Since 2009, the Administration of Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan has attempted to grapple with the secretive Boko Haram, with their efforts entering the international spotlight following the kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok in April 2014 and the subsequent #BringBackOurGirls social media campaign. While analyses have somewhat naturally focused on the evolution of the group responsible for the kidnappings,⁽²⁾ in-depth analyses of the Nigerian government’s counterinsurgency operations have been comparably less common, beyond somewhat simplistic condemnations of the Nigerian government’s failure to “do more.” This paper discusses Nigeria’s kinetic, political, socio-economic and diplomatic responses. It argues that the continuation of the current, largely reactive approach hamstrung by corruption, indiscipline and north-south rivalry is likely to reinforce the cycle of violence that has plagued the northeast since 2009. It also speculates that recent airings by the National Security Advisor (NSA) concerning a comprehensive de-radicalisation and development programme ⁽³⁾ may, if implemented, give grounds for optimism.

Kinetic response: Military

The Nigerian Army is widely regarded as well-versed in counterinsurgency due to its wealth of experience operating in insurgency environments, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire.⁽⁴⁾ The Nigerian government has attempted to maximise the benefits of this experience since 2011 by enmeshing the Army with other security forces in Joint Task Force (JTF) deployments, bringing the Army, Air Force, Navy, State Department and Police under unified command structures.⁽⁵⁾ It also encourages increased intelligence-sharing, force coordination and unity of direction, which are considered essential for any counterinsurgency operation,⁽⁶⁾ although this has been limited by Nigeria’s federal structure, which has caused confusion between chief state security officers and federally-controlled security forces.⁽⁷⁾

Nigerian JTF counterinsurgency operations in the northeast have been “generally repressive,” relying heavily on military-led operations to kill and capture “scores” of Boko Haram insurgents since the movement was first brutally crushed in 2009.⁽⁸⁾ While this use of force has clearly enabled the JTF’s to pressure Boko Haram strongholds in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa and reduce the scope of its activity,⁽⁹⁾ it has also produced large-scale extrajudicial killings, mass arrests and intimidation of civilians, who are treated as insurgent sympathisers.⁽¹⁰⁾ In 2011, for example, during a mass “cordon and search” operation in Maiduguri, 25 people were shot dead, women and children beaten, and homes destroyed.⁽¹¹⁾ Such excesses have further alienated the population, who perceive the national military as an instrument of southern repression, starving intelligence structures of information.⁽¹²⁾

Having gained the advantage by exploiting counterinsurgents’ brutality, Boko Haram has been able to “run rings around the Nigerian security agencies” and conduct spectacular attacks such as the coordinated assault on government buildings in Kano in January 2012, killing 200.⁽¹³⁾ Meanwhile, regular attacks on security facilities such as barracks damage public confidence and morale within the security forces.⁽¹⁴⁾ The ease at which high-security prison raids and the December 2013 assault on Maiduguri Air Force Base have taken place has raised concerns of Boko Haram infiltration;⁽¹⁵⁾ concerns which only worsened when, in June 2014, ten generals and 5 other senior security staff were reportedly court martialed for arming and providing intelligence to the group.⁽¹⁶⁾

Political, socio-economic and diplomatic response

Political negotiations with Boko Haram have not been fruitful to date, with the group purging members suspected to be considering rapprochement overtures towards Abuja in both 2011 and 2012. Meanwhile, the government is unable to negotiate with the group’s somewhat incoherent demands; calls for the Islamisation of Nigeria and Goodluck Jonathan’s conversion to Islam, for example, have been made alongside calls for the division of Nigeria into two.⁽¹⁷⁾ Largely, the consensus among analysts is that “Mr. Jonathan’s government has to attack the root causes of disaffection” that push young, unemployed youths towards radicalisation by Boko Haram, such as poverty and unemployment.⁽¹⁸⁾ Indeed, Boko Haram’s cells recruit by appealing to a variety of grievances, providing monetary inducement for impoverished almajiris and employing Shia, Sunni as well as more local traditional religious discourse and practice.⁽¹⁹⁾ Recent utterances from National Security Advisor Sambo Dasuki suggest that a shift may be taking place towards recognising this, unveiling a “soft approach” in the March 2014 Countering Violent Extremism programme that outlined plans for capacity-building economic development in the northeast, as well as developing partnerships with faith groups and local stakeholders in a bid to co-opt these groups in a de-radicalisation campaign.⁽²⁰⁾ Meanwhile, the government has been able to mobilise community self-defence and vigilante groups, empowering communities and in return providing a local source of intelligence.⁽²¹⁾ While potentially mere rhetoric, recognition of the requirement to adopt a multi-faceted, inclusive strategy to counter Boko Haram’s recruitment incentives provides grounds for cautious optimism.

Regionally, Nigeria enjoys diplomatic support from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) states such as Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Mali, as Boko Haram has been known to operate and recruit alongside regional movements such as the Movement for Unity and Jihad (now Al-Mourabitoun) in West Africa.⁽²²⁾ The June 2014 Paris Conference deepened this support for Nigeria’s counterinsurgency campaign through an agreement by regional powers such as Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin to share intelligence with Abuja. The United States, United Kingdom, France and Israel, having already provided counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, logistical and capacity-building assistance in recent years,⁽²⁴⁾ have increased support as part of the effort to find the Chibok girls.⁽²⁵⁾ However, Nigeria’s record of human rights abuses, combined with suspicions of malicious Western intentions and a doctrinal slowness to adapt, are likely to continue to limit the scope of future Western counterinsurgency support beyond the Chibok search operation.⁽²⁶⁾

Containment: Future prospects

It would be inaccurate to suggest that Nigeria to date possesses a counterinsurgency “strategy;” Abuja currently relies on its reactive, force-centric JTF deployments that geographically contain, but do not defeat, Boko Haram. Collective punishments, abuses and corrupt, extortive practices at the ground level only serve to bolster the insurgency’s intelligence and support networks, further hamstringing counterinsurgent operations and producing a cycle of violence. Incidents such as the Chibok kidnappings will remain a grim reality in northeast Nigeria until the government implements its recent rhetoric promoting a multifaceted strategy that combats poverty, radicalisation and addresses the widespread feeling of northern alienation from mainstream politics.

