This paper discusses the relevance of the relations between terrorist and criminal groups in West Africa. In the last two decades, West Africa has been marked by a sharp increase in terrorist activities, and groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Al-Dine, Ansaru, Boko Haram and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) have all conducted several attacks. Simultaneously, this region has seen an unprecedented level of criminal activities and the presence of several organised crime syndicates and drug cartels, becoming a hub for the trafficking of drugs. Framing the relationship between terrorist and criminal groups is therefore relevant in order to understand possible future peace and security developments in West Africa.

The first part of this paper points out which criminal activities affect the region, looking in particular at drug trafficking, arms smuggling and kidnappings. Furthermore, it aims to assess the features of the regional environment that can favour their proliferation and the linkage between different actors. The second part of the paper analyses the involvement of terrorist organisations in criminal activities, their relations with criminal networks and how these can benefit them or alter their behaviour. Understanding the degree to which terrorist organisations are involved in criminal activities or are cooperating with criminal networks can be complex, since actors always try to conceal their involvement in these kinds of activities, therefore obtaining precise data can be very difficult. However, despite these difficulties, some conclusions about the relevance of the terror-crime nexus can be drawn.

West Africa: Permissive environment and the rise of criminal activities

Both criminal groups and terrorist organisations take advantage of the environment in which they operate. In this respect, West Africa can be defined as a permissive environment: this region is widely characterised by weak states and instability, which these groups can exploit by way of legal and illegal means to fund their activities. In addition, the region presents a vast informal economy, which could amount to 60-70% of total regional GDP, and the existence of a cash-based economy can undoubtedly facilitate criminals and terrorists.⁽²⁾

Several West African states can be described as failing states, marked by weak judicial structures, a high level of corruption, an inability to secure the borders and their territory and a lack of legitimacy of their political institutions. Since 2000, eight coups (in Cote D’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania and Niger), two attempted coups (Mauritania), three civil wars (Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone) and an assassination of one president (President Vera of Guinea Bissau in March 2009) have taken place. According to the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index 2013, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Niger and Nigeria are ranked among the 20 worst states in the world, with terrible performances related to all the indicators associated with the index.⁽³⁾

West Africa’s poor economy certainly benefits both criminal networks and terrorist groups, which can exploit widespread poverty in order to recruit unemployed young people. The demography of the region is also relevant since the majority of the population is under the age of 20 and feelings of anger and resentment against government are widespread. In 2005, the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), Kofi Annan, highlighted this problem, asserting that unemployment “is the cause of destructive and self-destructive behaviour, ranging from activity in neighbourhood gangs to local militias membership where unemployed young people desperately seek not only income, but also recognition and a sense of identity.”⁽⁴⁾ The situation could become even worse, since the population is expected to grow rapidly in the next years while resources and healthcare are likely to diminish. For this reason, the possibility of an increase in the number of criminal gangs should not be underestimated, especially in urban spaces where traditional forms of authority are getting weaker. These criminal gangs could come to play a role in controlling protection rackets and the distribution of drugs, developing a strong linkage with wider criminal networks.⁽⁵⁾

Over the last decade, the region has been marked by a growing level of criminal activities, ranging from drug trafficking and arms smuggling to kidnappings for ransom. West Africa has particularly been affected by drug trafficking and has recently attracted the interest of Latin American traffickers. Although West Africa has shown a certain level of drug trade for decades, since the mid-2000s Latin American criminal organisations have increasingly begun to focus on this area to transform it into a transit hub to transport cocaine to Europe.

The region has several characteristics seen as particularly useful by organised crime. West Africa is strategically located between suppliers of drugs in South America and consumers in Europe and has a long tradition of smuggling and banditry. In addition, the area of Sahel is a wide area of ungoverned space that allows these groups to operate with few risks. Drugs, especially cocaine, enter this region mainly transported by sea (there are over 200 ports in the area, often dedicated to local and regional traffic but also to international trade), with Lagos (Nigeria), Abidjan (Cote D’Ivoire), Dakar (Senegal) and Douala (Cameroon) as the most important docking points. Drugs are then transported to North Africa using trafficking routes in Chad, Nigeria and Mali, many of them very similar to those used to transport salt in the past, thanks to a certain level of cooperation among Latin American traffickers, local criminal networks and terrorist organisations. Apart from cocaine, another major flow of drug concerns Moroccan cannabis resin transported to Libya, Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula. The Mauritanian intelligence claimed that most of this drug smuggling likely affects the Sahel region in order to avoid the transportation through the Algerian-Moroccan border, with Algerian army officers controlling the smuggling until northern Mali and criminal networks from Malian Arab communities controlling it in northern Mali and Niger towards Libya.⁽⁶⁾ It is worth noting that even political rulers and officials are often involved in the smuggling of drugs. A case in point is Guinea Bissau, which is often described as a ‘narco-state’, where the former president, Bernardo Vieira, and his Army Chief of Staff, General Tagme Na Waie, assassinated in 2009, were involved in criminal activities related to drug trade.

