With the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DR Congo or DRC) M23 and the crisis in Mali being put in the limelight by the international media, coverage of the Central African Republic (CAR) remaines scant. While armed forces are almost deemed endemic to CAR, especially in the north, rebel alliance Seleka drew attention to itself when it managed to seize the city of Damara – threatening the capital city of Bangui, a mere 75 km further south.⁽²⁾ Alarmed by Seleka’s continuous advance, President François Bozizé pleaded with former coloniser France, as well as the United States, to intervene.⁽³⁾

Even though their French ‘oncles’ have a long history of helping out CAR’s leadership in dire times,⁽⁴⁾ President François Hollande refused to commit any troops, and declared that the French contingent stationed in Bangui would only serve to protect its own national and French interests.⁽⁵⁾ As tensions rose, an angry mob gathered in front of the French embassy, and even managed to enter the building, calling themselves the ‘Young Central AfricanPatriots’.They claimed France was letting CAR and its youth down by its decision not to intervene.⁽⁶⁾ In the midst of all this, Islamic residents of Bangui and students not speaking Sango, the lingua franca in the southern part of CAR, are increasingly being equated to northerners and rebels, and find themselves threatened by their compatriots.⁽⁷⁾

As CAR’s political landscape remains relatively unknown, this CAI paper frames recent events within their broader framework. After discussing the characteristics of state apparatus, the paper explores the roots of the Seleka movement. In doing so, it shows that Seleka is not an anomaly, and shows how this rebel movement fits within CAR’s history and political landscape. This paper then moves on to discuss the involvement of external actors in the country. It finally explores how power sharing agreements, which are favoured and, to a certain degree, imposed by external mediators and forces, have worked out in the past, and what the prospects for CAR’s immediate future are, now that one has been reached.

The hollow state

Even as early as 1997, Central Africans were well aware of the limited capabilities the state had at its disposal. The inhabitants of the Republic often joke about the state’s power stopping at PK12, referring to the highway about 12 kilometres outside of Bangui, the capital city.⁽⁸⁾ Because the subsequent regimes heavily distrusted the army because of the possibility of a coup d’état,little investment was made to build up a competent army. While the regular army units remained underpaid and severely underequipped, the respective presidents always favoured either putting their trust and security with the presidential guard units, which they filled with their own kin, or counted on foreign troops to prop them up when necessary. This, in effect, made CAR a phantom state not able to project any decisive influence over its territory.⁽⁹⁾

The people in the north, where a local variant of Arabic is used rather than the national language, Sango, and who are thus considered culturally different, were left to fend for themselves and often felt alienated from the ‘southern’ government.⁽¹⁰⁾ The inability of the central state to project its power led to the now-omnipresent phenomenon of zaraguinas or coupeurs de route (litt. Road-cutters) – bandit groups operating throughout the country, who used roadblocks to rob travellers and, thus, spread a climate of insecurity throughout CAR.⁽¹¹⁾ Due to external events, small arms were increasingly smuggled into the country, which set the scene for a rise of armed groups.⁽¹²⁾

Sele-what? CAR as a rebel breeding ground

Even though CAR has a long history of rebel groups operating against it, one should be aware that Seleka has only recently become a player in the field. In fact, the Central African armed groups have a tendency to drastically change the playing field every few years. In a report from 2008, for instance, the major players, often the result of mergers between or splits from other armed groups, were rebel groups APRD (Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la démocratie) and UFDR (Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassamblement) fighting against the army.⁽¹³⁾ In 2010, when both of these groups had come to an agreement with the Central African Government, the maltreatment of the Runga ethnic group by UDFR fighters gave rise to the CPJP (Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix).⁽¹⁴⁾ This was a group that was mostly warring with the UFDR in the north, as well as being hostile to the Bozizé Government.⁽¹⁵⁾

Seleka, therefore, is not a rebel group that can look back on a long history of fighting the CAR Government. It is, however, part of a longer historical cycle of rebel groups opposing both the government as well as each other. It might come as a surprise then that such a relatively young and, reportedly unorganised group could easily conquer two thirds of an area bigger than France.⁽¹⁶⁾

Reporting on who or what exactly comprises Seleka is, to say the least, murky. Most sources put CPJP troops at the centre of the new group, even though CPJP President, ​​Abdoulaye Hissein, denied that his group has joined Seleka.⁽¹⁷⁾ Others have pointed out that UFDR and Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC) elements make up the other constituent parts of Seleka, together with some smaller or relatively unknown groups.⁽¹⁸⁾

It has been noted that CPJP action has, until recently, almost always been directed towards the Gula-dominated UFDR in retaliation for their treatment of Runga miners, while UFDR seemed to have had a ‘working relationship’ with the government since the agreements concluded between them in 2008.⁽¹⁹⁾ Some have, therefore, suggested that breakaway factions from these respective groups originally formed the Seleka-alliance.⁽²⁰⁾ It seems that most of these groups, whether from the start or later on, have decided to put their eggs in the Seleka basket, perhaps because of disappointments with regards to promises made in earlier agreements and not fulfilled by the government, or just, as anthropologist Louisa Lombard suggests, because anti-Bozizé feelings trump their internal rivalries.⁽²¹⁾

It remains to be seen how the coalition will hold after peace talks; whether its internal rivalries will be contained in light of the divide and conquer-style politics, or if the Bozizé Government will most likely try to play on the alliance. The lack of a real political programme, which could serve as a banner for constituent parts of the alliance to rally behind, further increases chances of such a scenario.⁽²²⁾ The rebel coalitions’ forces had no problem routing the government troops; this is more likely a testament to the state of the army rather than the strength of rebel troops.⁽²³⁾ Their willingness to come to an agreement after being confronted with international forces, despite earlier rhetoric, might also point in this direction.⁽²⁴⁾

International involvement and the power-sharing agreement

CAR has a long history of outsiders intervening in its internal affairs. Not only has France, up until now, often been instrumental in keeping subsequent regimes afloat, but many other external forces have had a tremendous influence on the Republic’s people and politics. These paragraphs discuss foreign involvement in CAR and analyse by whom and how the present situation, up until the current agreement, has been influenced.

With France’s military occupied in Mali and refusing to intervene, Bozizé had to turn to other backers – seeing as his own army is in no state to keep the rebels at bay.⁽²⁵⁾ Interestingly, South Africa was one of the first nations to send additional troops.⁽²⁶⁾ The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has been involved in training CAR’s presidential guard since 2007,⁽²⁷⁾ and spokesperson Siphiwe Dlamini frames the freshly deployed troops within that same narrative.⁽²⁸⁾ However, with sources on the ground claiming the SANDF troops are taking positions to defend Bangui from the rebel alliance,⁽²⁹⁾ analysts have interpreted the deployment within the context of geopolitical rivalry between France and South Africa.⁽³⁰⁾

The South Africans, however, are not the only ones from the African continent to get involved. Idriss Déby’s decision to intervene should come as no surprise.⁽³¹⁾ Chad’s president was both instrumental in bringing Bozizé to power back in 2003 and retains cordial relations with his CAR counterpart. Chad maintains a relationship with CAR not in the least because it wants to keep trouble in the porous border region to a minimum, but in hopes of exploiting the oil deposits discovered there.⁽³²⁾ The Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) has been present on CAR territory since 2008, but, notwithstanding Bozizé’s recent pleas, has mostly kept to the south-eastern regions where they fight Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Museveni seems to have no intentions to overstretch his military capabilities.⁽³³⁾

President Bozizé’s claims of the rebel troops being composed of foreign mercenaries seem unlikely,⁽³⁴⁾  although there is a large reservoir of unemployed former combatants who live in the border region with Chad that are likely to join rebel groups and see fighting as a way of earning their livelihoods.⁽³⁵⁾ While rebel groups from DR Congo and Libyan troops were involved in 2003 – when they intervened in hopes of protecting then-president, Ange-Felix Patassé, from Bozizé’s forces – this scenario seems unlikely now considering the domestic situations in those countries.

The final addition of troops from the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to the Chadian soldiers already present seems to have forced the rebel alliance to accept the offer to open talks.⁽³⁶⁾ Under the protection of the 120 soldiers sent by Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon each, official talks kicked off on 9 November 2012, with President Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville serving as mediator.⁽³⁷⁾

Prospects for power sharing

Big demands were put forward on both sides just before negotiations. The Seleka alliance not only demanded Bozizé’s resignation, but also insisted on an immediate suspension of the constitution and disassembly of the CAR’s parliament as well as the institution of transitional structures.⁽³⁸⁾ Bozizé on his part informed the press that he refused talks concerning his departure from the CAR’s presidential seat and claimed the rebels were in no way representative of the Central African people.⁽³⁹⁾

It seems, however, that a compromise was found between the two parties rather quickly, as an agreement was reached a few days later in Libreville, Gabon, where the talks were being held.⁽⁴⁰⁾ While Bozizé will remain in function until 2015, he did agree to sharing power and forming a coalition government with Seleka representatives.⁽⁴¹⁾ The parliament dissolved to clear the way for a transitional government, and Faustin Archange Touadera was replaced as prime minister by human rights advocate Nicolas Tiangaye, a figure not directly related to any of the fighting parties.⁽⁴²⁾ His task is to pacify the country again, reform the security sector, reboot the country’s moribund economy and prepare the coming legislative elections.⁽⁴³⁾

