In January 2012, South Sudan stopped oil production after it failed to reach an agreement with Sudan on transit fees.⁽²⁾ The dispute crippled the economies of both Sudan and South Sudan and fuelled a military conflict.⁽³⁾ Since then, numerous deals have been struck between the two sides but none have brought peace to the region. This paper explores the latest oil deal’s chances of success. This agreement, negotiated in Ethiopia, requires the oil rich south to begin production again by 24 March 2013. It also proposes that a demilitarised buffer zone be set up between the two states.⁽⁴⁾

Arguably, while the resource curse has the potential to bring war to the countries, it cannot necessarily bring peace. The problems facing the Sudanese region are multi-faceted and cannot be resolved by a deal that does not address the root causes of the conflict. Moreover, as James Copnall has pointed out, this is not a new deal.⁽⁵⁾ It is simply a commitment to implement the nine agreements that were signed in September 2012.⁽⁶⁾ Despite a lot of international pressure, these vital treaties have yet to come to fruition on the ground and it is unlikely that many Sudanese and South Sudanese people will be cheering in the streets before these international deals make a real difference at the local level.⁽⁷⁾

Oil, glorious oil

Some analysts and members of Sudan’s government have hailed this deal as the harbinger of peace and stability to the region. Rabie Abdul-Atti, a leading member of the ruling National Congress Party is remarkably optimistic. He stated that “the signed agreements have no way but to endure because the two sides have expressed willingness and seriousness to implement them.”⁽⁸⁾ He went on to argue that these agreements have the power to “lead to the settlement of all the outstanding issues.”⁽⁹)

This agreement should do much to restart the economies of both countries and has the potential to lift many civilians out of poverty. There is some truth in the conception that the revenues from oil may help to deal with the other socio-economic problems that plague both Sudan and South Sudan.⁽¹⁰⁾ As a result, it is plausible that the deal will pave the way for a more durable peace in Khartoum and Juba.

However, given that peace deals are not new to the Sudanese region and the conflict has yet to be resolved, this optimism may be misplaced. Even if this deal manages to hold the focus in both countries on oil, the exclusion of all other exports is detrimental. This attitude encourages a reliance on a single source of income, which ensures that survival for many South Sudanese and Sudanese people has remained at subsistence level.⁽¹¹⁾ South Sudan’s government earned 98% of its revenues from oil before they stopped production back in 2012.⁽¹²⁾

The failure to diversify has left the economies of both states vulnerable to collapse.⁽¹³⁾ Oil revenues are not always managed effectively and consequently, despite promising prospects, improvements to the infrastructure of both Sudan and South Sudan are minimal.⁽¹⁴⁾ There is a desperate need to think beyond the “oil resumption box” and unlock the potential in other sectors of the economy.⁽¹⁵⁾

The focus on oil deals is not only detrimental for the financial system but also for the politics of the region. Peace efforts must do more to include oil deals in agreements that pay more attention to the issues that drive the conflict in Darfur and other parts of Sudan, which, in turn, fuel divisions between Juba and Khartoum. These include authoritarian governance, political marginalisation and land dispossession.⁽¹⁶⁾ While the government in Sudan excludes all but a narrow clique of Sudanese from access to the power and wealth of the country, marginalised groups from the west, south and east will continue to take up arms against the regime.⁽¹⁷⁾ The signing of a trade agreement can do little on its own to prevent this.

Round peg, square hole

Arguably, the wrong tools are being used to fix the problems that keep re-emerging. The international community has largely overlooked the fact that whilst insurgent movements exist in South Sudan and Sudan each country will continue to accuse the other of sponsoring these rebellions. Domestic issues that are not resolved are feeding into foreign conflicts between the two states.

Several rebel forces opposed to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)-dominated South Sudanese Government have emerged in South Sudan, including the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), which Juba says is propped up by Khartoum.⁽¹⁸) In addition, South Sudan armed and trained the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) when it was part of the South’s rebel force. ⁽¹⁹⁾ The existence of these groups does little to help the prevalent feeling of suspicion.

This is exacerbated by the fact that even those who supported the Sudanese Government in the first war, like the Misseriya Arabs, have grown increasingly frustrated with Khartoum’s actions, in particular, with its decision in 2005 to abolish the West Kordofan state that represented the group’s homeland.⁽²⁰⁾ As such, they no longer heed the government’s calls to remobilise and many are joining the SPLM-N and other groups in the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SDF).⁽²¹⁾ Their failure to take up arms is easily attributable to South Sudan’s interference in Sudan’s affairs. For any progress to be made in the relationship between Khartoum and Juba, the situation within Sudan itself must be resolved. Intra-state peace is a fundamental pre-requisite for inter-state civility.

Aside from Khartoum’s internal problems, there remain numerous other unresolved inter-state issues that will affect the implementation of this oil deal. For example, according to Sudanese political analyst Meki Al- Meghrabi, the problem of Abyei must be resolved in order to ensure the implementation of the peace agreements.⁽²²⁾ Abyei is a fiercely contested border area, fought over because of its links to two ethnic groups – the Dinka Ngok in South Sudan and the Misseriya, the Sudanese Nomads.⁽²³⁾

Some developments have taken place in this area after months of deadlock over the composition of the Abyei Area Administration.⁽²⁴⁾ The Khartoum Government has reportedly abandoned its demand to hold 50% of the positions in the administration of Abyei.⁽²⁵⁾ According to Deng Mading Mijak, South Sudan’s newly appointed Deputy Co-Chairperson of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, differences over how to allocate and share the legislature and executive powers in the joint interim administration have “been resolved.”⁽²⁶⁾

Yet spoilers remain. On Friday, 22 March 2013, South Sudan accused the government of Sudan of failing to pull its troops back from their contested border in line with the agreement that provided a buffer zone intended to defuse tensions between the two nations.⁽²⁷⁾ The credible third party guarantee, provided by the United Nations Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) should have prevented such accusations from taking place by reassuring both sides that there was a commitment to peace and ensuring both states stuck to their word.⁽²⁸⁾ But the spokesperson for the South Sudanese army, Colonel Philip Aguer, complained that the failure by Sudan to abide by the buffer zone limits was the “responsibility of the UN interim force for Abyei.”⁽²⁹⁾ The border is yet to be clearly demarcated.

The mutual mistrust on the border also creates problems for the implementation of the oil agreement. Most obviously, there is the issue of how the transfer of oil is monitored. There have been accusations in the past that Sudan has exploited peace deals by siphoning off South Sudan’s oil for free.⁽³⁰⁾ As such, there is a real need for the international community to monitor the oil transfer in order for the states not to give in to the fear of exploitation and for the agreement to hold.

Concluding remarks

So far the attempts to resolve the many problems in the Sudanese region have been short sighted. The economic importance of the oil deal that has been struck between Sudan and South Sudan should not be down played, but to say that it will resolve the countries’ problems is rather naive.

The international community must address the Sudanese region’s crises as a whole and not pursue localised quick fixes.⁽³¹⁾ Piecemeal power sharing arrangements have done more to drive rebellion in Sudan than stop it and if negotiations continue to only address the political marginalisation in the periphery, calls for self-determination in Darfur and the Blue Nile will only grow louder.⁽³²⁾ Crucially, while such dissent is so apparent in Sudan, it is unlikely that the mutual mistrust that characterises the relationship between Juba and Khartoum will be resolved.

Both the South and the Sudanese governments will have to deal more seriously with their economic and regional tensions and stop pointing the finger at one another before peace is to become a real possibility.⁽³³⁾ A comprehensive solution that includes broader governance reform and meaningful national dialogue is necessary to end the multiple conflicts both within Sudan and over the border.⁽³⁴⁾ Unfortunately for the South Sudanese and the Sudanese people, despite a plethora of agreements having been made, the Khartoum Government, in particular, is not showing much willingness to implement them.⁽³⁵⁾ Omar Al-Bashir’s 23-year-old regime continues to starve its people and kill innocent civilians arbitrarily.⁽³⁶⁾

Consequently, suspicion still dominates attitudes across the border, the peripheral regions continue to rebel, further state disintegration ensues and a lucrative oil deal will not end the bloodshed.

Written by Jess Moody ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Contact Jessica Moody through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Conflict and Terrorism Unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com) This CAI discussion paper was developed with the assistance of Denine Walters and was copy edited by Nicky Berg.
(2) Hanna, M., ‘Sudan and South Sudan: Good neighbours’, Aljazeera, 6 August 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(3) Ibid.
(4) ‘South Sudan: Oil agreement was “issue of good faith”’, BBC News, 12 March 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(5) Copnall, J., ‘Sudan rivals to resume pumping oil’, BBC News, 12 March 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid.
(8) ‘Sudan: Mixed views on Sudan and South Sudan’s agreements’, Xinhua African News, 15 March 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Hanna, M., ‘Sudan and South Sudan: Good neighbours’, Aljazeera, 6 August 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(11) Lanzer, T., ‘Oil not Sudan’s only hope’, Mail & Guardian, 8 March 2013, http://mg.co.za.
(12) ‘Sudan rivals to resume pumping oil’, BBC News, 12 March 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(13) Ibid.
(14) Sika, H., ‘Will Sudan, South Sudan deal work this time?’, Aljazeera, 28 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(15) Lanzer, T., ‘Oil not Sudan’s only hope’, Mail & Guardian, 8 March 2013, http://mg.co.za.
(16) Prendergast, J. and Cheadle, D., ‘Lessons from Darfur, 10 years later’, USA Today, 19 March 2013, http://www.usatoday.com. 
(17) Ibid.
(18) ‘South Sudan profile’, BBC News, 14 March 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(19) Ali, A., ‘Observers to monitor Sudan, South Sudan buffer zone’, Mail & Guardian, 20 March 2013, http://mg.co.za.
(20) ‘Sudan’s spreading conflict(I): War in South Kordofan’, International Crisis Group, 14 February 2013, http://www.crisisgroup.org.
(21) Ibid.
(22) ‘Sudan: Mixed views on Sudan and South Sudan’s agreements’, Xinhua African News, 15 March 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com.
(23) Sika, H., ‘Will Sudan, South Sudan deal work this time?’, Aljazeera, 28 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(24) ‘Sudan abandons 50-50 power sharing demand for Abyei Administration’, Sudan Tribune, 22 March 2013, http://www.sudantribune.com.
(25) Ibid.
(26) Ibid.
(27) ‘South accuses Sudan of failing to withdraw troops from border’, Sudan Tribune, 22 March 2013, http://www.sudantribune.com.
(28) Ibid.
(29) Ibid.
(30) Sika, H., ‘Will Sudan, South Sudan deal work this time?’, Aljazeera, 28 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(31) ‘Sudan’s spreading conflict(I): War in South Kordofan’, International Crisis Group, 14 February 2013, http://www.crisisgroup.org.
(32) Ibid.
(33) Prendergast, J., ‘Preventing the next Mali’, Foreign Policy, 4 March 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
(34) ‘Sudan’s spreading conflict(I): War in South Kordofan’, International Crisis Group, 14 February 2013, http://www.crisisgroup.org.
(35) Prendergast, J., ‘Preventing the next Mali’, Foreign Policy, 4 March 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
(36) Ibid.