Beyond drug trafficking, the region is also affected by a combination of other criminal activities that draw the attention of both criminals and terrorist organisations. Cigarette smuggling can be considered as a forerunner of modern drug smuggling, often sharing the same routes, and is still a profitable business. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, former AQIM military commander and now leader of the group Al-Murabitoun, is believed to have run a vast cigarette racket in the Sahara region (for this reason he has been called “Mr Marlboro”). The proliferation of small arms and light weapons has a strong impact on the stability of the region since it facilitates several other criminal activities such as drug trafficking, kidnappings of civilians, and robberies. Previous conflicts, porous borders and easy movement of cash facilitate the spread of small arms across borders and, in the last year, arms smuggling has particularly increased because of the influx of weapons and fighters from Libya. Other criminal activities thriving in the region are the smuggling of migrants, fraudulent medicines, timber, petroleum, diamonds and ivory. These smuggling activities are all favoured by nomadic groups and transnational criminal ethnic networks with a high familiarity with the terrain and whose members can move freely across national borders and cooperate with terrorist organisations.

Criminal networks and terrorist/rebel groups: What kind of relationship?

Several groups operating in West Africa, such as the militant groups in the region of the Niger Delta, the Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de la Casamace in Senegal, Boko Haram, AQIM, and Hezbollah (which operates in the region to raise funds), seem to be increasingly directly involved in criminal activities. At the same time, they have often cooperated opportunistically with international or regional criminal networks. Cooperation between organised crime and terrorism is more likely to occur in regions where a large shadow economy exists, since this environment makes the financing through criminal activities less dangerous: in this regard, West Africa seems to be a case in point.⁽⁷⁾ In addition, terrorist groups can exploit the large shadow and illicit economy to gain the support of the population by assuring protection and an improvement of living conditions. Terrorist and rebel groups can therefore obtain what Vanda Felbab-Brown defines as political capital, gaining legitimacy and support from the local population, which could be willing to provide rebels and terrorists with supplies and intelligence.⁽⁸⁾

AQIM is deeply involved in criminal activities, such as cigarette and arms smuggling, drug trafficking and extortion, and has been able to develop a wide cooperation with criminal networks. AQIM and its offshoot, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) are involved in drug trafficking and some of its members belong to both AQIM and criminal networks. The organisation has also likely imposed transit fees on drug smugglers or has guaranteed protection to smuggling convoys through northern Mali.⁽⁹⁾ A Financial Action Task Force (FATF) report provides evidence of the involvement in drug trafficking, citing several cases of men arrested for transporting drugs on behalf of AQIM. There is also increasing evidence of the relations between AQIM and Latin American drug cartels.⁽¹⁰⁾ In December 2009, for example, two members of AQIM were arrested while protecting shipments of cocaine for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in return for a portion of the profits, while Mauritanian authorities have also highlighted that in 2010 members of the group provided security for a convoy of cocaine.⁽¹¹⁾ This relationship benefits both actors: the cartels take advantage of new smuggling routes and of the protection for shipments, while AQIM has found new sources of funding, acquired new capabilities and expanded the activities beyond its traditional area of operation. AQIM and other groups are taking advantage of the ethnic division within the region, developing strong ties in the Sahel with local tribes by marrying (for instance, the north-western village of Taoudéni in Mali has been marked by a very high number of marriages between Malians and AQIM members), in order to obtain protection for their smuggling activities.⁽¹²⁾

AQIM has recently expanded its activities engaging in the kidnapping industry, which is probably its most important source of revenue. The number of kidnappings has sharply increased in the last years and cooperation between criminals and terrorist organisations seems to be evident, with local criminals often conducting the kidnappings and then transferring the hostages to terrorists. Criminal groups earn money selling the hostages to AQIM’s battalions, which are then able to gain a bigger amount of money. Lacker asserts that between 2008 and 2012 AQIM has collected between US$ 40 million and US$ 65 million as ransom.