The road ahead, however, will not be an easy one. Bozizé’s entourage has already been cited as saying that even though Tiangaye ‘talks the talk,’ they wonder if he will be able to ‘walk the walk’.⁽⁴⁴⁾ A president clinging to power might not be the only obstacle to the new unity government. According to Andreas Mehler, researcher at the German Institute for Global Affairs in Hamburg, the result of power sharing agreements and external mediation is that often short-term peace and results are dealt with, while solutions for long-term problems remain unsolved.⁽⁴⁵⁾ In fact, the current accord is already the third power sharing agreement concluded since Bozizé came to power in CAR and some of those now negotiating, such as UFDR’s Martin Zinguele, have already occupied positions of power within the government. In his research on CAR, Mehler even noted that power sharing between conflict actors sometimes has the effect of hollowing out parliamentary politics, which make armed struggle an easier way of getting things.⁽⁴⁶⁾ It is indeed not unthinkable, especially considering the political cleavages within Seleka; those who feel they will lose out in a democratic process will simply turn back to the gun. While the concluded agreement calls for an integration of the rebel forces into the national army,⁽⁴⁷⁾ the limited amount of resources available to the government might not suffice to effectively enforce it. Attempts to complete the brassage process, as it is called, in nearby DR Congo have been met with less than success. The natural resources in and above CAR’s soil have, in the past, already provided armed groups with the means to fight of the government troops and establish their own little fiefdom.⁽⁴⁸⁾

Concluding remarks

The government of national unity formed between Bozizé and his followers and the groups making up the rebel alliance, Seleka, is the beginning, rather than the end, of the story. Media coverage pf the Central African Republic is rather limited and events in the country often get overshadowed by what is happening in other countries. As such, people do not tend to realise that what has happened since Seleka started to draw attention to itself is not an exception, but is embedded in an often destructive cycle the country has been subjected to in the last few decades.

While projects similar to the current government of national unity have failed before, it is possible for them to break out of this cycle. To succeed, however, considerable investments will be needed and much depends on the elites involved in the process. While natural resources present on CAR territory could be used in assisting this process, they can also be harnessed to work against it – as they have in the past. Whether the newly appointed government of national unity will be able to put CAR back on track and provide for its inhabitants, however, remains to be seen.

Written by Jasper Bauters ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Contact Jasper Bauters through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Conflict and Terrorism Unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com). This CAI discussion paper was developed with the assistance of Denine Walters and was edited by Nicky Berg.
(2) ‘RCA: Les rebelles de la Seleka s'approchent de Damara, dernier verrou avant Bangui’, Radio France Internationale, 7 January 2013, http://www.rfi.fr.
(3) Hirsch, A., ‘Central African Republic rebels advance towards capital’, The Guardian, 27 December 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
(4) For an overview of the CAR’s recent history, see ‘Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State’, International Crisis Group, Africa Report no. 136, 13 December 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org.
(5) Hirsch, A., ‘Central African Republic rebels advance towards capital’, The Guardian, 27 December 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
(6) ‘RCA: Des “jeunes patriottes centrafricains” s’en prennent a l’ambassade de France a Bangui’, Radio France Internationale,  26 December 2012, http://www.rfi.fr.
(7) ‘A Bangui, les musulmans, assimilés aux rebelles, vivent dans la peur’, Jeune Afrique, 5 January 2013, http://www.jeuneafrique.com.
(8) Bierschenk, T. and Olivier de Sardan, J.P., 1997. Local powers and a distant state in rural Central African Republic. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 35(3), pp. 441-468.
(9) ‘Central African Republic: Anatomy of a phantom state’, International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 136, 13 December 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org.
(10) Spitaels, S. and Hilgert F., ‘Mapping conflict motives: Central African Republic’, International Peace Information Service, 2009, http://www.geneva-academy.ch.
(11) Saibou, I., 2006. La prise d’otages aux confins du Cameroun, de la Centrafrique et du Tchad une: Nouvelle modalité du banditisme transfrontalier. Polis, 13(1-2).
(12) Berman, E.G. and Lombard, L., 2008. The Central African Republic and small arms: A regional tinderbox, Small Arms Survey: Geneva.
(13) Spitaels, S. and Hilgert F., ‘Mapping conflict motives: Central African Republic’, International Peace InformationService, 2009, http://www.geneva-academy.ch.
(14) The cartographic material published by IPIS gives an insight into the evolution of the conflict in CAR between 2008 and 2010. See http://www.ipisresearch.be.
(15) Bauters, J., ‘A taxonomy of non-state armed actors in the Central African Republic’, International Peace Information Service, IPIS Intern Papers, 2010, http://www.ipisresearch.be.
(16) Ori, K.O., ‘Regional forces challenge CAR's strong but divided rebels’, The Africa Report, 3 January 2013, http://www.theafricareport.com.
(17) ​Look, A., ‘Analysts question if CAR rebel alliance can hold’, Voice of America, 6 January 2013, http://www.voanews.com.
(18) Kpatindé, F., ‘Centrafrique: Pour qui roule la Seleka?’, Radio France Internationale, 29 December 2012, http://www.rfi.fr.
(19)  ‘Dangerous little stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 167, 16 December 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org.
(20) Kpatindé, F., ‘Centrafrique: Pour qui roule la Seleka?’, Radio France Internationale, 29 December 2012, http://www.rfi.fr.
(21) Rolley, S., ‘Interview: Louisa Lombard, chercheuse, spécialiste de la Centrafrique’, Radio France Internationale, 5 January 2013, http://www.rfi.fr.
(22) Misser, F., ‘Central African Republic: The collapse of the Bozize regime’, African Arguments, 15 January 2013, http://africanarguments.org.
(23) ‘Why are African armies so bad?’, The Africa Report, 19 December 2012, http://www.theafricareport.com.
(24) ‘CAR war of words heats up amid talks’, Al-Jazeera, 10 January 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(25) ‘Africa’s poorest country: Rebels at the gate’, The Economist, 27 December 2012, http://www.economist.com.
(26) ‘SA to send 400 troops to Central African Republic’, Mail & Guardian, 6 January 2013, http://mg.co.za.
(27) ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country’, United Nations Security Council, S/2008/410, 23 June 2008.
(28) ‘CAR: South Africa bolsters its troops in Bangui’, IRIN News, 8 January 2013, www.irinnews.org.
(29)  ‘SA to send 400 troops to Central African Republic’, Mail & Guardian, 6 January 2013, http://mg.co.za.
(30) Heitman, H.R., ‘South Africa’s deployment to the CAR’, DefenceWeb, 9 January 2013,  http://www.defenceweb.co.za.
(31) ‘Q&A: Central African Republic's rebellion’, BBC News Africa, 11 January 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(32) Debos, M., 2008. Fluid Loyalties in a Regional Crisis: Chadian ‘Ex-liberators’ in the Central African Republic. African Affairs, 107(427), pp. 225–241; Marchal, R., ‘Au marge du monde, en Afrique Central’, les  études du CERI’ no. 153-154, March 2009, http://www.sciencespo.fr.
(33) ‘CAR sends SOS to Uganda’, The Africa Report, 2 January 2013, http://www.theafricareport.com.
(34) ‘CAR leader calls rebels mercenary terrorists’, Al-Jazeera, 9 January 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(35) Debos, M., 2008. Fluid Loyalties in a Regional Crisis: Chadian ‘Ex-liberators’ in the Central African Republic. African Affairs, 107(427), pp. 225-241.
(36) Ori, K.O., ‘Regional forces challenge CAR's strong but divided rebels’, The Africa Report, 3 January 2013, http://www.theafricareport.com.
(37) Misser, F., ‘Central African Republic: The collapse of the Bozize regime’, African Arguments, 15 January 2013, http://africanarguments.org.
(38) Duhem, V., ‘Centrafrique: L’opposition demande le départ de Bozizé’, Jeune Afrique, 3 January 2013, http://www.jeuneafrique.com.
(39) ‘Centrafrique: Le président Bozizé refuse d'évoquer son départ, tandis que les négociations ont débuté’, Jeune Afrique, 8 January 2013, http://www.jeuneafrique.com.
(40) ‘Peace deal signed for CAR after Gabon talks’, Al-Jazeera, 11 January 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(41) ‘Central African Republic president 'ready to share power' with rebels’, The Guardian, 30 December 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk; ‘Central African Republic president and rebels to form coalition government’, The Guardian, 11 January 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
(42) ‘Central African Republic dissolves government after peace deal’, Reuters, 12 January 2013, http://uk.reuters.com; ‘Centrafrique: le Premier ministre démis de ses fonctions’ Jeune Afrique, 12 January 2013, http://www.jeuneafrique.com; ‘RCA: l'opposant Nicolas Tiangaye nommé Premier ministre’, Radio France Internationale, 17 January 2013, http://www.rfi.fr
(43) ‘Nicolas Tiangaye Premier ministre, un chemin vers la paix semé d'embûches’, Radio France International, 18 January 2012, http://www.rfi.fr.
(44) Ibid.
(45) Mehler, A., 2009. Introduction: Power-Sharing in Africa. Africa Spectrum, 44 (3), pp. 2-10.
(46) Mehler, A., 2011. Rebels and parties: The impact of armed insurgency on representation in the Central African Republic. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 49 (1), pp. 115-139.
(47) ‘Peace deal signed for CAR after Gabon talks’, Al-Jazeera, 11 January 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(48) Spitaels, S. and Hilgert F., ‘Mapping conflict motives: Central African Republic’, International Peace Information Service, 2009, http://www.geneva-academy.ch.