João Lourenço’s Luanda peace deal seems unlikely to resolve the crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame are scheduled to meet in Luanda on Sunday under the auspices of Angolan President João Lourenço.

They’re trying to resolve their long, bitter dispute over the continuing violence in the eastern DRC. It will be their first face-to-face meeting in 18 months.

Lourenço hopes they will sign a provisional deal that addresses each leader’s principal grievance in the dispute. The DRC will ‘neutralise’ the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) armed rebels who have been operating in eastern DRC for over 25 years. Rwanda will – in effect – withdraw its forces, which have been supporting the M23 armed rebels in the same territory.

The FDLR was originally created by Hutus who fled Rwanda after participating in the genocide against Tutsis in 1994. The M23 essentially comprises ethnic Tutsi Congolese.

But whether or not the two leaders will sign the agreement is unclear; and it’s even less clear if signing it will address the problem.

Lourenço has been conducting vigorous diplomacy under the Luanda Process to try to end the conflict peacefully. On 30 July, he brokered a ceasefire agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, which took effect on 4 August. It included an Ad Hoc Verification Mechanism to monitor implementation.

In pursuit of a substantive peace deal, DRC and Rwandan experts met in Luanda on 31 October to develop a harmonised plan for the neutralisation of the FDLR and Rwanda’s disengagement. Both countries’ foreign ministers later approved a ‘concept of operations’ on 25 November.

This concept of operations was hailed as a major breakthrough. But it appears that many important details of the plan that could be stumbling blocks remain to be agreed upon. The most significant is probably the sequencing of actions by the two sides.

DRC Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner repeated to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) her government’s frequent accusations that over 4 000 Rwanda Defence Force members were illegally in her country, carrying out offensive actions with M23 support.

US ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield was clear too that Kigali was still providing substantial military assistance to M23. She told the UNSC that ‘we were alarmed by M23’s recent violations of the ceasefire under the pretext of “defensive actions” violations supported by RDF troops. These actions, and the RDF’s endorsement of them, must end.’

But despite all these charges and UN Group of Experts reports endorsing these claims, Rwanda denies the presence of any of its forces in the country and is demanding that the DRC neutralise the FDLR before it ends what it calls its ‘defensive actions.’

Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe told the UNSC that ‘framing this as an intra-African hostility diminishes the complexity of the conflict and the roles of various actors involved.’ He said blaming the M23 as the root cause of the problem – as the recent UN Secretary-General’s report had done – was wrong, as the conflict was premised on marginalising the minority communities, mainly the Congolese Tutsi, in eastern DRC.

Thomas-Greenfield added that Rwanda and the DRC should do what they had agreed was needed. ‘The DRC must take action against the FDLR and cease its support to that group. Rwanda must withdraw its more than 4 000 troops from DRC territory and cease its support for M23. In addition, MONUSCO [the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo] must be allowed to implement its mandate.’

However Stephanie Wolters, Senior Research Fellow and Great Lakes expert at the South African Institute of International Affairs, is sceptical about the prospects of the concept of operations that Tshisekedi and Kagame are to deliberate on. She finds it problematic that ‘the basic elements of it is that the FDLR have to be neutralised and then Rwanda will withdraw its “defensive measures.”’

The fact that the concept of operations accepts Rwanda’s terminology for its actions means that ‘Rwanda gets to save face because it doesn’t even have to acknowledge that it’s supporting the M23 or even that it has troops in the DRC,’ she told ISS Today.

‘And the more important thing is that it shifts the whole conflict back to it being the fault of the DRC, which is … the focus on the FDLR.

‘How is it possible that we go from the M23 causing massive humanitarian crises and displacement and taking vast territory in North Kivu to this being refocused on the one thing we know this isn’t about, which is the FDLR, but which the Rwandans always say it’s about?’

Like many analysts, Wolters does not believe the FDLR is the real reason for Rwanda’s military incursion into eastern DRC, and so the concept of operations is based on a misrepresentation of the conflict’s origin and drivers.

She fears the two presidents might not even sign the agreement on Sunday, because Kagame might not put his name to any document that’s tantamount to an admission of guilt that he has troops in the DRC. Tshisekedi, conversely, might not sign any document that doesn’t acknowledge Rwanda’s real role.

And if they do both sign, she believes the concept of operations burdens the DRC much more than Rwanda, as neutralising the FDLR will be difficult, not least because it’s so intertwined with other forces in eastern DRC.

She is also dismayed at how weakly the international community has responded to Rwanda’s brazen invasion of DRC. Thomas-Greenfield called on Rwanda to ‘immediately remove its surface-to-air missile systems from North Kivu and cease GPS signal interference, which have effectively grounded MONUSCO air operations, not to mention endangered the lives of UN and humanitarian personnel, as well as countless civilians.’

It is astounding that the US and others can so blithely accuse Rwanda of conducting such substantive military operations in eastern DRC, yet seem so helpless to stop it. Thomas-Greenfield’s remarks suggest that MONUSCO has largely become a spectator to the drama. And so, it seems, has the Southern African Development Community Mission in DRC. Though both might have played some small role in constraining the M23.

It is likely that both will be pinning their hopes more than others on Lourenço to resolve the crisis diplomatically. MONUSCO’s mandate is about to expire on 20 December, and the UNSC has begun negotiations to renew it.

But the relative lack of attention paid to it at this week’s UNSC meeting raises the question of how much it is contributing to the resolution of the crisis anyway.

Written by Peter Fabricius, Consultant, ISS Pretoria