Written by Alex Waterman ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Alex Waterman is a Research Associate at CAI with a focus in insurgencies, civil wars and counterinsurgency strategy. Contact Alex through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Conflict & Terrorism Unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Nicky Berg. Research Manager: Leigh Hamilton.
(2) The origins, scope and root causes of the insurgency are beyond the scope of this paper. For an excellent overview of the evolution of Boko Haram covering origins, motives, trends and relations with other groups, see Cordano, D., ‘The evolution of Boko Haram: A growing threat?’, Consultancy Africa Intelligence, 27 June 2014, http://www.consultancyafrica.com.
(3) Otuchikere, C., ‘NSA designs economic plan for Boko Haram states’, Leadership, 19 March 2014, http://allafrica.com.
(4) Sule, Maj. A.M., ‘Nigeria’s participation in peacekeeping operations: A thesis’, Peace Operations Training Institute, 26 April 2013, http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org.
(5) Hussein, S., 2012. Counter-terrorism in Nigeria. Royal United Services Institute Journal, 157(4), pp. 6-11.
(6) Paget, J., 1967. Counter-insurgency campaigning. Faber: London. Although dated, the works of British counterinsurgency theorists largely continue to be regarded as demonstrating the truisms associated with this type of conflict.
(7) Hussein, S., 2012. Counter-terrorism in Nigeria. Royal United Services Institute Journal, 157(4), pp. 6-11.
(8) Osumah, O., 2013. Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria and the vicious cycle of internal security. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24(3), pp. 536-560.
(9) Olojo, A., ‘Nigeria’s troubled north: Interrogating the drivers of public support for Boko Haram’, International Centre for Counterterrorism - The Hague, October 2013, http://www.icct.nl; Akpan, F., Ekanem, O. and Olofu-Adeoye, A., 2014. Boko Haram insurgency and the counter terrorism policy in Nigeria. Canadian Social Science, 10(2), pp. 151-155.
(10) ‘Spiralling Violence: Boko Haram attacks and security force abuses in Nigeria’, Human Rights Watch, 2012, http://www.hrw.org.
(11) Hussein, S., 2012. Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria. Royal United Services Institute Journal, 157(4), pp. 6-11.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Osumah, O., 2013. Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria and the vicious cycle of internal security. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24(3), pp. 536-560; Walker, A., ‘What Is Boko Haram?’ United States Institute of Peace Report no. 308, June 2012, http://www.usip.org. Walker also provides details of other similar attacks up to and during 2012.
(14) Osumah, O., 2013. Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria and the vicious cycle of internal security. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24(3), pp. 536-560
(15) Hussein, S., 2012. Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria. Royal United Services Institute Journal,
157(4), pp. 6-11; Akpan, F., Ekanem, O. and Olofu-Adeoye, A., 2014. Boko Haram insurgency and the counter terrorism policy in Nigeria. Canadian Social Science, 10(2), pp. 151-155.
(16) ‘Nigerian villagers “killed in Boko Haram church attack”’, BBC News, 4 June 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(17) Walker, A., ‘What is Boko Haram?’ United States Institute of Peace Report no. 308, June 2012, http://www.usip.org.
(18) ‘Dealing with Boko Haram’, New York Times, 30 May 2014, http://www.nytimes.com; for links between poverty and insurgency, see: Osumah, O., 2013. Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria and the vicious cycle of internal security. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24(3), pp. 536-560.
(19) Zenn, J., ‘The different faces of Boko Haram’, Council on Foreign Relations: Africa in Transition, 29 August 2013, http://blogs.cfr.org; for an overview of the almajiri, see: Parker, G., ‘Nigeria’s abandoned youth: are they potential recruits for militants?’, TIME Magazine, 18 February 2012, http://content.time.com.
(20) Otuchikere, C., ‘NSA designs economic plan for Boko Haram states’, Leadership, 19 March, http://allafrica.com; Mutum, R., ‘FG announces “soft” counter-terror strategy’, Daily Trust, 19 March 2014, http://allafrica.com.
(21) Akpan, F., Ekanem, O. and Olofu-Adeoye, A., 2014. Boko Haram insurgency and the counter terrorism policy in Nigeria. Canadian Social Science. 10(2), pp. 151-155.
(22) Hussein, S., 2012. Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria. Royal United Services Institute Journal. 157(4), pp. 6-11.
(24) Hussein, S., 2012. Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria. Royal United Services Institute Journal. 157(4), pp. 6-11; For US support to Nigeria, see: Blanchard, L. P., ‘Nigeria’s Boko Haram: frequently asked questions’, Congressional Research Service, June 2014, http://fas.org.
(25) ‘Dealing with Boko Haram’, New York Times, 30 May 2014, http://www.nytimes.com.
(26) Walker, A., ‘Why Nigeria has not defeated Boko Haram’, BBC News, 11 May 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk.