The history of the African Union (AU) started on 25 May 1963, when its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), was established in Addis Ababa.⁽²⁾ The preamble of the OAU Charter outlined the commitment of member states to collectively establish, maintain and sustain peace and security in Africa, but, at the same time, to defend the norm of non-intervention. The OAU only had the power to intervene in a conflict situation if it was invited by the parties involved in the dispute. Intra-state disputes were seen as a matter of the governments since the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the member states was highly respected.⁽³⁾

In the 1990s, extreme violence in several African states, such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia took place.⁽⁴⁾ The OAU had its hands tied and could not intervene effectively. African countries realised that a change was needed. In March 2001, the representatives of the OAU member states gathered in Sirte, Libya, where they decided to establish a new organisation.⁽⁵⁾ The AU was officially launched at the 2002 Durban Summit.⁽⁶⁾ Its launching was seen as a milestone in the stabilisation of Africa’s peace and security.⁽⁷⁾

This paper presents the AU as the regional organisation whose aim is to establish peace and security on the African continent. It presents the AU’s peculiarity, namely the right to intervention. Furthermore, the paper analyses three of the AU’s missions, namely missions in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia and discusses their success (and failure). It focuses on obstacles that the AU had to overcome to implement its missions. The paper concludes with the findings that the AU is not completely ready to secure peace and security on the continent due to the lack of funding, the nature of the conflicts and the political will of some African leaders.

New hope for peace in Africa

The AU focuses more on the promotion of peace, security and stability and democratic principles, institutions and human rights than its predecessor did.⁽⁸⁾ It is “the world’s only regional or international organisation that explicitly recognises the right to intervene in a member state on a humanitarian and human rights ground.”⁽⁹⁾ The right of intervention derives from the ideal of Pan-Africanism and the principle of non-indifference. Those principles stipulate that African countries can no longer remain indifferent to the conflict and suffering that occurs in their neighbourhoods, and that African countries have the primary responsibility for establishing and maintaining the peace and security architecture on the continent.⁽¹⁰⁾ The right to intervention is legalised in the articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the AU’s Constitutive Act.⁽¹¹⁾ The so-called responsibility to protect is implemented and coordinated by the AU’s security organ, called the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which decides upon intervention with the consensus or a two-thirds majority and cannot be blocked by a veto. The AU’s legitimacy increased with the United Nation’s (UN) recognition.⁽¹²⁾

African Union’s interventions

Since its establishment the AU has launched various missions with different successes. Its first mission was deployed in Burundi. Burundi, in the Great Lakes region, has been experiencing chaos, disorder and massive human rights abuses ever since decolonisation in the 1950s. Burundi’s transition to self-rule was not smooth, and was characterised by ethnic violence ⁽¹³⁾ between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority. Violence grew to genocidal dimensions, and constant tensions between smaller rebel groups and the transitional government occurred.⁽¹⁴⁾ The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was signed in 2000 to consolidate the peace process in the country, but it was not respected.⁽¹⁵⁾ Moreover, a ceasefire agreement was signed in 2002, yet, the fire started even before the ink on the document dried.⁽¹⁶⁾ Those unsuccessful attempts to restore peace in the country led to the launch of the Peace Operation in Burundi (AMIB). It was the first operation wholly initiated, planned and executed by the AU members.⁽¹⁷⁾ In April 2003, the AU dispatched a peacekeeping mission with the task to protect, disarm, demobilise and reintegrate combatants. It consisted of 3,335 troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa and observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia.⁽¹⁸⁾

The mission was described as one of the AU’s biggest success stories, as a shining example of African solutions to African problems.⁽¹⁹⁾ It made concerted efforts to prevent genocidal tendencies in the Great Lakes region, and played a crucial role in the ceasefire negotiations. At the end of the AMIB mission peace was restored to the majority of the Burundi regions, except for the region outside Bujumbura, where armed national liberation forces remained a problem. The troops protected returning politicians who took part in the transnational government, made efforts to integrate former militia into society, supported the disarmament process and created conditions that allowed refugees and internally displaced people to return home. They provided favourable conditions for the United Nations (UN) troops, which joined in 2004.⁽²⁰⁾ But the mission faced several obstacles. There was lack of adequate equipment, food and medicine. Some funds were provided by the European Union (EU), the World Health Organisation, the United Nations Children’s Fund and the German Technical Operation. But the funding came late.⁽²¹⁾ The PSC was instituted in December 2003, and was still coping with lack of managerial capacity and technical knowhow to facilitate the financial and organisational component.⁽²²⁾ For example, it did not effectively distribute all the external donor funds that were allocated to the desperately under-funded mission.⁽²³⁾ And about 4,000 military personnel had to disarm about 20,000 combatants.⁽²⁴⁾ Ethiopia and Mozambique sent their troops later due to the AU’s decision that countries had to finance their own troops. But to some extent, a strong South African commitment to the region made up for a limited contribution from other AU members.⁽²⁵⁾

The real test for the AU came with the crisis in Darfur, where the Arab ‘white’ Sudanese government fought a civil war against the predominantly black population. The government armed the Arab militia, known as the Janjaweeds, to supplement its regular army and to launch raids on the non-Arab population base of potential rebel supporters. In 2003, the non-Arab forces struck back, frustrated with the attacks on their land, and the thinking that their interests were not being represented in the ongoing peace talks between Khartoum and the Southern rebels. Government forces responded even more brutally, and were genocidal in scale.⁽²⁶⁾ According to Pan-Africanism, and due to Sudan’s opposition to the non-African intervention, the African leaders wanted to solve the conflict in Sudan by themselves.

The AU was successful at the beginning. Its Chadian mediation team and the Abuja Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks negotiated the signature of the N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on 8 April 2004 and the Darfur Peace Agreement between the government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army. But its efforts to provide effective security were hampered in many ways. Even though the AU received the funding from Canada, the EU, Germany, Great Britain and the United States of America (USA), the mission was still underfunded. As of May 2007 many peacekeepers had not been paid for months. The AU’s richest countries had to pay for the AU’s regular and peacekeeping budgets. But those departments also have several internal sectors they needed to finance.⁽²⁷⁾ At the beginning AU troops consisted of a few hundred troops and staff, which eventually grew to 7,000, but that was still relatively small in number in relation to the size of the area and the number of soldiers they needed to disarm – 20,000-strong Janjaweed forces that were supported by the 200,000 military troops of the government.⁽²⁸⁾ Moreover, the AU employed its police force, which lacked experience with recruitment, training, operational planning and logistics. The 250 poorly equipped police officers used only four police cars, which forced the AU to conduct fewer controls and diminished its power to protect civilians and the peacekeepers. Furthermore, police officers came from several countries, which caused language barriers among them.⁽²⁹⁾ The AU mission was also unclear due to the different views of the members of the AU about the mission’s purposes and the caution not to diminish the sovereignty of the Sudanese Government.⁽³⁰⁾ The AU members appeared to be highly reluctant to apply diplomatic pressure on Khartoum. Sudan’s President Al-Basir even sought to assume the leadership position within the AU during the Darfur conflict. At the end it was acknowledged that the AU improved a grim security situation in Darfur. But finally it needed to admit its limitation and joined with the UN in a UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).⁽³¹⁾

The next test for the AU was Somalia. Somalia has been torn with widespread conflict for decades. Despite the fact that Somalia is an ethnically homogenous country, it is characterised by a lack of social cohesion and widespread poverty, which translates into instability. The outbreak of the civil war was the last stage in the history of social and political transformations, when several non-state actors were fighting for power.⁽³²⁾ In 2007, the PSC established the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with the purpose to stabilise the situation in the country and to promote dialogue, facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and create conditions for a long-term stabilisation and development in Somalia.⁽³³⁾ AMISOM was first deployed to protect the Transitional Federal Government and strategic infrastructure in Mogadishu from the insurgents who had strengthened their positions when Ethiopian forces withdrew and to provide support for humanitarian assistance for the Somali people. Also, the AU peacekeeping mission to Somalia in 2007 revealed the organisation’s limitations. Later that year, the AU agreed to send a 7,600-strong peacekeeping force to Somalia to resist the Ethiopian troops that invaded the country in December 2006.⁽³⁴⁾ But only 2,700 Ugandans and 2,550 Burundians actually came and left in August 2009.⁽³⁵⁾ Those groups have also been involved in armed confrontation with local groups, which highlighted the inadequacy of the mission’s actions regarding the complexity of the situation.

The mission mostly undertook the peacekeeping tasks that contributed to the maintenance of the status quo, but did not undertake any urgently needed confidence-building measures.⁽³⁶⁾ The mission was also unsuccessful due to the AU member states’ disagreements about the purposes of the mission and breaking of the AU’s rules. Kenya, for example, wanted to extend the AU’s mission to include dealing with terrorist activities. It also mobilised its troops on the border with Somalia, even though the AU prohibited any military interventions by the neighbour states.⁽³⁷⁾ Consequently, the PSC Commissioner had to ask the UN to urgently dispatch a peacekeeping mission to Somalia.⁽³⁸⁾ It was acknowledged that it was unreasonable to expect AMISOM to provide for peace in an extremely challenging environment, due to the weakness of its mandate and lack of means and resources.⁽³⁹⁾

Despite a strong Pan-Africanism, only limited success. Why?

The ideas and principles the AU expresses are noble and progressive. They focus on the protection of the continent’s security rather than the respect of the individual states’ sovereignty.⁽⁴⁰⁾ They reflect the desire to impose African solutions for African problems, pride and a can do’ attitude. They overcame the thinking that the West is responsible for African problems and should, therefore, also solve them.⁽⁴¹⁾ Consequently, it plays an important role in peacekeeping operations. But experts say that the AU has a long way to go before it becomes fully operational, and express concerns about the burdens and expectations that have been placed on it so far.⁽⁴²⁾

The AU, with the extended and ambitious mandate in the field of establishment of peace, is a relatively young organisation. All its missions revealed the same limitations. The AU faces organisational and financial barriers. Endemic poverty, and numerous civil conflicts among its member states severely hinder its functioning. For example, in 2006 only 12 countries paid their yearly contributions. The AU heavily relies on the political and economic support from the regional institutions and the international community, but regional economic institutions also have limited resources and are poorly organised.⁽⁴³⁾ AU missions rely too heavily on the commitment of a few countries, such as South Africa and Nigeria.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Some countries are too poor and too internally devastated by their own conflicts, and cannot afford to participate in other conflicts.⁽⁴⁵⁾ International donors, such as the EU, G8 and the USA are often slow in decision-making and rigid in their decisions about funding.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Moreover, so many external sources endanger the genuine development and self-respect of the AU.⁽⁴⁷⁾ Another criticism about the AU is that its decisions are still very much the subject of the will of its strongest leaders.⁽⁴⁸⁾

The AU missions discussed above did not succeed without the UN’s help. But they achieved some success. They still managed to save many lives.⁽⁴⁹⁾ They demonstrated that even a small mission can make a considerable difference in the peace and stability of the region.⁽⁵⁰⁾ However, “the achievement of new goals is still an aspiration and not a reality,” said Robert O. Collins, an Africa expert and professor of history at the University of California.⁽⁵¹⁾ And despite the likeableness of the slogan ‘African solutions to African problems’, Africa is obviously not totally ready for that. It is true that it succeeded to bring at least relative peace to some countries, as in Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leona and Sudan, in situations when most of the international community did nothing. Yet, the world’s poorest continent cannot solve the world’s most deadly, frequent and widespread of conflicts.⁽⁵²⁾

