Sudan has been gripped by nearly three decades of war and a chronic humanitarian crisis. After a bitter 22-year civil war, the south of the country gained independence by becoming South Sudan in 2011. South Sudan’s poorly demarcated 2,000km border with Sudan was not only established to segregate the religious and ethnic landscape of the two countries but also to divide oil resources. As a result, the border has remained a constant flashpoint between the two countries and a number of rebel forces.

The impoverished regions on the periphery of Sudan, such as Darfur, South Kordofan (Nuba Mountain region) and the Blue Nile, have faced some of the country’s worst fighting and consequently also contain the largest refugee populations. On the fringes of Sudan, the refugee population swells twice every year with the onset of the rainy season and then again with the resumption of fighting during the dry season.

The year 2013 is unique in that a military resurgence by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) is occurring during the rainy season. The current fighting in conjunction with this year’s substantial regional flooding is rapidly exacerbating an already fragile humanitarian situation. At present, this year’s heavy rainy season and floods have displaced 23,000 families, totalling an estimated 150,000 new refugees.(2) This CAI paper discusses the risks that a severe rainy season and concurrent military operation place upon the refugees fleeing from militarised forces, floods, famine, lawlessness and appalling refugee camp conditions on the South Sudan border.

Ongoing conflict between Sudan and South Sudan

The humanitarian crisis in South Sudan began in 2011 shortly after the country received its independence.(3) Almost immediately, the new country began to receive an influx in the numbers of refugees and internally displaced people (IDP) fleeing fighting in Sudan between government and rebel forces.

The SAF has traditionally conducted military operations during the countries’ dry season, which limits the logistical complexity of operating in remote regions of Sudan without road access. The SAF benefits from dry season operations as it is able to utilise its mechanised units and air force to greater lethality. Additionally, attacking during this time coincides with the planting and harvesting season in Sudan, thereby preventing the civilian population from being able to produce food.(4) Such scorched earth tactics are extremely effective in creating widespread famine by denying the civilians food and causing them to give up their land and flee across the border for South Sudan.

The SAF does not have the logistical or financial capabilities to operate continuously in all of the remote border regions. It is able to maintain a presence there by funding and equipping radicalised Islamic paramilitary groups. These groups include paramilitary militias such as the Janjaweed and the government’s Popular Defence Force (PDF), which comprise jihadists, mujahedeen, Sudan’s Islamic Movement members, youths and students.(5)

The SAF also uses its air force for direct and indiscriminate attacks. The direct support attacks are often tasked to the country’s MiG-29SE, MiG-29UB fighters and helicopter gunships.(6) Sudan uses its Antonov (AN-326) cargo planes to drop unguided ordinance in indiscriminate attacks where the objective is terror and precision is not a factor.(7) Moreover, the SAF has been accused by the Small Arms Survey of using cluster bombs, a weapon banned in 2008 by the Convention of Cluster Munitions.(8) The use of cluster bombs to terrorise the local population and destroy their harvest drives many refugees to abandon their homes. In addition, cluster munitions that fail to detonate create deadly minefields. The aerial bombing campaign is sustained year round, and even in the wet season it is used as a scorched earth tactic.(9)

Living as a refugee and status of the camps

The majority of refugees flee from South Kordofan and the Blue Nile where fighting between the SPLM-N and the SAF is most active. The SAF’s continued indiscriminate aerial bombing campaign, use of pro-government militias and the ensuing conflict with the SPLM-N has caused a chronic humanitarian crisis across the border in South Sudan.

In this regard, the ever-increasing refugee population in South Sudan is currently estimated at over 222,000 with an estimated 1,800 refugees arriving each month.(10) The largest refugee camps in South Sudan are Yida, Doro and Batil. The majority of refugee camps are situated on or very near the border of Sudan, which remains an extremely dangerous area given the boundary and oil disputes between the two countries.

Figure 1: Map of the major refugee camps on the south and southeast border of Sudan.(11)

The refugees fleeing the violence in Sudan traverse some of the most remote locations in Sudan and South Sudan. These areas lack infrastructure, have few, if any, public services and are physically cut off from the rest of South Sudan due to an absence of roads, especially during the rainy season. Along the way, the refugees risk being attacked by pro-Sudanese government militias and the SAF. In August 2013, for example, 150 families fleeing from recent fighting in Baw County reported being attacked by SAF in the town of Medani.(12) One of the refugees, Khidir Abusoi, was killed while others were arrested.(13) The refugees that arrived at the camps in South Sudan were in very poor condition after having walked for days to reach the camp. They, like so many refugees arrive malnourished, with high levels of morbidity, extreme dehydration and in need of immediate medical care.(14)

The camps have a chronic lack of trained medical personnel and supplies. The medical personnel are often overextended and the supplies completely inadequate to meet the needs of the refugees.(15) The organisation Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), is very active in aiding South Sudan refugee camps and reports that refugee children under five years are at the greatest risk of death.(16) The leading health risks in the refugee camps according to MSF and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are malaria (60.1%), acute watery diarrhoea (53.8%) and acute bloody diarrhoea (2.9%), acute jaundice syndrome and hepatitis E leading to mortality.(17) The head of UNHCR in South Sudan, Vincent Lelei, has further reported a disturbing recent increase in the number of cases of measles in the camps.(18)

The situation in the camps is very poor due to a lack of funding, tenuous political relations and limited medical capability. The geographic locations of many of the refugee camps compound these challenges. The camps were constructed with little consideration for the region’s geology and intense rainy season, for example. The early camps were built on black cotton soils, which have an extremely high affinity for water causing them to swell in the wet season and shrink in the dry season.(19) As such, during the country’s four to six-month rainy season, the camps are inundated with deep mud making them impassable to vehicles and shutting down their airstrips. Additionally, the soil maintains a continuously moist environment that encourages the proliferation of parasites and malarial mosquito populations. On the contrary, in the dry season, the soil contracts so significantly that fixed infrastructure is often damaged.

Finally, due to the remoteness of the camps and their location on the periphery of both countries, a complete lack of organised law exists. As such, the refugees face security risks in excess of the health risks they already encounter.

Security threats to refugees

The camps in the past have been a site of recruitment for rebel groups such as the SPLM-N and paramilitary militias such as the Janjaweed and PDF.(20) The rebel groups have also used the refugee camps as a stand down area where they will send their fighters to recover and relax between military movements. In this regard, the SPLM-N continues to actively help supply, coordinate and deliver medical supplies to the refugees in the camps through one of their affiliated South Sudanese humanitarian groups, often flying in trained medical personnel from Uganda, supplying armed convoy escorts, vehicles and running donation campaigns to receive medication. The ruling party of Sudan, the National Congress Party (NCP), further claims that the camps’ airstrips are used to transport military hardware and store weapons. This claim has never been substantiated even though UN members have performed regular sweeps of the camps.

Because of their presence, the NCP ordered the Sudanese Air Force to attack Yida, the largest refugee camp in South Sudan in November 2011.(21) The Sudanese Air Force is notorious for attacking civilian targets using unsophisticated and unguided bombs, often rolled out of the back of Russian Antonov cargo aircraft. During the attack, one of these unguided bombs landed on a school within the refugee camp but failed to detonate.(22) In total, four bombs were dropped in November 2011 in the Yida refugee camp. At that time the camp had 75,000 individuals, but none of them were injured in the attack.(23) The attack on Yida was strongly condemned by the UN and caused a number of aid agencies to temporarily suspend operations and remove personnel.(24)

In addition to conventional attacks, there is a high incidence of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) in the South Sudanese refugee camps.(25) The absence of an established judicial system, recognised state enforcement agents and a severe lack of resources has led to an environment of sexual exploitation and violence. There are no published figures on the number of rapes that occur in South Sudanese refugee camps, as it is extremely difficult to determine the extent of SGBV due to entrenched cultural factors that prevent victims from talking about the crimes committed against them.(26)

In this regard, the victims of SGBV are often afraid to discuss the assaults due to local customs where they themselves may be accused of violating moral codes.(27) Women who report being raped risk being imprisoned for adultery, or being forced to marry the person who perpetuated the rape.(28) Additionally, Sudanese women who do speak out about rape are often considered traitors and ostracised within the camps.(29) The topic of SGBV is such a taboo that even hired female translators often refuse to translate information regarding SGBV.(30)

Sexual violence is also seen in the form of extramarital sexual exploitation, which is prevalent in the camps. Girls as young as ten years old are being forced to marry or being used as prostitutes in exchange for food and other goods.(31) The significant lack of material assistance is strongly correlated with sexual violence and exploitation in the camps.

Finally, trafficking of refugees and IDPs out of the camps into urban cities, such as Juba, Torit, Wau and Khartoum, has recently been on the increase. The traffickers often lure young women and children to leave the camps willingly with the promise of legitimate work and money. They are then sold into domestic servitude, work camps, forced animal herding, or prostitution. As the women and children often leave willingly, the full extent of trafficking occurring within the camps is difficult to quantify. At present the Government of South Sudan is not making any effort to combat the trafficking of refugees within its borders.(32)

Concluding remarks

The challenges faced by refugees are monumental. The risk of death is a perpetual reality for refugees and IDPs fleeing the liberation areas of Sudan. Yet, this reality does not significantly change upon reaching the refugee camps in South Sudan. Here the refugees face continued hardships, lawlessness and food insecurity. Yet despite the risks, the inflowing refugees claim that they fear SAF security forces and Antonov bombers more than hunger and disease This year’s severe flooding and the recent restart of hostilities between the SAF and the SPLM-N threaten to cause an even bigger humanitarian crisis than was seen in 2011 unless sufficient international assistance is mobilised.

Written by Ryan M. Barnett ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Ryan M. Barnett is a Research Associate with CAI. Contact Ryan through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Conflict & Terrorist unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Nicky Berg.
(2) ‘23,000 flee Jonglei violence, UN says’, Sudan Tribune, 31 May 2013, http://www.sudantribune.com.
(3) ‘South Sudan: One refugee, one vote’, United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs South Sudan, 13 July 2013, http://www.unocha.org.
(4) Freccia, T., ‘Conflicts in Sudan’, Enough Project, http://www.enoughproject.org.
(5)‘Sudan parliament wants more support of paramilitary forces’, Sudan Tribune, 3 September 2013, http://www.sudantribune.com.
(6) ‘Sudan confirms purchase of Russian MiG-29 jet fighters’, RIANovosti, 14 November 2008, http://en.rian.ru.
(7) ‘Sudan’s military continues attacks against Buram county’, Nuba Reports, 15 March 2012, http://www.nubareports.org.
(8) ‘Small arms survey accuses SAF of using cluster bombs in Southern Kordofan’, Sudan Radio Service, 29 August 2013, http://www.sudanradio.org.
(9) Ibid.
(10) ‘23,000 flee Jonglei violence, UN says’, Sudan Tribune, 31 May 2013, http://www.sudantribune.com.
(11) ‘South Sudan: Dire medical needs in under-prepared refugee camps’, Medecins Sans Frontieres, 17 January 2013, http://www.msf.org.
(12) ‘South Sudan: One refugee, one vote’, United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs South Sudan, 13 July 2013, http://www.unocha.org.
(13) Personal communication, Hashim Orta, Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency/SRRA, 24 August 2013.
(14) ‘Integrated Nutrition and Retrospective Mortality Survey – Yida Refugee Camp Unity State, South Sudan’, Action Against Hunger International, July 2012, https://data.unhcr.org.
(15) ‘2013 UNHCR country operations profile - South Sudan’, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, January 2013, http://www.unhcr.org.
(16) ‘South Sudan: The health situation is deteriorating for the 63,500 refugees in Yidacamp’, Médecins Sans Frontières, 12 July 2012, http://www.msf.org.za.
(17) ‘Refugee Surveillance Update (Maban and Yida)’, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 28 July 2013, https://data.unhcr.org‎.
(18) ‘Food fears for tens of thousands in Jonglei’, IRIN News, 23 July 2013, http://www.irinnews.org.
(19) ‘Black cotton soil’, Foundation, Concrete and Earthquake Engineering, June 2012, http://civil-engg-world.blogspot.com.au.
(20) ‘We had no time to bury them – War crimes in Sudan’s Blue Nile State’, Amnesty International, 2013, http://www.amnestyusa.org.
(21) Copnall, J., ‘Sudan 'bombs refugees' in South Sudan's Unity state’, BBC, 11 November 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk..
(22) LaRocco, A. and Marinkovic, N., ‘Breaking news: Sudan bombs Yida refugee camp in South Sudan’, Enough Project, 10 November 2011, http://www.enoughproject.org.
(23) Ibid.
(24) ‘UN condemns bombardment of refugee camp in South Sudan’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 11 November 2011, http://www.unocha.org.
(25) ‘A sexual and gender based violence rapid assessment: Doro Refugee Camp, Upper Nile State, South Sudan’, Danish Refugee Council, July 2012, http://drc.dk.
(26) Ibid.
(27) Ibid.
(28) Ibid.
(29) Ibid.
(30) Ibid.
(31) ‘2013 trafficking in persons report - South Sudan’, United States Department of State, 19 June 2013, http://www.refworld.org.
(32) Ibid.