harm the primary goal of these groups: the creation of negotiation space with the Nigerien Government.

In the case of the second goal of militant attacks, gaining exposure is a means of encouraging recruitment while also contributing to the overall strategic goal of spreading jihad and destabilising the region in order to instigate Sharia Law. The killing of government or security forces, or international personnel is a major means of achieving this goal. It is notable that the dual attacks on the Agadez barracks and the SOMAIR facility was specifically designed to kill, not to provide cover for any kidnappings. Al-Murabitoun’s stated goal as a new organisation, aside from the spreading of jihad across the region, is to punish France for its involvement in the Mali intervention.

Islamist militant groups ranging across the region, such as al-Murabitoun, are largely confined, by virtue of the size of these groups, to hit-and-run attacks and the resources available to them. Similarly, local militants such as the MNJ would be logistically limited in what they could hope to achieve in attacking uranium industry facilities. Nevertheless, even small, lightly-armed groups pose a threat to the facilities themselves and especially to the personnel staffing those facilities. While damaging infrastructure or disrupting production would be one means of attracting attention, the killing of international and preferably Western personnel is of greater symbolic significance. In either case, the tactical means available to potential attackers should be considered. Large quantities of explosives, possibly arranged as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) of sufficient size to damage machinery are logistically more difficult to acquire and assemble than are the smaller quantities of explosives needed to cause casualties at a bomb site. For that matter, a few gunmen can potentially cause significant casualties negating the need to source, assemble and transport explosives.

Preventative security measures remain difficult to implement

Preventative security entails enacting measures to mitigate the tactical capabilities of potential attackers. In the case of Niger’s uranium sector, the primary focus is the securing of facilities against penetration by attackers. Increasing security is not, however, merely a case of increasing guard numbers. Larger security forces can dramatically raise operational costs. There are, then, also questions about whether private security or state security forces should be used. The quality and operating mandate of security personnel should also be considered, particularly in the event of an attack and protracted fire-fight amongst civilian personnel. Moreover, the nature of the facilities in question makes the provision of comprehensive security difficult if not impossible. There is a practical limit to countering the ability of strike attacks from any direction in a rapid and massed manner on perimeters that often stretch several kilometres. In early 2013, following the In Amenas hostage crisis, France deployed Special Forces to Areva facilities in Arlit and Imouraren, but these troops were eventually withdrawn.⁽⁸⁾

Where perimeter security is limited, it is possible to focus on a citadel approach, such as is found on ships vulnerable to maritime piracy where the crew shelter in hardened ‘safe rooms’. Such safe rooms are, however, merely a temporary respite to buy the civilian personnel time while a quick reaction force of government troops arrives. As such, a close relationship between the AREVA facilities and the government must be in place. In small scale raids, involving hard-to-track numbers of attackers, early warning systems are vital. The establishment of observation posts with the ability to broadcast facility-wide warnings are the key to giving those personnel the time to reach secure areas. Such observation points might also aid in spotting any pre-attack surveillance conducted by militants.

Another key aspect of bolstering security at Nigerien uranium facilities requires a broader strategic approach to regional security. Here, the emphasis lies on the Nigerien Government and the regional security partnerships in place with neighbouring states. Although border security remains an enormously challenging prospect given the terrain involved, it is possible to better monitor the movements of large groups of militants, who are necessarily constrained by logistical needs, to hops between urban centres. More effective collection and sharing of intelligence on the movement of such groups will be particularly helpful in preventing the larger scale attacks such as was seen in In Amenas.

The Nigerien uranium sector is a crucial aspect of broader Nigerien security

Niger’s security challenges are highlighted by an examination of the threats facing the Nigerien uranium sector. However, the uranium sector is just one potential area of vulnerability. At present, uranium is the focal point of the Nigerien resource-extraction industry. Not only does the uranium industry represent a salient point upon which anti-government forces might campaign in terms of environmental harms and unfair distribution of wealth, but the larger geo-strategic importance of the uranium industry itself is significant. The role of Areva and France is also a significant factor in the targeting of uranium sector facilities and personnel by militants. It is, however, worth noting that oil could become a significant extraction and export sector component. At present, Niger’s relatively small-scale petroleum industry is based around the Agadem oil fields near Zinder, some 900 km east of Niamey. Protests and pricing issues have so far limited exports or sector growth, but there remains the potential for oil to become a dominant source of income for the country. A growing oil industry carries with it the risks of increasing disputes over revenue distribution. Like the uranium sector, a growing petroleum sector means a large, and vulnerable, infrastructural footprint including refineries and pipelines. Unlike uranium, oil theft is also a potential security concern. As such, the Niger Government faces not only the growing threat of Islamist militant attacks, but is also growing increasingly vulnerable by virtue of a growing list of potential targets.

Areva’s dominance of the Nigerien uranium sector means that France is strategically invested in the security of the region. Because France is increasingly involved in regional politics, notably in the 2013 military intervention in Mali, French-owned or -related facilities and personnel will be increasingly targeted. While the kidnapping of Western personnel has historically been a lucrative and popular source of income for local militants, the changing security landscape of the region now suggests that attacks which are intentionally-designed to kill such personnel may increase. In this regard, facilities in Niger, which have repeatedly proven vulnerable to raids, must be hardened to better protect vulnerable personnel. Other preventative security measures geared toward early detection of raiding parties or pre-operation intelligence-gathering, must be bolstered. Whether the intention of an attack is to take hostages or to inflict headline-grabbing casualties, the emphasis of preventative security measures must be on the protection of personnel at Niger’s uranium sector sites.

This article is extracted from the October 2013 edition of CAI’s Africa Conflict Monthly Monitor (ACMM) – the brainchild of award-winning journalist and columnist, James Hall.
The 92 page report dissects conflict trends within the African continent, with articles authored by ACMM’s team of African conflict experts. Subscribe to ACMM here.

Written by Conway Waddington ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Conway Waddington is a Regional Analyst with ACMM, has contributed papers, reviews and con­ference material to the Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria, South Africa) and has acted as a peer-review­er for Scientia Militaria. Contact Conway through CAI’s Counter Proliferation unit ( counter.proliferation@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by James Hall and Dominique Gilbert.
(2) ‘French nationals among seven workers kidnapped in Niger’, BBC News Africa, 16 September 2010.
(3) ‘French hostages released in Niger’, BBC News, 25 June 2008.
(4) ‘Islamist bombers kill 20 in Niger attacks’, Agence France-Presse, 23 May 2013.
(5) ‘Niger: Desert residents pay high price for lucrative uranium mining’, Integrated Regional Information Networks, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 30 March 2009.
(6) Map compiled by ACMM with graphical template sources from D-Maps.
(7) ‘Uranium in Niger’, World Nuclear Association, July 2013.
(8) Todd, T., ‘French special forces “to protect” Niger uranium mines’, France 24, 25 January 2013.