Coups in the Sahel set a discouraging precedent for whether Madagascar's military leader will leave office in two years.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has taken a gamble in not suspending Madagascar for the ‘coupvolution’ that deposed president Andry Rajoelina on 12 October 2025 and brought Colonel Michael Randrianirina to power.

Randrianirina assumed control after weeks of service delivery demonstrations by Gen Z protesters and others. When his elite Army Corps of Personnel and Administrative and Technical Services (CAPSAT) military unit suddenly switched sides, Rajoelina fled.

High Constitutional Court President Florent Rakotoarisoa said the presidential office was vacant and transferred power to Randrianirina. Since power was handed to him by the court, SADC did not suspend Madagascar – as it had in 2009 when Rajoelina ousted president Marc Ravalomanana in what was then deemed a coup. Ironically, CAPSAT was also behind that overthrow.

The African Union (AU) however was quite clear that an unconstitutional change of government had occurred, and suspended Madagascar.

The country’s constitution says that if a president abandons power, the High Constitutional Court declares the presidency vacant and ‘the functions of the Head of State are exercised by the President of the Senate.’

At the time of the crisis, that would have been General Richard Ravalomanana, a Rajoelina ally. But Ravalomanana was ‘unavailable’ after the Senate removed him, saying it was responding ‘to the Malagasy people’s aspirations for stability, justice, and transparent governance.’ The High Constitutional Court used this institutional vacuum to justify ‘inviting’ Randrianirina to take the presidency.

Randrianirina promised to restore democratic civilian government within 18-24 months and announced a national consultation on how to get there. That reassured SADC, which invited him to a virtual summit in December.

The summit urged Randrianirina to ‘initiate a Malagasy-owned and -led inclusive national dialogue during the transitional period, to pave the way for fresh elections, and facilitate the peaceful return of political exiles.’ It directed him to submit a dialogue readiness report and a draft transition roadmap by 28 February 2026, which he did. The 24-month transition timetable plans presidential elections in 2027.

But will Randrianirina meet the deadline? The continental precedents are not encouraging. There has been a rash of coups this decade, mainly in West Africa. The military juntas that seized power have largely promised a return to elections and civilian rule within specified timelines – then missed those deadlines.

In Mali, military officers seized power in coups led by Colonel Assimi Goïta in 2020 and 2021. He repeatedly promised to hold elections but then postponed them. Last July, Mali’s transitional parliament granted Goïta a five-year presidential term, renewable ‘as many times as necessary’ without the need for elections.

Burkina Faso experienced two coups in 2022, the second by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who initially pledged to restore civilian rule by July 2024. In May 2024 he extended military rule by five years and declared himself eligible to run for president.

In Niger, General Abdourahamane Tiani seized power in July 2023, ousting Mohamed Bazoum. Tiani proposed a return to democracy within three years, but was sworn in as president under a new charter in March 2025, initiating a five-year transition.

Like in Madagascar, the jury’s still out in Guinea-Bissau, where the military under General Horta Inta-A Na Man seized power in November 2025. Elections have been scheduled for December 2026.

In some cases, junta leaders have eventually allowed elections, but run for office themselves, violating the AU rule that forbids coup leaders from doing so.

In Gabon, for instance, General Brice Oligui Nguema staged a coup in 2023, promising a swift return to civilian rule. He delayed until April 2025, when he ran for elections and won in a 94.9% landslide.

Similarly in Guinea, after leading a 2021 coup, Colonel Mamady Doumbouya promised a two-year transition and elections in 2024. He extended this by a year, after which polls were held under dubious conditions. He ran for president and won by a landslide.

And in Chad, military officer Mahamat Déby took power after his father’s death in 2021. He promised a transition to democracy but ran for president and won in 2024 without meeting democratic conditions.

Will Madagascar be any different?

A concern shared by SADC and the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) is that the dialogue process to restore civilian rule should be inclusive. Important unilateral actions by Randrianirina question his commitment to the transition, including his appointment of an unpopular prime minister and his abrupt firing of the new prime minister and the entire cabinet.

Writing for Foreign Policy in November, political scientists Salah Ben Hammou and Jonathan Powell described Madagascar’s 2025 transfer of power as a ‘coupvolution’ – a popular revolution culminating in a coup.

They said in similar instances elsewhere, protesters had initially welcomed the military’s support for their revolutions, but were disappointed when the military ignored their demands, simply entrenching itself in power. Egypt in 2013 and Sudan in 2019 were examples.

Similarly, after the Sahelian coups, civilians welcomed the ousting of unpopular leaders, but then became disillusioned. Hammou and Powell said in Madagascar, protesters were now experiencing ‘buyer’s remorse’ because of Randrianirina’s unilateral government appointments, which raised familiar fears that their revolution had been hijacked.

Having elected to not suspend Madagascar, SADC has incurred a special responsibility to be ultra-vigilant in monitoring Randrianirina’s adherence to the agreed roadmap – and should be ready to suspend the country if he does not.

Written by Peter Fabricius, Consultant, ISS Pretoria