It is worth noting that AQIM is formed by several divisions, called katibas, which operate rather independently and present rival leaders. These divisions can carry out criminal activities without the consent of the central leadership, while drug trafficking and kidnappings for ransom can help the katibas to assert their operational independence and mark their own territory. The Northern katiba led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar was assumed to be especially connected with drug trafficking and kidnappings, and the disapproval in certain occasions by AQIM leader Droudkel may have prompted Belmokhtar to create the Moulathamoun battalion and, later, the group Al-Murabitoun. In the same vein, Yahia Abu Amar Abid Hammadou (also known as Abdelhamid Abu Zeid, killed in February 2013) led the AQIM division in north-eastern Algeria, which was particularly involved in kidnappings and was therefore one of the richest divisions.

The role played by criminal groups and the importance of the relations arising from kidnappings has been evident during the conflict in Mali in 2012. The alliance between Tuareg rebel leader Iyad ag Ghali and members of the Ifoghas tribes with AQIM has largely revolved around previous relations built during ransom negotiations since 2003. Money coming from ransoms enabled AQIM to emerge as a crucial player and to tip the balance between ag Ghaly’s Ansar Al-dine and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) during the conflict.

Although not engaged in military operations in West Africa, Hezbollah is also exploiting the region to raise funds by way of drug trafficking, money laundering and diamonds trade, taking advantage of the Lebanese Diaspora along the coast of West Africa. In addition, Hezbollah has set up several front companies with the aim of raising funds and covering illicit activities.⁽¹³⁾ In Sierra Leone, for instance, the Lebanese community plays an important role in diamond trafficking and provides Hezbollah with support and cover.⁽¹⁴⁾ Although the leader of Hezbollah Nasrallah has denied any involvement so as not to damage Hezbollah’s image as an anti-corruption group, a lot of money has been raised through criminal activities, money which is usually transferred to Lebanon to fund Hezbollah’s activities. This money can also allow Hezbollah to maintain a degree of independence from Iran.

Another group deeply involved in criminal activities is Boko Haram in Nigeria. As shown by a FATF report, members of Boko Haram confessed that the organisation is involved in arms smuggling and is cooperating with groups outside Nigeria for the acquisition of arms.⁽¹⁵⁾ In several occasions, the group has used women to deliver arms, since they are generally less controlled by security forces because of Islamic tenets that prohibit physical contact with girls. Boko Haram also takes advantage of belonging to a common ethnic identity which facilitates cross-border smuggling: members of Boko Haram are mostly ethnic Kanuri which are present also in north-eastern Nigeria, northern Cameroon, south-eastern Niger, and south-western Chad, where the bases of activity of Boko Haram are located. Boko Haram has also increased its involvement in kidnappings and bank robberies. The organisation has robbed several banks and cash-in transit convoys in the regions of Maiduguri and Bauchi, earning between 500 million to 1 billion Nigerian naira (between US$ 3 million to US$ 6 million).⁽¹⁶⁾ The group has also been involved in kidnappings for ransom, also threatening Nigerian officials with the abduction of their wives and children. It seems likely that the vast amount of money earned could have caused rivalries among different factions of the groups, as testified by the creation of the splinter group of Boko Haram, Ansaru, responsible for several kidnappings.⁽¹⁷⁾

Other rebel or terrorist groups have been involved in criminal activities, taking advantage of the West African permissive environment. For example, the Tuareg insurgency has raised funds through cigarette smuggling, drug smuggling and kidnappings, while Casamace rebels are involved in cannabis trafficking, cigarette smuggling and arms smuggling.⁽¹⁸⁾ In the same vein, vast evidence exists that in the Niger Delta militants often exchange oil for weapons with several criminal gangs, while in Cote d’Ivoire rebels are assumed to have purchased weapons with money coming from the sale of stolen cocoa.⁽¹⁹⁾

West Africa illustrates how the distinction between terrorist and rebel organisations and criminal networks can sometimes be blurred due to the overlap of tactics, needs and aims. At the same time, some individuals may be active both in criminal groups and in terrorist organisations, while a process of mutual learning seems to have developed. The vast majority of terrorist groups in West Africa belong to a grey area between pure ideological and political groups and criminal groups, and they can be considered as hybrid organisations. The involvement in the illicit economy can contribute to modify the characteristics and the membership of the groups, making them more fragmented and composed mostly of individuals driven more by economic interests which can be obtained thanks to smuggling, kidnapping and extortion. As pointed out by a wide range of literature investigating the crime-rebellion nexus, once an insurgent group becomes involved in illegal activities, its resources, aims, membership and identity can be affected. According to Svante Cornell, for example, the involvement of insurgents in the production and trafficking of narcotics is bound to reduce rebel incentives to seek a negotiated solution, making the conflict more difficult to resolve.⁽²⁰⁾

Terrorist groups and criminality: Worrying trends

This paper has illustrated how the relationship between terrorists and criminal groups can take different forms, depending on the circumstances and on the opportunities provided by the social, political and economic environment. On the whole, there are signs of a growing symbiosis between terrorist groups and criminal networks. Although the relations appear to be very dynamic and the alliances fluid, the cooperation between criminal groups and terrorist organisations seems to benefit both parts. On the one hand, criminal groups can obtain protection and security, taking advantage of insurgent military capabilities and of a situation of greater instability, which is the ideal condition for the proliferation of illegal activities. On the other hand, terrorists can obtain economic resources, and avoid carrying out military operations with the only aim to obtain weapons and ammunition, avoiding high risks. Terrorist groups can also obtain different kinds of support (intelligence, cover) and exploit criminal specialists to receive help for money laundering, document forgery, corruption and other criminal activities.

Apart from cooperating with criminal networks, West African groups seem increasingly directly involved in criminal activities, which have provided them with economic resources, political power and influence. In this sense, these groups tend to be hybrid organisations. Without entering the diatribe between greed and grievances, it is important to note that even in the case where terrorists and rebels are driven by ideology and not by economic interests, predation and criminal activities may be revealed as the only strategy to financially support them. The involvement in the illicit economy can contribute to modify the membership and the incentives of these groups and, in the long run, this could markedly affect their behaviour and make it more difficult to end conflicts and reach negotiated solutions.

Written by Diego Cordano ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Diego Cordano is an intern at CAI. Contact Diego through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Conflict & Terrorism Unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Nicky Berg.
(2) ‘Terrorist financing in West Africa’, Financial Action Task Force report, October 2013, http://www.fatf-gafi.org.
(3) The Fund for Peace website, http://ffp.statesindex.org.
(4) ‘Youth unemployment and regional insecurity in West Africa’, United Nations Office for West Africa Issue Papers, 2006, http://www.iydd.org.
(5) Richard Norton refers to ‘feral cities’, where the state is no longer able to exert control and provide the population with adequate resources. Richard, N., 2003. Feral cities. Naval War College Review, 56(4), pp. 97-106.
(6) Lacker, W., ‘Organized crime and conflict in the Sahel-Sahara region’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 September 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org.
(7) Shelley, L., 2005. The unholy trinity: Transnational crime, corruption, and terrorism. Brown Journal of International Affairs, 11(2), pp.101-111.
(8) Felbab-Brown, V., 2010. Shooting up: Counterinsurgency and the war on drugs. Brookings Institute Press: Washington D.C.
(9) Lacker, W., ‘Organized crime and conflict in the Sahel-Sahara region’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 September 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org.
(10) ‘Terrorist financing in West Africa’, Financial Action Task Force report, October 2013, http://www.fatf-gafi.org.
(11) Rollins, J. and Wyler L., 2010. International terrorism and transnational crime: security threat, U.S. policy and considerations for Congress. Congressional Research Service: Washington D.C.
(12) Thornberry, W. and Levy, J., ‘Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’, Center for Strategic & International Studies, AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series, September 2011, https://csis.org.
(13) Afokpa, V., 2013. Regional profits: The rise of hybrid terrorism in West Africa, Unpublished master’s thesis, Stanford University, http://iis-db.stanford.edu.
(14) Berdal, M. and Serrano, M., (eds.), 2002. Transnational organized crime and international security: business as usual? Lynne Rienner: Boulder.
(15) ‘Terrorist financing in West Africa’, Financial Action Task Force report, October 2013, http://www.fatf-gafi.org.
(16) Afokpa, V., 2013. Regional profits: The rise of hybrid terrorism in West Africa, Unpublished master’s thesis, Stanford University, http://iis-db.stanford.edu; Rinim, H., ‘Boko Haram, armed robbers attack 100 bank branches’, This Day Live, 10 December, 2011, http://www.thisdaylive.com.
(17) ‘Boko Haram: Growing threat to the U.S. homeland’, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, 13 September 2013, http://homeland.house.gov.
(18) ‘The nexus between small arms and light weapons and money laundering and terrorist financing in West Africa’, GIABA report, 2013, http://web.giaba.org.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Cornell, S., 2005. The interaction of narcotics and conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 42(6), pp. 751-760.