Twenty years after a civil war ripped apart the Somali nation, leading to the collapse of Siad Barre’s government – the last official government of the country until 2012 — Somalia was home to one of the worst humanitarian crises the world has ever seen with up to 12 million people facing starvation. In the midst of famine, drought, continuous warfare, terrorism, piracy off its coast and a pervasive lawlessness, combined with bankruptcy, the international community had somewhat glibly labelled the country a “failed” or “collapsed” state. Partly due to security concerns relating to its instability, a lack of political will existed among international actors,⁽²⁾ to drive any major reforms or assistance to help the state emerge from its deplorable ordeal. The lack of political infrastructure and authority in the East African state had been a major barrier to intervention on any significant level with powerhouses such as the United States (US), Britain and Russia and many NGOs labelling the capital and other parts of the country no-go areas.

As tens of thousands perished and millions of internally displaced citizens required immediate aid in late 2011, it came as somewhat of a surprise when Turkey declared its resolve to aid the country, calling on others to follow suit. Following a landmark visit by then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that year, which marked the first visit by a non-African head of state for almost two decades — labelled an “icebreaker”⁽³⁾ due to international actors regaining an interest in Somalia — a new era for Somalia was born as the world turned its attention back to the plight of the war-torn country. Turkey, widely lauded as Somalia’s modern saviour,⁽⁴⁾ has since paid more attention to Somalia than any other country by way of humanitarian aid, investment and the establishment of political and military links. This CAI paper explores the evolving relationship between Turkey and Somalia since 2011, examining the unique dynamic binding these Muslim nations that goes back to the heritage of the Ottoman Empire and looks at how, despite threats by the militant group Al Shabaab, Turkey’s continued involvement could lead Somalia to prosperity and act as a catalyst for expanding Turkey’s soft power in Africa.

Muslim altruism or the beginnings of Turkish neo-colonialism

Turkey’s policy has moved beyond humanitarian aid and is now focused on cultivating political and trade links. For example, both countries signed a military agreement in early 2014 which will see Turkey building fully-equipped military facilities and providing military training and education to Somali troops,)⁽⁵⁾ the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) has led investment efforts in Somalia and scholarships for Somali students to study in Turkish universities have been granted. Turkey claims that it is not seeking a colonial-style role in Somalia ⁽⁶⁾ but rather a “brotherly” one where mutual benefit is a shared objective.

Of course, closer inspection of Turkey’s broad African strategy since 2003 shows an increasingly assertive stance being adopted, marked by unprecedented visits to Ethiopia and South Africa, the securing of observer status at the African Union and the establishment of 33 embassies around the continent by 2012;⁽⁷⁾ and it is difficult to view its Somali policy as distinct in nature from its wider African objectives. Indeed, some commentators suggest that because Turkey in particular is perceived differently in Africa to traditional actors such as the United Kingdom (UK), US and France — which have more acceptance and are generally viewed as having good intentions — this favours a greater soft power expansion than might happen otherwise and also calls for a more integrated approach to East Africa specifically as the problems of the region are so intricately linked.⁽⁸⁾ Moreover, Turkey’s efforts at state building in Somalia will be symbolic of their intentions elsewhere in Africa, and if successful, may drive them forward to expand their influence and adopt similar policies throughout the continent and perhaps elsewhere.

The Ottoman heritage connecting the two countries may well be a somewhat under-appreciated or under-valued link as far as Western commentators are concerned. One of the chief factors attributed to the high regard in which now-President Erdogan is held throughout Somalia,⁽⁹⁾ aside from his symbolic visit in 2011 and the subsequent international call for humanitarian action, is his perceived re-establishment of Ottoman roots and connections with Somalia. Turkey appears to have utilised its historical relations as an overarching narrative to improve relations⁽¹⁰⁾ to build strong bonds with the Somali people, and this may explain why every faction in the country from civil society to government bodies and the private sector have welcomed Turkish involvement in the country since 2011. The only exception to this is the Al Qaeda linked insurgency group Bayt Al Shabaab.

A stooge of the West? – Al Shabaab and threats to Turkish involvement

Al Shabaab does not view Turkey as a selfless, compassionate and brotherly Muslim state engaged in carrying out altruistic endeavours for the greater good of the Somali people. Some Western actors view the Justice and Development party’s (AKP) foreign policy in Africa as being primarily concerned with integrating Turkey politically within the continent and expanding Turkey’s soft power sphere of influence.⁽¹¹⁾ It is unsurprising that this realpolitik perspective is shared by members of the terror group. Central to their fear is the threat that Turkey’s reconstruction of Somalia poses to their existence and influence.⁽¹²⁾ The model of Islamic democracy held up by Turkey which expounds a relatively moderate Islam than that preached by the insurgents, is spreading in Somalia, and Al Shabaab perceives humanitarian and development initiatives as “wooing” civilians toward this ideal,⁽¹³⁾ which clearly undermines the anti-imperial conservative nature of its philosophy.

The terror group’s distaste for Turkey’s involvement in Somalia has manifested in the form of direct attacks on Turkish citizens and operations in the country, including a car bomb attack in July 2013 some metres from the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu which claimed the lives of six people ⁽¹⁴⁾ and the fatal shooting of a security chief connected to Turkish Airlines⁽¹⁵⁾ in what was the second attack on Turks in the capital in less than a year.

Al Shabaab makes no secret of the fact that it is targeting Turks specifically. They have publicly taken responsibility for attacks ⁽¹⁶⁾ and have claimed that NATO is the greatest enemy of Islam and accordingly view Turkey in the same vein as they view other NATO members such as the US: as adversaries. Although it is clear that Al Shabaab’s actions have to a certain extent succeeded in deterring some aspects of Turkish involvement – the suspension of Turkish agencies’ operations in Mogadishu during the month of Ramadan in 2014 ⁽¹⁷⁾ is evidence of this – there is an undeniable resilience on the part of the Turkish elite to push forward in the face of this adversity. Turkey knows that to focus exclusively on battling Al Shabaab will not be conducive to strategic success in Somalia; it is the strengthening of state institutions through capacity building and education that will eliminate the influence of Jihadist rhetoric posited by the group in the long term. The re-iterating of its commitment to Somalia by senior Turkish officials after each terrorist atrocity compounds the notion that Turkey will not be deterred easily. That Al Shabaab wants to prevent the setting up of a fully functioning centralised government in the state ⁽¹⁸⁾ is widely understood by Turkey. It is a motivator for them to continually exhibit leadership in the country, not least to keep the international community’s attention on Somalia’s plight. An example of the efficacy of this was seen when the UK acknowledged the political force that Turkey has brought to bear in the country: Ambassador to Somalia, Matt Baugh, emphasised that through its actions on the ground Turkey had shown to the world what could be achieved in an operational sense in Somalia.⁽¹⁹⁾ It is evident that this approach was key in driving Al Shabaab out of Mogadishu in 2012 and the major challenge now lies in reducing its current influence in areas outside of the capital where they have wrested control from local clans.

Is Turkey’s halo and its patience waning?

Despite the progress made by Turkey in bringing aid to Somalia since 2011 and its catalytic role vis-à-vis Somalia’s recovery, a number of cracks have appeared in the two countries’ relationship leading some to question whether Turkey is turning away from its self-proclaimed long lost brother. It seems that milestones such as the bilateral military agreement signed in February 2014 allowing Turkey to train Somali soldiers and build modern military bases and the twenty-year contract for the development of Mogadishu port (which will employ Turkish workers) are not enough to persuade commentators of Turkey’s commitment to its Ottoman brethren. The protests by Somali port workers concerned about losing their jobs to young educated Turks that have marred the plans to transform the seaport to one of an international quality standard ⁽²⁰⁾ highlight the fact that not all Turkish interference is welcome and Somalis can feel threatened by commercial and other involvements of Turkish actors. The context and circumstances of such involvement is quite important to placate certain factions of Somali civil society.

Ambiguity regarding the cutting of direct budget support to Somalia in late 2013 signified to some a striking fading of Turkey’s assistance and support for the country. On one hand it seemed that Turkey’s cash aid to the country (US$ 4.5 million per month, which was provided in a rather unorthodox and controversial manner)⁽²¹⁾ had ground to a sharp halt. A Turkish official told the news agency Reuters that there were no plans to resume direct budgetary support;⁽²²⁾ however, on closer inspection it appeared that this particular support had been agreed only for a finite period and the agreement had simply expired, thereby painting a very different picture, certainly not one of a country losing faith in its beneficiary’s administration and issuing a harsh penalty accordingly. Compounding the confusion somewhat was the resignation of Yussur Abrar who had been governor of the Somali central bank for a mere seven weeks, citing the pressure on her to sign dubious deals ⁽²³⁾ as the reason for leaving. Some observers had concluded that Turkey’s cutting of budgetary support rested heavily on this fact. One may conjecture that it is likely Turkish officials were aware of Somali government corruption long before direct budgetary aid had commenced. Perhaps there was tacit acceptance that this was part and parcel of Somali administrative processes, and donors could only make efforts to ensure corruption was minimised and transparency achieved insofar as was possible, given the complexities of the failed state.

It may be fair to say that Turkey is frustrated with the Somali Federal Government’s (TSG) failures in the three years since Turkey’s major involvement in the country commenced in 2011. Turkey has not thus far openly criticised the TSG for failure to promote good governance ⁽²⁴⁾ and the conjecturing that Turkish dissatisfaction may lead to a withdrawal from Somalia seems to be based primarily on two actions: those of the direct cash aid suspension and the slight scaling back of reconstruction programmes in Mogadishu. These actions could, however, also be attributed to internal political issues in Turkey ⁽²⁵⁾ which have impacted on its economy and strength of its currency.

Concluding remarks

Turkey has shown its willingness to devote great efforts towards rebuilding Somalia. As its sphere of influence has spread across the Middle East and Africa in recent years, it is developing a globalised foreign policy and Somalia is the country in which it is best exhibiting its soft power potential as it builds state capacity, invests heavily, provides humanitarian and developmental aid and develops trade links. All of this has been achieved at a time when Somalia had topped lists such as “most dangerous places on earth,” media rhetoric painted a bleak picture of an anarchic country, and most nations had turned away from Somalia and were either unable or unwilling to provide much beyond sporadic aid packages.⁽²⁶⁾

In a constructivist sense Turkey has developed an image in the minds of Somalis as a fellow Muslim nation that cares about Somalia’s future due to its shared historical and religious ties. It has commenced the rebuilding of the social fabric of the “failed” state through its pragmatism and bravery in working on the ground in areas others would not dare go. While it may be significantly dissatisfied with the Somali government, it is difficult to envisage an abandonment of the progress made and the ties forged thus far, not least because its Somalia policy is representative of its broader African policy and success in the East African state will determine whether Ankara will proceed with similar policies throughout the African continent in the near future.

Written by Greg Ryan ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Greg Ryan is a Research Associate with CAI with an interest in international relations. Contact Greg through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Asia Dimension Unit ( asia.dimension@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Nicky Berg. Research Manager: Claire Furphy.
(2) Until as recently as 2013, most NGOs providing aid to Somalia were based outside of the state, primarily in Nairobi, due to security concerns. See Ali, A., ‘Turkish aid in Somalia: The irresistible appeal of boots on the ground’, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com.
(3) Inanc, Y.S., ‘Somalia’s long-lost brother is here to rebuild the country’, The Daily Sabah, 9 June 2014, http://www.dailysabah.com.
(4) Rhetoric from public figures attests to this perception. The UN’s deputy humanitarian co-ordinator in Somalia, Killian Kleinschmidt, declared that the Turks accomplished more in Somalia in recent years than any other country or NGO had in 21 years. In 2012 the Somali ambassador to Turkey Nur Sheikh Hamud Mursal described Turkey a “saviour sent by GTod to Somalia.” See Harte, J., ‘Turkey shocks Africa’, World Policy Institute, Winter 2012, http://www.worldpolicy.org.
(5) ‘Somalia and Turkey sign military agreement’, Keydmedia, 28 February 2014, http://www.keydmedia.net.
(6) According to the Turkish Ambassador Kani Torun, Turkey’s aim is not to exploit the country’s resources but to build links to allow the country to flourish in its own right. As he refers to the training of Somali soldiers specifically, one might conjecture that he is referring to the country’s ability to develop its trade functions effectively through the enforcing of contracts and through developing more security measures which would serve as a facilitator of trade. See Inanc, Y.S., ‘Turkey seeks lasting presence in Somalia via investments’, Daily Sabah, 12 June 2014, http://www.dailysabah.com.
(7) These embassies were charged primarily with identifying opportunities for trade and investment. See Mesfin, B., ‘The soft power role of Turkey in Somalia’, Harowo, 6 October 2014, http://allafrica.com.
(8) Ozkan, M., 2014. Turkey’s involvement in Somalia: Assessment of a state-building in progress. SETA Publications: Ankara.
(9) Upon winning the first Turkish presidential election in 2014 (following his tenure as Prime Minister) mass tributes from Somali figures, not least from Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, were forthcoming, highlighting his lingering popularity within the country. See Juma, Y., ‘Somalia congratulates Turkey’s Erdogan on poll win’, Turkish Press, 11 August 2014, http://www.turkishpress.com.
(10) The Ottoman Empire had occupied parts of Somalia during its heyday in the sixteenth century when local clans had requested assistance in confronting the Portuguese navy and similarly in the nineteenth century when they returned in solidarity with the Somalis to resist a British invasion. See Mesfin, B., ‘The soft power role of Turkey in Somalia’, Harowo, 6 October 2014, http://allafrica.com ; Inanc, Y.S., ‘Turkey seeks lasting presence in Somalia via investments’, Daily Sabah, 12 June 2014, http://www.dailysabah.com.
(11) Tank, P., ‘Turkey’s new humanitarian approach in Somalia’, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, December 2013, http://www.peacebuilding.no.
(12)Lepeska, D., ‘Turkey’s rise from aid recipient to mega-donor’, Aljazeera America, 25 April 2012, http://america.aljazeera.com.
(13) Kaya, K. and Warner, J., ‘Turkey’s love affair with Somalia’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 November 2012, http://blogs.cfr.org.
(14) Nor, O. and Botelho, G., ‘Police: 6 killed in attack on Turkish embassy in Somalia’, CNN, 28 July 2013, http://edition.cnn.com.
(15) Since 2012, Turkish Airlines are the only airline providing Somalia with a direct link to the outside world. See Yahya, H., ‘Somalia: A path to unity’, Harum Yahya, 24 May 2014, http://www.harunyahya.com.
(16) The group released a message on the social media platform Twitter subsequent to the attack on the Turkish embassy in 2013. They claimed that the Turkish are part of a group of countries “bolstering the apostate regime and attempting to suppress the establishment of Islamic Sharia.” See Tokyay, M., ‘Turkey confronts Al-Shabaab in Somalia’, SE Times, 6 March 2014, http://turkey.setimes.com.
(17) Khalif, A., ‘Turkey promises to stand by Somalia’, Africa Review, 16 July 2014, http://www.africareview.com.
(18) See Tokyay, M., ‘Turkey confronts Al-Shabaab in Somalia’, SE Times, 6 March 2014, http://turkey.setimes.com.
(19) See Harding, A., ‘Turkey – Somalia aid pioneers?’, BBC, 22 February 2012, http://www.bbc.com.
(20) See Billow, A., ‘Somali port workers protest Turkish firm take-over of port’, Voice of America, 30 September 2014, http://www.voanews.com.
(21) The governor of the central bank in Somalia would collect the entire amount in boxes full of cash from the Turkish embassy each month – see Tastekin, F., ‘Cash box crops up in Turkey’s Africa opening’, Almonitor, 18 February 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com.
(22) ‘Turkey denies cutting off cash aid to Somalia’, Hurriyet Daily News, 16 February 2014, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com.
(23) Tastekin, F., ‘Cash box crops up in Turkey’s Africa opening’, Almonitor, 18 February 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com.
(24) Jama, A.W., ‘Turkish dissatisfaction with the Somali government may lead to total withdrawal from Somalia’, Horseed Media, 17 May 2012, http://horseedmedia.net.
(25) Ibid.
(26) Tovrov, D., ‘Why Turkey is coming to Somalia’s aid’, International Business Times, 8 March 2012, http://www.ibtimes.com.