This paper addresses the steady disappearance of Lake Chad and continues from an initial exchange of discussions on the Consultancy Africa Intelligence (CAI) LinkedIn Group.⁽²⁾ It starts by setting the scene and providing the (abridged) discussions on the LinkedIn discussion group, followed by a brief reflection on the respective viewpoints. Part 2 of the paper concludes by discussing some of the available pathways for action and smart adaptation.

Setting the scene

Lake Chad, once one of the African continent's largest bodies of fresh water, in the Sahelian zone of west-central Africa at the conjunction of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, used to be approximately 25,000 square kilometres in size (1963). At present, however, less than 10% remains (see Figure 1). It is a situation comparable to the Aral Sea between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. According to experts, several reasons lay cause to this dramatic reduction. For instance, the siphoning-off of water from the rivers that feed the lake and the effects of climate change (evapotranspiration) and desertification. And, not in the least, the vastly increased population (17 million forty years ago, now 30 million) that leads to a disproportional rise in water consumption for domestic use, their livestock and agriculture. This latter reason is of specific concern since any uncontrolled and too-rapid growth of population, in combination with the effects of climate change, will have far reaching consequences for human security and development, and it can lead to political destabilisation, especially in already fragile regions.⁽³⁾ In October 2010, the former Libyan president, Muammar Kaddafi, remarked that Europe should assume a shared responsibility in order to prevent a new flow of migrants across the Mediterranean Sea, which would see many people die during the crossing.

Figure 1: The Disappearance of Lake Chad in Africa ⁽⁴⁾

With this in mind, and looking at the proverbial countdown of Lake Chad disappearing completely, three particular questions need to be addressed. Firstly, how can the conflict potential of possible climate-induced water and food crises be defused? Secondly, how should an increase in climate-induced migration be addressed? And thirdly, how can the need for increased regional cooperation, in the face of a rapidly disappearing Lake Chad, with trans-border consequences be addressed? Adaptation processes and measures can provide some answers to these questions, but require substantial degrees of insight and sensitivity in conflict-prone and political fragile regions.⁽⁵⁾ is paper focuses on the third question, suggesting that an effective regional cooperation with a degree of international assistance may also deliver answers and pathways towards solutions for the other questions.

For Lake Chad, a prestigious plan is on the drawing board to use water from the Ubangi River,⁽⁶⁾ the chief northern tributary of the Congo river to replenish Lake Chad. Investments are assessed in the region of US$ 14.5 billion, of which the international community is expected to be a significant donor. An international donor conference is planned for later in 2013 to gauge the level of financial support available, and what needs to be sourced by the surrounding nations. To that effect, it can only be hoped that the prevailing regional insecurity will not prove to be a major factor to dissuade the remaining ‘Global Cash Donors’ (most notably the BRICS ⁽⁷⁾ nations) to step up to the challenge. Unfortunately, there are already situations of competing interests: the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, has announced a European Union (EU) international aid conference for Mali,⁽⁸⁾ planned for mid-May 2013. And, by way of an early indication of what would be required, the Côte d’Ivoire Foreign Minister, Charles Koffi Diby, indicated that West African nations would need US$ 950 million in aid to sustain and reinforce a military mission to help fight Islamists in Mali.⁽⁹⁾ The list for other urgent financial assistance schemes in fragile states on the African continent does not end here. Closer to Europe, over a million Syrian refugees have sought temporary refuge in neighbouring Lebanon, causing an extreme strain on the Lebanese capacity – and tolerance – to absorb an influx equivalent to over a quarter of their own population. Therefore, how to apportion the financial aid available to where it is needed most, in a manner that is seen to be constructive and fair by the majority of nations, is difficult.

The estimated costs to redress the gloomy future prospects of severe water-stress in the Lake Chad region, if indeed realistic, are phenomenal. Either way, doing nothing would be even more expensive in the long term. This article, therefore, is based on the assumption that past (and successful) adaption by the local population to the declining water level ⁽¹⁰⁾ is now starting to stretch human ingenuity and adaptation to its maximum. Neither does the author believe it is necessary to completely refill the lake to its old levels, where all bordering nations will have an assured access to water, nor is there no longer the looming risk of acute water-stress. In other words, as a first phase, the planned transfer of water from the Ubangi should at least start to balance the foreseen rate of evaporation, natural seepage into the ground and consumption (including human induced wastage). Subsequent, and supporting, phases to further increase the initial flow of water transferred and to serve other beneficial schemes ⁽¹¹⁾ (like irrigation, fish farms, countering evapotranspiration, etc.), should take into account any adverse effects on the then present, established equilibrium, and not necessitate another round of ‘significant adaptation’. Either Lake Chad itself or the Ubangi region will provide the water. Mathematical modelling and simulation are valuable tools to determine the pros and cons of each subsequent phase. To put a timeline on the perceived urgency, a survey by the Canadian firm CIMA-International ⁽¹²⁾ suggests that the lake might disappear completely by 2025 if nothing is done.

The Water Transfer Project

As early as the 1960s, a plan was proposed to divert waters from the Ubangi to the Chari River, which empties into Lake Chad. According to this plan, the water from the Ubangi would revitalise that lake and provide livelihood in fishing and enhanced agriculture to tens of millions of central Africans and Sahelians. Further inter-basin water transfer schemes were proposed in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1994, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) proposed a similar project, and at the March 2008 summit the heads of state of the LCBC member countries committed to the diversion project. In April 2008, the LCBC advertised a request for proposals for a feasibility study.⁽¹³⁾ In August 2009, a special seminar ⁽¹⁴⁾ on Lake Chad was held in Stockholm, Sweden. On 22 February 2010 it was announced that CIMA International of Montreal (Canada) had signed a multi-million dollar contract to do a feasibility study of a project to transfer water from the Ubangi River to Lake Chad. The project was called ‘unusual’ (!) because it calls for regional cooperation between the countries in the Congo Basin and the Lake Chad Basin. It took a further two years to convene in February 2012 for the aforementioned feasibility study and the LCBC Investment Plan.⁽¹⁵⁾

Figure 2: Height difference between Lake Chad and Ubangi River (Hekkens, M.)

The transfer of water from the Ubangi needs to overcome the height differences between the Congo Basin and the Lake Chad Basin. In layman’s terms, making use of existing technologies to overcome a height difference of approximately 200 metres measured between the Ubangi and the highest point of the plateau that separates both basins (see Figure 2). No extreme feats of engineering (like the Suez or Panama projects at their time) are required to achieve this. Furthermore, it is suggested that the use of available local skills and equipment is very well possible for much of the preparatory work.⁽¹⁶⁾ So, why such extreme costs, even taking into account the need to build supporting infrastructure and those measures required (i.e. electricity to power the pumps, service roads, etc.) to get the water across the plateau and then use gravity to flow towards Lake Chad? And, if correct that the project is ‘not too technical’, what are the bottlenecks that prevent decisive action, and are these – as already alluded to – more political than technical? Would the suggested phase 1 not be sufficient, at least to stem future destabilising effects which are perhaps irreversible? Is it fair to say that less than perfect action now is a much better course of action than waiting for the ‘Rolls Royce’ solution (including the necessary funding), with all future eventualities being fully covered?

The initial discussion

This section provides a shortened overview of the initial discussions on the CAI LinkedIn Group.

Marco Hekkens. “Some quick observations. I assume that a further decline of the lake is not a linear event as a result of the combined effects of siphoning off water, climate change, and increasing population. That means that re-distributed water from the Ubangi needs to reach the lake much sooner rather than later. Will everybody in the wider region acknowledge the need to act decisively? Put differently, will an extensive security umbrella be required in order to allow the work to be done without interferences (kidnapping of technicians, stealing of plant and materials, etc.), and what (future) political leverage will be introduced by the nation that controls the start point of the pipeline? Does the project require upsetting existing eco-systems, and run the risk of delays? Where to will local people start to migrate when they no longer maintain faith in completing this miracle well in time, and what additional social-demographic and sub-regional stresses will result? Or can this mega project become a regional unifying theme, that transcends the many existing and future friction points (think extractive industry), and perhaps “by using all available hands to the pumps”, could it also significantly reduce the present, and staggering cost estimate?  We are back to the good (and old) thematic issue of strong, unselfish political leadership required at the highest level!”

Mridulya Narasimhan. “Given the number and magnitude of problems these nations already face (poverty, mutiny, corruption, illicit trade etc.), would their myopic thinking be able to accommodate water-depletion as an 'important enough policy issue?'”

Marco Hekkens. “Using the word 'myopic' does capture your rhetoric question. Another challenge that hampers Africa (but not only Africa), and should be added to your list, is sticking to the long term planning, which is linked to an as much as possible comprehensive (long term) vision. This challenge is understandable, because few are prepared to wait another 20+ years before investments in development and education (to mention only two) truly have matured and deliver the much discussed 'sustainable' progress, and they as individuals will also experience the benefits. Water is a source of life, and fresh, clean potable water to humans is like petrol to a car, you can't do without it. Ignoring that seems an illogic stance. And there ends the analogy because seeking for alternative energy sources seems to be more 'sexy' than safeguarding the globe's fresh water sources (and other eco-systems), at least to some.”

“Going back to Lake Chad, and really stepping outside the box of moderate thinking, a solution might be found through the introduction of a supranational body that is charged to deal with this particular issue. It would operate within an international governance framework, and would need to have a mandate and the resources to engage with actors such as industry, local authorities and civil society groups to address – in this particular case – the risk and subsequent detrimental effects of Lake Chad drying up. It would be an instrument sitting halfway between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power, able to go either direction. It would also be an instrument to ensure effective dissemination of ‘understandable information’ to the local populace and stakeholders, using the various dissemination methods and technologies available. In my view, this does not need to infringe on sovereignty, but if the nations involved cause any sort of unnecessary, unwarranted obstruction, certain sanction mechanisms as per the mandate would kick-in and ultimately could penalise (‘name and shame’) those institutions, including the individuals responsible, depending on the nature and severity of the obstruction and/or obfuscation.”

“If this sounds far-fetched, it is perhaps because we have grown afraid to 'call a spade a spade' and make use of effective remedial mechanisms, be these diplomatic, economic, ultimately military and hold people to account for their failings. Admittedly, employing such mechanisms in a manner that selectively targets the culprits, and not the innocent is easier said than done. It is a distinct challenge because ‘the culprits’ are most apt in passing the buck; but it is not a challenge that cannot be overcome...it is more a matter of how.”

“I guess my response could be summarised by the question: "Can we maintain a sufficient level of harmony between what is perceived as necessary by and for a nation, a (sub)region, a continent, and 'the global interests at large'; and how to prevent sliding towards irrevocable imbalances?"”

Mridulya Narasimhan. “I feel establishing new agreement and new bodies, whether supranational or otherwise, may be a little misleading. Essentially, the first step should be to look into the existing water policies of Chad and surrounding nations to see if there is a provision for a water-sharing pact. Also, if these nations do go ahead with a supranational approach, how are they to establish an unbiased view? How can one guarantee that the member states shall work together unconditionally without any hidden agendas?”

Marco Hekkens. “I concur with your remark with regard to national and sub-regional water policies. But I am not overly optimistic that such policies are sufficiently mature and carry the importance that they deserve, i.e. concrete activities in accordance with a defined (multi)national action plan, properly resourced, set against a realistic timeframe and overlooked at the appropriate levels. It makes me lean towards a way ahead where an independent, non-profit, supranational organisation should be mandated to take charge. Easier said than done, fully agree. In particular, having all stakeholders agreeing on the perceived urgency, accepting a "willing hand and neutral leadership" on their behalf, and not viewing this from a point of infringement on sovereignty, or giving preferential treatment to one particular tribe, or just perceived inferiority. Great mix!”

Diverging viewpoints – Any?

The author and Narasimhan each come from a very different world, thousands of miles apart, and each also thousands of miles away from Lake Chad. Their respective parent nation, the Netherlands and India, both understand the need for water management and its many applications, not just preventing large scale flooding. The author is a retired Marine Officer with over 36 years of service, and perhaps less hesitant to use bold words. Narasimhan is young, talented, inquisitive, and has different experiences and skillsets. As it seems they both share more than a national pre-occupation with water borne out of dire necessity, and a casual interest on the situation of Lake Chad to engage in dialogue and seek for substantiated answers. Referring to the above discussion, it is not a matter of who is more right, or less wrong. What matters is that two individuals, who until the start of the discussion were total strangers to each other, found time to engage on something of relevance, of global relevance. This is a miniature example of globalisation and constructive use of social media. If this dialogue could be replicated at a much larger scale in the Lake Chad region, what would be the effect?

Click here to read Part 2

Written by Marco Hekkens ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Contact Marco Hekkens through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Conflict and Terrorism Unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com). The author was kindly assisted by Mridulya Narasimhan. The paper was developed with the assistance of Denine Walters and copy edited by Nicky Berg.
(2) ‘Ticking time bomb - Surface of Lake Chad reduced to only 1/10 of its original size’, A discussion on LinkedIn’s Consultancy Africa Intelligence (group), 2013, http://www.linkedin.com.
(3) Tänzler, D., ‘Cosy adaptation – Conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change’, adelphi factsheet (www.adelphi.de) issued during EPLO ‘Brown Bag Lunch discussion’ (www.eplo.org) in Brussels on 26 February 2013.
(4) ‘The disappearance of Lake Chad in Africa’, GRID-Arendal, 2013, http://www.grida.no.
(5) Tänzler, D., ‘Cosy adaptation – Conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change’, adelphi factsheet (www.adelphi.de) issued during EPLO ‘Brown Bag Lunch discussion’ (www.eplo.org) in Brussels on 26 February 2013.
(6) In French, it is referred to as the ‘Oubangui’ river.
(7) Acronym used for the emerging national economies of Brazil, Russian Federation, India, the People’s Republic of China and South Africa.
(8) ‘Mali aid conference planned for May’, Huffington Post, 19 February 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com.
(9) ‘”$950m needed” to drive Islamist out of Mali’, Times Live, 26 February 2013, http://www.timeslive.co.za.
(10) ‘Lake Chad: Inhabitants adapt to lower water levels’, ScienceDaily, 28 February 2012, http://www.sciencedaily.com.
(11) ‘Adaptive water management in the Lake Chad basin: Addressing current challenges and adapting to future needs’, World Water Week, Stockholm, 16 – 22 Aug 2009, http://www.fao.org.
(12) CIMA website, http://www.international.cima.ca.
(13) Ubangi River, Wikipedia, 2013, http://en.wikipedia.org.
(14) ‘Adaptive water management in the Lake Chad Basin: Addressing current challenges and adapting to future needs’, FAO Water, 16-22 August 2009, http://www.fao.org.
(15) ‘Quebec consulting engineers win contracts with African & Arabian peninsular’, Canadian Consulting Engineer, 22 February 2010, http://207.253.82.95.
(16) Toshihiko, M., ‘Chad Basin and Sahel climate improvement project by the Congo water uplifting over the plateau’, 2008, http://wldb.ilec.or.jp.