From its nascent status as a bona fide global power, India is expanding to protect its vital interests, and necessary to achieve this expansion is the control of sea lines of communication and strategic awareness of maritime affairs far beyond its territorial boundaries.⁽²⁾ India’s power projection into Africa has centred on the Indian Ocean, particularly its African archipelagos and the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa, escalating and strengthening its relations and involvement in these areas since piracy attacks attracted global attention in 2008.⁽³⁾

This CAI paper discusses the evolution of the Indian navy’s unique relationship with Africa in recent years and how it may develop in the future as it continues its “look West” strategy in aiming to expand its political sphere of influence through its naval operations in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, India’s rise as a naval power has been driven partly as a reactionary measure to the ever-increasing blue water capabilities of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N)⁽⁴⁾ and the uneasy relationship that exists between the two nations is examined in the context of its relevance to and impact on the African continent.

Sphere of influence, anti-piracy measures and India’s trade links with East Africa

India’s emergence as an economic power in recent times is well documented. The build-up of its naval capability, which began in earnest in the late 1990s, has been driven by economic needs for trade expansion and access to resources to serve a large and rapidly growing population. The increase in piracy attacks off the Somali coast in 2008 served as a catalyst for recent expansion as they began to hurt India’s trade (along with other nations) within the region and indeed further afield.⁽⁵⁾

India’s increased aggressiveness in tackling piracy played no small part in the significant drop in piracy attacks off the east African coast since 2012,⁽⁶⁾ attributed to the role of international navy co-ordinations and increased private security measures. In 2011 India had captured more pirates than any other state except Puntland.⁽⁷⁾ Although absent from certain international co-operative ventures off the east African coast,⁽⁸⁾ India’s involvement in initiatives such as the “Shared Awareness and De-Confliction” (SHADE) mechanism in which the Indian navy interacts with representatives from other navies and shares maritime and surveillance information, and the India-Africa Forum Summit, which focused on maritime security co-operation as key for trade relations, has led to successful inroads in combating piracy, illegal fishing and dumping in recent years.

From the perspective of India and its African trading partners, the importance of co-operation in the maritime sphere is clear considering existing and potential trade figures – an estimated US$ 100 billion trade target was set at the India-Africa Trade Ministers meeting in 2013.⁽⁹⁾ Trade plays a central part in India’s expansion and as it is facilitated largely via maritime channels with countries along the east coast of Africa, the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa, India’s naval expansion can be observed through its collaboration with individual African economies as well.

The extensive bilateral ties established with island nations such as Mauritius and Seychelles attest to the Indian government’s acknowledgement of the strategic importance of these locations vis-à-vis India’s naval aspirations in the Indian Ocean. The Indian navy has patrolled the former’s exclusive economic zone since 2003,⁽¹⁰⁾ highlighting its recognised geostrategic potential half a decade prior to India’s recent surge in power projection. India has also enjoyed diplomatic ties with the 115 island archipelagic state of the Seychelles since 1976, and currently Indian warships dock and refill in Seychelles during training exercises and routine patrols along the African coast.⁽¹¹⁾ It is little wonder India continues to view the Seychelles as a key part of its blue water expansion considering the sheer size of its economic zone.⁽¹²⁾ Donations of maritime fleet stock such as the Trinket-class large naval patrol boat Topaz and the provision of training to the Seychelles Coast Guard ⁽¹³⁾ along with other naval assistance such as conducting hydrographic surveys,⁽¹⁴⁾ point to India’s continued commitment to strong relations with the islands. India is clearly highly cognisant of access to the islands’ untapped marine resources and their geostrategic status as a “regional hub”⁽¹⁵⁾ in the Indian Ocean.

Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti represent the chief coastal avenues for trade in East Africa. The Indian navy acknowledged this through its presence to “deter” piracy attacks in the region. It has deepened relations by showing its flag through engaging in flotilla missions around the Gulfs of Aden and Oman and the Horn of Africa. These missions have gone as far north as the Mediterranean Sea.⁽¹⁶⁾ India is increasingly looking to East Africa as a source of oil despite its already extensive involvement in oil fields in Sudan and Egypt, and continued naval presence and co-operation with east African countries should be expected. The building of India’s super port at Karwar, expected to finish by 2020, which will help to extend its influence around the horn of Africa,⁽¹⁷⁾ is evidence of this long term thinking. Despite criticism that African countries are often not involved in multinational patrolling operations and initiatives off their own coast,⁽¹⁸⁾ India continues to develop naval and political relations with countries along the east African coast. Since India’s anti-piracy patrolling began off the Somali coast in 2008, bilateral trade has developed significantly between the two countries, with a 30% increase between 2012 and 2013 alone.⁽¹⁹⁾ Economic ties would be expected to increase in the future if Somalia becomes more politically stable. Signs of this have begun to appear since 2013,⁽²⁰⁾ signalling good prospects for mutual co-operation between the two nations.

India may, however, encounter problems expanding their blue water capabilities vis-à-vis east Africa. Despite increasing trade links and a slight stabilisation of the political situation in Somalia,⁽²¹⁾ maritime criminality and illegal operations do not appear to be subsiding along with the drop in piracy attacks. This would seem due in part to underhand dealings and even the outright facilitation of criminal networks by some African state officials, as highlighted by an incident a number of years ago when Kenyan officials claimed that military equipment on board a Ukrainian vessel which had been captured by pirates off the Somali coast was purchased by their security forces. It was later discovered that the equipment had been bound for South Sudan and was not intended for Kenya at all.⁽²²⁾ Illicit smuggling networks operating in Kenya and the east coast have linked government officials to groups such as Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda⁽²³⁾ which underscores the difficulty India may have in trusting African officials to co-operate in tackling illegal operations and to protect their investments against security risks. Irritating, no doubt, to the Indian naval elite is the fact that Kenya possesses the largest maritime fleet of the East African nations, giving it hegemonic rule along the coast as far north as the Horn of Africa. However, such power brings corruption and a potential threating of the stability of an already volatile region.⁽²⁴⁾

As India seeks to develop trade links with Somalia in particular, it may find itself hindered by the fact that Kenyan officials have control over certain ports that are within the sovereign jurisdiction of Somalia. For one thing, revenue collected by these officials, which would otherwise be going to the Somali government, and essentially, back to India via trade, is lost. Since volatility leads to the inefficient use of naval forces and, judging by the above example, opportunity costs for trade, it is clear that a stable East Africa is vital to India’s interests. Of course an increase in political stability in East Africa combined with drops in piracy will not necessarily pave the way for economic growth and development vis-à-vis trade with India and others, as unexpected knock-on effects may occur.⁽²⁵⁾ In effect, the levels of illegal activity and those involved may remain unchanged but the nature of such activity may evolve.

India and China’s uneasy maritime relationship and the role of Africa

China’s relationship with Africa is becoming increasingly complex and intertwined within the political and economic affairs of the continent. In the maritime realm this is important because China has the largest shipbuilding industry in the world.⁽²⁶⁾ Furthermore, it has, like India, become increasingly involved in naval collaborations with international and African fleets, and in a similar vein, aims to extend its blue water sphere of influence to strengthen its global reach and consolidate its superpower status.

The co-operation of China with arch rivals India and Japan ⁽²⁷⁾ has surprised many and, considering China’s traditional standoffishness towards these nations, highlights a shift in the countries’ attitudes towards each other. However, this co-operation notwithstanding; when it comes to sea power in the Indian Ocean the relationship between Beijing and New Delhi remains uneasy as the largest Asian investors in Africa compete for trade, resources and political, military and even social influence on the continent. China has huge long term investments in Africa and accordingly needs secure sea lines of communication from East Africa to its southern coast. India may therefore be well advised to remember the famous warning - ironically often misattributed to the infamous Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu – to “keep your friends close and your enemies closer” and to treat any political or naval outreach from the PLA-N with caution.

Conclusion

India’s sea power projection is continually expanding. Its place in the global naval pecking order has increased in recent years and it can now be considered a bona fide global power in the blue water sense. India’s awareness of the strategic importance of African maritime territories and its commitment to an increasing naval stronghold is clear. Many commentators see the primary objective of India’s increased naval diplomacy with East Africa as balancing China’s influence ⁽²⁸⁾ without resorting to more direct confrontation. China’s extraordinary focus on investing in Africa in return for access to resources, and the speed at which this is occurring, has certainly been a catalyst for India’s blue water expansion westwards over the last fifteen years.

It remains to be seen whether tensions with China will lessen, however, the uneasy relationship between the two powers holds many positives for Africa’s development, as both countries attempt to ingratiate themselves to gain a stronger foothold on the continent. The competitive nature of both countries’ expansions holds great promise for African states; the balance of power leads to certain stability throughout the sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean and African coast, despite obvious tensions. Such collaboration and increased naval monitoring has led to a decrease in piracy attacks, illegal fishing and illegal dumping, all of which cost Africa dearly in economic terms each year. Furthermore, China and India’s increase in diplomatic and economic ties with African countries, in an attempt for each to counteract the other’s sphere of influence, leads to continued investment in trade and development of infrastructure. African countries such as Somalia, Djibouti, Seychelles and Mauritius have already benefitted from the security, infrastructure, training and equipment provided by the Indian navy and diplomatic relations and economic ties have also flourished as a result.

India’s long term development of its blue water capabilities is thus something that Africa can embrace and despite cynicism towards India and China’s motives for co-operation, there can be no doubt that this co-operation will continue to reap positive rewards for the African continent as the twenty first century progresses.

Written by Greg Ryan ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Greg Ryan is a Research Associate with CAI with an interest in international relations. Contact Greg through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Asia Dimension Unit ( asia.dimension@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Nicky Berg. Research Manager: Claire Furphy.
(2) Zur, Y., Magal, T. and Kedem, N, 2012. The growing power of the Indian Navy: Westward bound, Military and Strategic Affairs, 4 (3), pp. 101-116.
(3) ‘India’s string of pearls’, Maritime Security Asia, 23 September 2011, http://maritimesecurity.asia.
(4) Sethi, S., ‘Indian Navy: The quest for blue waters’, Indian Defence Review, 14 June 2014, http://www.indiandefencereview.com.
(5) At the height of the piracy epidemic in 2011, it is alleged that several ships per week were being hijacked off the east African coast and attackers often demanded ransom payments worth millions of US dollars. In addition, premiums to insure ships surged to offset the increasing risk of loss of goods or delays in transit. See Apps, P., ‘Have hired guns finally scuppered Somali pirates?’, Reuters, 12 February 2013, http://www.reuters.com; Kaburo, N., ‘Somali piracy drops significantly amid foreign navy intervention’, Xinhuanet Africa News, 15 January 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english.
(6) The International Chamber of Commerce’s (ICC) International Maritime Bureau (IMB) revealed that there were only 15 incidents in 2013, compared to 75 in 2012 and 237 in 2011. Kaburo, N., ‘Somali piracy drops significantly amid foreign navy intervention’, Xinhuanet Africa News, 15 January 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english.
(7) ‘Watch out pirates, here comes the Indian Navy’, Somalia Report, 19 April 2011, http://www.somaliareport.com.
(8) Notably the Cutlass Express multinational exercises which have taken place annually since 2011. See ‘Eight navies complete East African exercise Cutlass Express 2012, The Maritime Executive, 8 November 2012, http://www.maritime-executive.com; Miles, D., ‘Exercise boosts maritime interoperability in East Africa’, U.S Department of State website, 13 November 2103, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov.
(9) ‘India-Africa to work towards securing bilateral ties’, DNAIndia, 13 January 2014, http://www.dnaindia.com.
(10) Ibid.
(11) ‘India has given Seychelles a maritime patrol aircraft for war against pirates’, Oceanus Live, 27 March 2013, http://www.oceanuslive.org.
(12) The islands have an exclusive economic zone of a staggering 1.3 million square kilometres. See Basak, S., ‘India – Seychelles: The way ahead’, National Maritime Foundation, 21 June 2014, http://www.maritimeindia.org.
(13) ‘India’s string of pearls’, Maritime Security Asia, 23 September 2011, http://maritimesecurity.asia.
(14) Basak, S., ‘India – Seychelles: The way ahead’, National Maritime Foundation, 21 June 2014, http://www.maritimeindia.org.
(15) Ibid.
(16) Zur, Y., Magal, T. and Kedem, N., 2012. The growing power of the Indian Navy: Westward bound. Military and Strategic Affairs, 4 (3), pp. 101-116.
(17) Lacey, B., ‘India’s super port: Karwar to revolutionise the Indian Navy’, Future Directions International, 18 June 2014, http://www.futuredirections.org.au.
(18) The European Union’s Operation Atalanta, a NATO task force, the Chinese Navy’s task force 529, and Malaysian, Russian and Yemeni task forces do not involve Africans in their operations. See Baker, M.L., 2011. Toward an African maritime economy. Naval War College Review, 64 (2), pp. 39-62.
(19) ‘India – Somalia relations’, Government of India: Ministry of External Affairs website, http://www.mea.gov.in.
(20) Apps, P., ‘Have hired guns finally scuppered Somali pirates?’, Reuters, 12 February 2013, http://www.reuters.com.
(21) Though admittedly this is contentious and the country’s political stability remains extremely precarious.
(22) ‘Fragile Africa cannot maintain maritime security’, The Maritime Executive, 17 June 2014, http://www.maritime-executive.com.
(23) Brass, B., ‘East Africa: More than just pirates’, Centre for International Maritime Security, 9 October 2013, http://cimsec.org.
(24) Ibid.
(25) One example being a suggested increase in inshore racketeering by local fisherman as a result of increased patrols out in the open oceans. Walker, T., ‘African coastal piracy in 2013 – The beginning of the end or the end if the beginning?’, Institute for Security Studies, 28 January 2013, http://www.issafrica.org.
(26) Cohen, S. and McKnight, T., ‘Pirates suddenly emerging against merchant vessels off new coast of Africa, New York Sun, 10 June 2014, http://www.nysun.com.
(27) In 2014 China signed a co-ordinated security and defence agreement with Japan and Djibouti, allowing Chinese and Japanese ships access to the latter’s ports, and invited India to participate in its first ever multilateral maritime exercises. Moreover, in 2012 Chinese, Japanese and Indian naval forces co-operated in escort and patrol duties for international vessels. See, Richards, C., ‘Could China and Japan work together in East Africa?’, The Diplomat, 20 March 2014, http://thediplomat.com; Singh, A., ‘The Indian Navy’s China dilemma’, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 28 April 2014, http://idsa.in; ‘China’s navy gathers good will off Somalia’, International Business Times, 4 July 2012, http://www.ibtimes.com.
(28) Sethi, S., ‘Indian Navy: The quest for blue waters’, Indian Defence Review, 14 June 2014, http://www.indiandefencereview.com.