Written by Petra Pavšič ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Contact Petra Pavšič through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Conflict and Terrorism Unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com). This CAI paper was developed with the assistance of Denine Walters and edited by Nicky Berg.
(2) ‘Transition from the OAU to the African Union’, African Union Summit, http://www.au2002.gov.za.
(3) Murithi, T., 2008. The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia. African Security Review, 17(1), pp. 69-82.
(4) Ibid.
(5) ‘Transition from the OAU to the African Union’, African Union Summit, http://www.au2002.gov.za.
(6) ‘About the African Union’, AllAfrica, http://allafrica.com.
(7) Jeng, A., 2010. Enforcing the African Union peace and security framework in Burundi. Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, 2(8), pp. 116-128.
(8) ‘Transition from the OAU to the African Union’, African Union Summit, http://www.au2002.gov.za.
(9) Hanson, S., ‘The African Union’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, http://www.cfr.org.
(10) Murithi, T., ‘The African Union’s transition from non-intervention to non-indifference: An ad hoc approach to the Responsibility to Protect?’, 2009, http://library.fes.de.
(11) Hanson, S., ‘The African Union’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, http://www.cfr.org.
(12) Akuffo, E.A., 2010. Cooperating for peace and security or competing for legitimacy in Africa? The case of the African Union in Darfur. African Security Review, 19(4), pp. 74-89.
(13) Jeng, A., 2010. Enforcing the African Union peace and security framework in Burundi. Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, 2(8), pp. 116-128.
(14) Rodt, A.P., 2011. The African Mission in Burundi: The successful management of violent ethno-political conflict? Ethnopolitics Papers, 10, pp. 1-27; Jeng, A., 2010. Enforcing the African Union peace and security framework in Burundi. Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, 2(8), pp. 116-128.
(15) Rodt, A.P., 2011. The African Mission in Burundi: The successful management of violent ethno-political conflict? Ethnopolitics Papers, 10, pp. 1-27.
(16) Boshoff, H., ‘Burundi: The African Union's first mission. African security analysis programme situation report’, Institute for Security Studies, 2009, http://www.grandslacs.net.
(17) Murithi, T., 2008. The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia. African Security Review, 17(1), pp. 69-82.
(18) Møller, B., ‘The African Union as security actor: African solutions to African problems?’, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper nr. 57, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk.
(19) Rodt, A.P., 2011. The African Mission in Burundi: The successful management of violent ethno-political conflict? Ethnopolitics Papers, 10, pp. 1-27.
(20) Murithi, T., 2008.The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia. African Security Review, 17(1), pp. 69-82.
(21) Rodt, A.P., 2011. The African Mission in Burundi: The successful management of violent ethno-political conflict? Ethnopolitics Papers, 10, pp. 1-27.
(22) Jeng, A., 2010. Enforcing the African Union peace and security framework in Burundi. Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, 2(8), pp. 116-128.
(23) Rodt, A.P., 2011. The African Mission in Burundi: The successful management of violent ethno-political conflict? Ethnopolitics Papers, 10, pp. 1-27.
(24) Jeng, A., 2010. Enforcing the African Union peace and security framework in Burundi. Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, 2(8), pp. 116-128.
(25) Rodt, A.P., 2011. The African Mission in Burundi: The successful management of violent ethno-political conflict? Ethnopolitics Papers, 10, pp. 1-27.
(26) Keith, A., ‘The African Union in Darfur: An African solution to a global problem?’, http://www.princeton.edu.
(27) Akuffo, E.A., 2010. Cooperating for peace and security or competing for legitimacy in Africa? The case of the African Union in Darfur. African Security Review, 19(4), pp. 74-89.
(28) Nikitin, B.S., 2010. Report: The Positive Impact of African Union Forces on Darfur. Student Pulse, 2(1), pp. 1-3.
(29) Akuffo, E.A., 2010. Cooperating for peace and security or competing for legitimacy in Africa? The case of the African Union in Darfur. African Security Review, 19(4), pp. 74-89.
(30) Nikitin, B.S., 2010. Report: The Positive Impact of African Union Forces on Darfur. Student Pulse, 2(1), pp. 1-3.
(31) Keith, A., ‘The African Union in Darfur: An African solution to a global problem?', http://www.princeton.edu.
(32) Marangio, R., 2012. ‘The Somali crisis: Failed state and international intervention’,  Istituto Affari Internazionali Working Papers 12-15, May 2012, http://www.iai.it.
(33) Murithi, T., 2008. The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia. African Security Review, 17(1), pp. 69-82.
(34) Talbot, A., ‘Somalia: African Union Force agreed’, World Socialist Web Site, 2007, http://www.wsws.org.
(35) Hanson, S., 2009. 'The African Union', http://www.cfr.org.
(36) Marangio, R., 2012. 'The Somali Crisis: Failed State and International Intervention.' Istituto Affari Internazionali Working Papers 12-15, http://www.iai.it.
(37) Mulliro, W., 'Kenya wants aggressive AU intervention in Somalia', AlShahid, 27 July 2010, http://english.alshahid.net.
(38) 'AU Pleads for UN Intervention for Somalia', Voice of America, 27 October 2009, http://www.voanews.com.
(39) Cilliers, J., et al., 2010. 'Somalia: the intervention dilemma'. Institute for Security Studies, Policy Brief10, pp. 1-8.
(40) Hanson, S., 'The African Union’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, http://www.cfr.org.
(41) Møller, B., ‘The African Union as security actor: African solutions to African problems?’, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper nr. 57, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk.
(42) Hanson, S., ‘The African Union’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, http://www.cfr.org.
(43) Ncube, J. and Akena, A.M., ‘A stream cannot rise above its source', Pambazuka News, 22 November 2012, http://www.pambazuka.org.
(44) Møller, B., 'The African Union as security actor: African solutions to African problems?', Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper nr. 57, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk.
(45) Talbot, A., ‘Somalia: African Union Force Agreed’, World Socialist Web Site, 23 January 2007, http://www.wsws.org
(46) Hanson, S., ‘The African Union’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, http://www.cfr.org.
(47) Ncube, J. and Akena, A.M., ‘A stream cannot rise above Its source', Pambazuka News,, 22 November 2012, http://www.pambazuka.org.
(48) Hanson, S., ‘The African Union’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, http://www.cfr.org.
(49) Nikitin, B.S., 2010. Report: The positive impact of African Union Forces on Darfur. Student Pulse, 2(1), pp. 1-3.
(50) Jeng, A., 2010. Enforcing the African Union peace and security framework in Burundi. Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, 2(8), pp. 116-128.
(51) Hanson, S., ‘The African Union’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, http://www.cfr.org.
(52) Møller, B., 'The African Union as security actor: African solutions to African problems?', Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper nr. 57, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk.