The 11-year Sierra Leonean Civil War (1991 – 2002) claimed the lives of around 50,000 people (by conservative estimates, with many more injured and displaced), completely staggered the formal economy where it had already been ailing, and exhausted the country's considerable natural resources.⁽²⁾ The catalyst for peace is accepted as being Operation Palliser, the British intervention. Operation Palliser was launched in May 2000 to bolster the failing United Nations (UN) peacekeeper presence.⁽³⁾ However, before this came the involvement of private military companies (PMCs), most prominently, Executive Outcomes (EO) and Sandline International, both now defunct. This paper discusses the role of PMCs in the Sierra Leone Civil War and how their activities, often contested, in fact helped lead to eventual peace. While PMCs are most often cast in a negative light, this paper argues that PMC involvement was crucial and helped to introduce and develop a peace infrastructure.

Force will be met with force

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report of 2000 painted a bleak picture of Sierra Leone. Life expectancy at birth was 38 years, the adult literacy rate was 31% and the infant mortality rate was at 164 deaths per 1,000 births. Out of 174 countries in the Human Development Index, it came in at last place.⁽⁴⁾ Per capita annual income was US$ 200, and the government was operating in exile from Nigeria.⁽⁵⁾ By that time, the country had been at war for almost nine years, and it showed.

In 2000, the main aggressors in the war - excluding international actors and PMCs - were the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in collaboration with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).⁽⁶⁾ On paper, the RUF manifesto called for “a national democratic revolution…what we need then is organised challenge and resistance. The strategy and tactics of this resistance will be determined by the reaction of the enemy forces - force will be met by force, reasoning with reason, and dialogue with dialogue.”⁽⁷⁾ But on the ground, ideology quickly gave way to reality and, despite the rather organised nature of the RUF, the situation gave way to systemic foraging, looting, and the committing of war crimes by 1995. Things were not much better with the SLA: the “plummeting economy, lack of aid, and severe cash flow problem”⁽⁸⁾ faced by the state, coupled with indiscriminate conscription, meant that the army was also committing grievous acts. This gave rise to the infamous “sobel” – “soldier by day, rebel by night.”⁽⁹⁾

It should be noted at this point that the focal point of the conflict lay in the Kono region to the east, and in several areas in the south. These regions contained the majority of Sierra Leone's mineral and, in particular, diamond mines. Koindu, the centre of the Kono region, is eight kilometres from the border with Liberia and three from that of Guinea, leaving it particularly vulnerable to occupation by the RUF, coming over the border from Liberia. This is precisely what happened. Without production from its biggest source of revenue, the Sierra Leonean government’s position weakened considerably.

With the Sierra Leonean government losing its precarious hold on the state, resources and army by the day, some difficult decisions had to be made. After a brief failed experiment with the PMC Gurkha Security Guards, the government was helped by Branch Energy - one of the primary mining companies active in Sierra Leone - into a mutually beneficial business partnership that would prove more fruitful: enter South African firm Executive Outcomes.

Cry “Havoc!” and let slip the dogs of war

The modern PMC can be defined as “an entity that offers services aimed at addressing security concerns through a variety of security engagements…From a legal perspective a [PMC] is a corporate entity, while a mercenary group is not.”⁽¹⁰⁾ The deterioration of defined lines post-Cold War, coupled with the institution of capitalism, makes PMCs an inevitability, particularly in weak states such as Sierra Leone during the Civil War.

Arriving in March 1995, Executive Outcome's restructuring of the army was followed by a three-phase strategy: end the siege of Freetown (Sierra Leona’s capital), clear and reclaim the mines, and find and destroy the RUF headquarters. They had in large part fulfilled all of these objectives by early 1996, with their presence thereafter becoming more passive. Complications with their payment led to their departure in January 1997; an affiliate, LifeGuard, remained to guard the mines.⁽¹¹⁾

The next big PMC to become involved was London-based Sandline International, following the May 1997 coup by the AFRC (in collaboration with the RUF). Initially arranged by British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone, Peter Penfold, Sandline's reason for being in the country was “to negotiate the provision of military expertise and planning for the eventual return of the [de jure] government-in-exile to Sierra Leone by force, if the international community did not provide a satisfactory solution”.⁽¹²⁾ Sandline had close links with the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence; these links were to prove useful later on.⁽¹³⁾ Sandline's precise role in assisting the government - besides logistical support and intelligence gathering for the counter-coup effort - is unclear; it is unknown whether Sandline was actually in the front line of the fighting. However, their five-phase plan, which involved the Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and EO's former affiliate, LifeGuard, had succeeded in securing Freetown and reinstating the government by 1998 - but this was not to put a stop to the civil war just yet.

Sandline's involvement was fraught with controversy. Scandal broke in May 1998 when a British government inquiry concluded that Sandline had breached a UN embargo on “arms for Africa.”⁽¹⁴⁾ Led by Customs and Excise (now Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs), Sandline rebutted that its actions had not been unlawful and that their arming of the de jure government had been supported by Foreign Office officials. Ground-roots support for the British, particularly Peter Penfold, was strong; the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK) at the time, Tony Blair, also defended the British position involving Sandline: “In Sierra Leone we helped restore a democratically elected regime, which is a good thing, not a bad thing.”⁽¹⁵⁾

Sandline mostly recovered from the affair and went on to carry out another contract in neighbouring Liberia in 2003; but it shut its doors in 2004, issuing the following telling statement on its website:

The general lack of governmental support for Private Military Companies willing to help end armed conflicts in places like Africa, in the absence of effective international intervention, is the reason for this decision. Without such support the ability of Sandline to make a positive difference in countries where there is widespread brutality and genocidal behaviour is materially diminished.⁽¹⁶⁾

As for Sierra Leone, the fighting continued with unmatched brutality until the conclusion of Operation Palliser; then, at last, peace.

All's fair in love and war

The involvement of EO and Sandline in the Sierra Leonean Civil War was controversial but crucial.⁽¹⁷⁾ EO's success came at a critical phase when Freetown had almost been taken by rebels. Indeed, EO recaptured the diamond mines, leading to the reopening of the mines, a cease-fire and elections. Sandline succeeded in bringing the resulting legitimate government back from exile. Without either PMC, public and political interest in Sierra Leone would not have been raised either in South Africa or, imperatively, the UK.

Criticism of PMC involvement in regions such as West Africa are largely made under the Western assumption that notions of state security and a functioning military are universally applicable; it also assumes an absence of a patrimonial state with deep tribal values. Moreover, at the time of PMC intervention in Sierra Leone, little foreign aid was available to Sierra Leone through secure channels thanks to “resource shortages and ‘donor fatigue’.”⁽¹⁸⁾ The impact that EO and Sandline had in turning the war around in Sierra Leone should be apparent. What the PMCs managed to do that the government-led interventions did not was to secure and protect what infrastructure there was left.

Peace: The climate of freedom?

While still not scoring great on the Human Development Index, as of 2012 life expectancy in Sierra Leone has risen to 45 years; the adult literacy rate has risen to almost half; the infant mortality has decreased to 114 per 1,000 births; and per capita annual income increased over twofold, to US$ 580.⁽¹⁹⁾ Most importantly, the country is not at war. There is still a long way to go, and Sierra Leone is not yet rid of its “resource curse,” but recovery and development are apparent - the mines are operant, there is foreign direct investment from China, there are growing small and medium-sized enterprises and there is a considerable increase in the tourism (particularly “adventure tourism”) sector.⁽²⁰⁾

We cannot conclude without mentioning the 2014 outbreak of Ebola; being in the recovery stage as it is, Sierra Leone was in a particularly vulnerable position to the epidemic. Its battle against the virus hinges largely on resources - this includes the resources already in place to fight the more endemic malaria. A doctor working for medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières made the following statement on the BBC website: “I feel the people of Sierra Leone are more than up to the challenge - if they get sufficient support.”⁽²¹⁾ The crisis, if left unfettered, could threaten the development of the country, and certainly the stability that all have fought so hard to achieve.

Written by Marika Josephides ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Marika Josephides is a Research Associate at Consultancy Africa Intelligence (CAI) with a focus on terrorism, counterterrorism, statebuilding and the roots of conflict. Contact Marika through CAI’s Conflict & Terrorism unit. Edited by Nicky Berg. Research Manager: Leigh Hamilton.
(2) Gberie, L., 2005. A Dirty war in West Africa: The RUF and the destruction of Sierra Leone. Indiana University Press: United States.
(3) Renton, A., ‘Sierra Leone: One place where Tony Blair remains an unquestioned hero’, The Guardian, 18 April 2010, http://www.theguardian.com.
(4) ‘Human Development Report 2000', United Nations Development Programme, 2000, http://hdr.undp.org.
(5) Douglas, I., ‘Fighting for diamonds - Private military companies in Sierra Leone’, 1998, http://www.issafrica.org.
(6) Exploring the intricacies and backgrounds of connections, affiliations, and involvement by these and still more actors is beyond the ambit of this paper, as is the chronological development of connected events. For an excellent description of what went on, see Douglas, I., ‘Fighting for diamonds - Private military companies in Sierra Leone’, 1998, http://www.issafrica.org.
(7) ‘Footpaths to democracy: Toward a mew Sierra Leone’, Revolutionary United Front, http://fas.org.
(8) Douglas, I., ‘Fighting for diamonds - Private military companies in Sierra Leone’, 1998, http://www.issafrica.org.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Baker, D. and Gumedze, S., 2010. Private military/security companies and human security in Africa. African Security Review, 16(4), pp. 1-5.
(11) ‘Chronology of Sierra Leone’, Africa Confidential, 1998, http://www.africa-confidential.com.
(12) Douglas, I., ‘Fighting for diamonds - Private military companies in Sierra Leone’, 1998, http://www.issafrica.org.
(13) Ibid.
(14) Buncombe, A., Routledge, P. and Abrams, F., ‘Inquiry finds Sandline did breach arms embargo’, The Independent, 17 May 1998, http://www.independent.co.uk.
(15) Ibid.
(16) Sandline website, http://www.sandline.com.
(17) EO did not escape controversy either: it is strongly suspected but not officially verifiable that its contract was paid in part using shares in Branch Energy, a private mining firm. See Douglas, I., ‘Fighting for diamonds - Private military companies in Sierra Leone’, 1998, http://www.issafrica.org.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Unicef website, http://www.unicef.org.
(20) Renton, A., ‘Sierra Leone: One place where Tony Blair remains an unquestioned hero’, The Guardian, 18 April 2010, http://www.theguardian.com.
(21) ‘Ebola crisis: A doctor's view from Sierra Leone’, BBC News, 20 August 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk.