The economic reform agenda has emerged as the defining feature of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s presidency, especially the reforms under way to open the electricity and freight logistics markets to competition.

It has been pursued largely out of necessity, as many of the theoretical risks associated with monopoly structures materialised in the form of devastating loadshedding and crippling price hikes and the threat of a near collapse of the port and rail systems.

Yet, the reforms have also been implemented despite going against the instincts of many in the ANC, and alliance partners that believe strongly that a State-led development pathway, implemented largely by State-owned companies and government departments, remains the best route out of extreme inequality and poverty.

For other more cynical actors, of which there are sadly far too many in South Africa, it is also the preferred pathway to enrichment. This, because it concentrates opportunities for a politically connected elite that are far more difficult to access and secure when there are multiple participants and entry points.

There are already signs that the reforms are a key source of tension in the alliance and a potential unifying platform for those preparing to wrest control of the ANC from the reformers.

This risk has been amplified by a Constitutional Court ruling that determined that Parliament did not deal correctly with a report by an independent panel that found that Ramaphosa had a case to answer in relation to how he dealt with the theft of foreign currency from his Phala Phala farm.

The ruling means that domestic politics, which have been remarkably stable following the formation of the government of national unity, are unstable once again. The ugly rhetoric will surely test the resilience of Ramaphosa and his supporters, despite there being limited societal appetite for his removal and genuine hurdles in the way of any impeachment.

But should the ANC perform poorly in the November municipal elections, which currently looks likely, it could prove a useful tool for those with presidential aspirations.

The implications for Operation Vulindlela are also potentially serious.

On the one hand, even the most ideological of actors cannot deny the benefits of the reform agenda, and the political risks associated with its reversal.

Besides the stabilisation of electricity supply, the volatility of which made South Africa an investment desert and darkened the public mood, the changes are starting to catalyse private investment, with positive macroeconomic spillovers that are noticeable.

A serious pipeline of power generation and storage projects is now in place, and the recent awarding of rail access rights to 11 private train operating companies should further galvanise the country’s long-awaited rail revival, which is needed to help reduce road congestion and improve road safety.

Whether these gains, and the promise of yet more to come, will be enough to hold back a political tide being strengthened globally – and at home – by the pull of populism is a real question once again, however.