South Africa and indeed Africa’s role in, and risk to, global nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security remains largely overshadowed globally by events in the Middle East and problems associated with nuclear disarmament of nuclear weapon states (NWS). Yet, significant challenges highlighted in early 2014 indicate there is a vital need for greater African participation in global non-proliferation efforts and for African leaders to address weaknesses in nuclear security to protect the world from nuclear terrorism. This CAI paper focuses on the critical need for increasing education, training and awareness related to nuclear non-proliferation in Africa as an important step in bringing the continent’s leaders further into the global nuclear security policy debate.

Seven African countries ranked among the world’s worst in terms of the 2014 Nuclear Materials Security Index published by the private United States (US)-based Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), namely Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe.⁽²⁾ Released in January ahead of the March 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) to be held in the Netherlands, the report also down-graded South Africa, where overall physical security of fissile material stocks is a concern, and saw the country fall by a point since 2012 NTI Index. South Africa’s drop is an important consideration, as its government is one of the most vocal African states at international forums of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and aims to spearhead nuclear expansion in Africa. A key finding of the NTI Index is that the global community must demand an effective and accountable global system on how nuclear materials should be secured.

In addition, the scant attention paid to the limited, but not negligible, nuclear proliferation risks associated with uranium mining, also spurred a call in January 2014 by the Swedish think-tank, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), for African leaders to be vigilant of, and to address those risks to nuclear proliferation.⁽³⁾ A CAI report in July 2013 on the immense challenges to Africa’s growing uranium sector recommended stronger, independent controls both on uranium extraction and its transportation.⁽⁴⁾

Major challenges continue to face NPT and other global nuclear security mechanisms that involve evolving and inter-connected geopolitics on nuclear security premised on rights for nuclear expansion. Yet, Africa’s participation in nuclear security forums remains particularly low notwithstanding a variety of regional risks, and the growing nuclear ambitions in Africa, a prolific producer of uranium for nuclear fuel.

A shift in focus: Africa’s need for non-proliferation education

The existing educational programmes in Africa focus on nuclear security and technical procedure, such as the technical co-operation and safeguards agreements instituted by the United Nation’s (UN) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but little is being done for non-proliferation education. The IAEA has participated in Africa since 1957, but given Africa’s collectively poor scores on the 2014 NTI Index it would appear that these initiatives alone are not adequate. Regionally, Africa’s most likely source of non-proliferation training and knowledge-sharing is the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE). Established in 2009 by the African Union (AU) as the compliance mechanism of the Pelindaba Treaty,⁽⁵⁾ and meant to be headquartered in South Africa, AFCONE remains inactive and therefore non-functional in contributing to non-proliferation.

As civilian nuclear aspirations spread across the continent and over 30 states participate in uranium exploration, African non-proliferation education is needed to prevent dangerous situations like, for example, the abandonment of the research reactor in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Le Centre Regional d’Etudes Nucleaires de Kinshasa (CREN-K) that was commissioned by Belgium and supported by the Atoms for Peace programme of US president Dwight Eisenhower in 1959, has sat in a bleak and dangerous extended shutdown condition since 2004.⁽⁶⁾ The reactor’s current status is ambiguous but it has a history of security issues, including stolen fuel rods from the facility and the arrest of nuclear officials suspected of supporting illicit uranium exportation.⁽⁷⁾ It is one of approximately 26 nuclear installations in various countries on the African continent that garner scant global attention. Increasing African non-proliferation education will help avoid potential pitfalls like the DRC’s CREN-K and, for instance, three unexplained security breaches at South Africa’s Pelindaba nuclear facility – the third in 2012 ⁽⁸⁾ - while African uranium exploration and nuclear ambitions multiply.

Africa’s role in nuclear non-proliferation education and training

Africa has a unique opportunity to play an important role in global non-proliferation and disarmament due to its population of 1 billion people and its voting block of 54 states in international bodies. The support for non-proliferation is evident in Africa’s involvement with the NPT and establishment of the Pelindaba Treaty, making Africa the world’s largest Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ).⁽⁹⁾ However, there is not always the capacity or knowledge for developing states to form a stronger voice in shaping the non-proliferation discourse on the continent. This is evident in the implementation of, for example, the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, adopted in April 2004, which seeks to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime and address the prospect of non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD).⁽¹⁰⁾ African implementation of UNSCR 1540 has been difficult and reports undetailed. One of several reasons African states claim reporting has been inadequate is the idea that no WMD-related substances or technology are found within African borders. In 2013, the AU Commission stated its intention to assist in the implementation of the international and regional non-proliferation regime through enhancing the level of ratification of UNSCR 1540, among other treaties and frameworks.⁽¹¹⁾ However, despite its infrastructure and security-related focus, no mention of nuclear non-proliferation issues was made during the AU’s 22nd continental summit, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in late January 2014.

The involvement of developing African states internationally will be important in shaping an African perspective on nuclear non-proliferation and improving nuclear security in the region. The West African nation of Côte d’Ivoire, for example, was designated as most improved alongside Vietnam for countries with no weapons-usable nuclear materials in the 2014 NTI Index. This was driven largely by the country becoming party to international legal agreements such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). Eighteen African countries have still not acceded to or ratified the CPPNM and only Niger of Africa’s four uranium-producing countries (Malawi, Namibia, Niger, and South Africa) ratified the 2005 CPPNM Amendment,⁽¹²⁾ in May 2009.

Increasing African participation in international legal frameworks would benefit from increased participation in international forums. For instance, African attendance in the NSS, an initiative of US president Barak Obama, has been extremely low. The only African countries that participated in the 2010 Washington DC-held NSS were Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and South Africa, with the addition of Gabon at the 2012 NSS in Seoul, South Korea. With the 2014 NSS potentially being the last, increasing Africa’s involvement in non-proliferation will need to be achieved in other international forums, conventions, and working groups. Reaching higher levels of African participation could be advanced through the support of the education and training programmes already in place, as well as the development of new educational non-proliferation initiatives.

African nuclear-related forums are under-utilised on non-proliferation training

Africa possesses distinct, regional forums in which non-proliferation education can be implemented and championed, including the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development, and Training (AFRA),⁽¹³⁾ the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA) and the non-operational AFCONE.⁽¹⁴⁾ The former two organisations offer a prospect for advancing non-proliferation education, training and awareness, but neither has made any substantial progress in this arena to date. Instead, AFRA and FNRBA in collaboration with the IAEA have focused on nuclear technology and energy expansion. Doing so has caused these organisations to miss opportunities to significantly integrate non-proliferation education in past technical cooperation programmes, training seminars ⁽¹⁵⁾ and safeguards agreements. Given its level of involvement with these forums, the IAEA could also be expected to use the support garnered from the African states due to the widespread nuclear energy ambitions, to establish the importance of non-proliferation in the minds of African leaders.

Similarly, AFCONE could provide a forum for advancing the regional non-proliferation dialogue. The commission should, for example, support state accession to international programmes like the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), established in 2003 to combat the flow of WMD materials and delivery systems. Additionally, AFCONE should take active roles in assisting African states in international agreements (like UNSCR 1540) as well as the implementation of export controls and uranium market regulation. However, the IAEA and its active role in AFRA and the FRNBA has been criticised for potentially undermining AFCONE’s ability to activate.⁽¹⁶⁾

Educational non-proliferation programmes in Africa: US and EU initiatives

In recent years the US and European Union (EU) have made efforts to step up nuclear non-proliferation awareness and education programmes in Africa, focussed particularly on the need for vigilance in export controls. However, these efforts are not pervasive, and increasing the frequency and number of educational opportunities while placing a greater emphasis on non-proliferation will increase African knowledge and awareness.

For instance, the US Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has designed workshops to connect various stakeholders in Africa on nuclear security issues such as the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials.⁽¹⁷⁾ Additionally, the US African Command (AFRICOM) is working to expand its non-proliferation training initiative throughout the continent so that each country can build response capabilities to WMD attacks. If successful, this programme could lead to a more robust understanding in Africa of the risks of proliferation and contribute to an inclusive discourse as more states receive training. In 2013, AFRICOM began the initiative in collaboration with elite Kenyan and Ugandan forces. According to Colonel Isaac Muchendu, commander of Kenya Rapid Deployment Capability, “terrorist activities in Kenya are real and this capability is crucial to possess.”⁽¹⁸⁾

The EU has also provided training related to WMDs as well as Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) material protection through the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence (CoE). The CoEs intend to provide regional and international coordination needed to mitigate CBRN risks of criminal, accidental or natural origin. The EU CoE is currently targeting the African Atlantic Façade and Eastern and Central Africa for bolstering the national CBRN legal frameworks and provision of technical training to enhance CBRN preparedness.

Both US and EU based institutions are facilitating non-proliferation education in which African educators and diplomats are participating. The US is working through its Department of State’s Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS), which contributes to non-proliferation curriculum development in universities around the world. Further integration of non-proliferation education into African universities would provide a mode for generating interest in the next generation of African leaders. Lecturers from Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa recently participated in a PNS curriculum development workshop in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Similarly, the Austrian-based Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-proliferation (VCDNP) hosted an intensive course on nuclear non-proliferation in Vienna, Austria, in 2011 for diplomats from 22 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and South America. Though efforts made by the US and EU have not been widespread they have, at least, been present on the issue of providing nuclear non-proliferation education to Africans.

Non-proliferation education initiatives in Africa: The CTBTO model

The strong relationship Africa has built with the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) is exemplary of the potential for increasing African participation in international non-proliferation efforts. Other international nuclear non-proliferation institutions should look to the CTBTO as a model for integrating Africa into their programmes, which currently have little focus on the region despite its growing risks. The Austrian-based CTBTO, which opened for signature in New York in 1996, encompasses the aspirations of global nuclear disarmament outlined in the NPT. The organisation has been well received in Africa with 51 states having signed, and 42 having ratified the treaty. Banning nuclear weapons testing on African soil and Africa’s effort to become a NWFZ was spurred by French nuclear tests in the Sahara Desert on 13 February 1960, and is the likely reason for Africa’s persistent work with the CTBTO.⁽¹⁹⁾ The organisation is tasked with establishing a global verification regime through its National Data Centres (NDC), 30 of which are spread throughout Africa.⁽²⁰⁾

The CTBTO has trained staff in seismic, infrasound and radionuclide laboratories in Egypt, Niger, and South Africa among others that allows for the detection of a nuclear blast. The training provided through the NDCs may indicate why the organisation appears to have progressed further than the UNSCR 1540 and the safeguard agreements of the IAEA. Long-term success for the CTBTO, as well as any other organisation seeking to increase non-proliferation awareness in Africa, is likely to be dependent on the political will of the African governments to maintain and initiate new commitments. Continuing to find new ways to educate and inform Africans on the importance of non-proliferation should also contribute to establishing a demand for further commitments from African leaders. To this end, the CTBTO is attempting to reach new populations through lectures and online courses under the Capacity Development Initiative (CDI) that covers legal and technological facets of the treaty and its verification regime.

Conclusion

Former US Senator and NTI’s co-chairman, Sam Nunn, has advocated a consensus on forming a global system for securing weapons-grade materials to impede proliferation and prevent nuclear terrorism, a cause Africa could contribute to with increased participation in the global discourse.⁽²¹⁾ With dismal scores in nuclear security and an absence of a continental perspective on non-proliferation, this call for a consensus cannot be addressed without raising the level of education and awareness in Africa on nuclear non-proliferation.

Current efforts have fallen short, some focusing predominantly on nuclear expansion, while other initiatives are not widespread enough to encompass a larger African audience. International organisations like the IAEA and regional institutions like AFCONE, AFRA, AU and FNRBA could contribute to further African participation in the global non-proliferation forums by increasing non-proliferation education. Not doing so could result in a lost opportunity for Africa to use its collective influence in support of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Achieving greater education and training on non-proliferation in Africa will also require an increase in international, regional, and sub-regional initiatives. Additionally, more country involvement is needed in international commitments like the CPPNM, the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS),⁽²²⁾ and the UNSCR 1540.⁽²³⁾ However, this will not be possible if non-proliferation is sidelined while nuclear energy expansion remains the focus of both African and international governments. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) may come to play an important role in progressing non-proliferation awareness in the absence of governmental attention. NGOs focussed on non-proliferation like the Swiss-based International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) may be a strong option in providing education in non-proliferation while African and international partner governments continue to vie for nuclear expansion deals.

It is important that global nuclear vendors seeking to gain a foothold in Africa’s nuclear expansion, like Russia, also take an active role in providing non-proliferation education to countries they intend to work alongside. Additionally, non-proliferation education and awareness as well as nuclear security will have trouble advancing if the international non-proliferation regime is solely focused on areas like Iran and the Middle East while risks continue to stack up across the African continent.

Written by Donald Stewart ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Donald Stewart is a Research Associate with CAI with a particular interest in monproliferation and terrorism. Contact Donald through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Counter-Proliferation unit ( counter.proliferation@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Kate Morgan.
(2) ‘Countries without weapons-usable nuclear material overall score’, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Nuclear Materials Security Index, January 2014, http://ntiindex.org.
(3) Anthony, I. and Grip, L., ‘Africa and the global market in natural uranium – from proliferation risk to non-proliferation opportunity’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) policy paper 39, November 2013, http://books.sipri.org.
(4) ‘Africa’s uranium routes: Africa’s uranium weighs on the world’s geopolitics and needs independent market regulation’, Consultancy Africa Intelligence, July 2013, http://www.consultancyafrica.com.
(5) The Pelindaba Treaty first opened for signature 11 April 1996 and entered into force 15 July 2009. ‘African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)’, NTI, http://www.nti.org.
(6) ‘Research reactors in Africa’, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), November 2011, http://www.iaea.org.
(7) Crall, P. and Bergnenas, J., ‘Uranium smuggling allegations raise questions concerning nuclear security in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), April 2007, http://cns.miis.edu.
(8) ‘South African Government’s nuclear energy plans: Limited public input and potential security concerns’, Consultancy Africa Intelligence, October 2012, http://www.consultancyafrica.com.
(9) Every African nation, except for South Sudan, is party to the NPT and all of the African states participate in the Pelindaba Treaty with 54 signatories but only 35 ratifications, see ‘African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)’, NTI, http://www.nti.org.
(10) Broodryk, A. and Stott, N., ‘Challenges and solutions for 1540 implementation in the African region’, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), http://cits.uga.edu.
(11) ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Non-Proliferation,’ African Union Peace and Security Department, December 2013, http://www.peaceau.org.
(12) A Diplomatic Conference in July 2005 was convened to amend the Convention in order to make it “legally binding for States Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport”, see ‘International Conventions and Legal Agreements: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material’, IAEA, http://www.iaea.org.
(13) AFRA stems from an initiative of African member states (39 in total as of 2013) to the IAEA requesting help on establishing a regional cooperation on nuclear science and technology, see the AFRA website, http://www.afra-iaea.org.
(14) FNRBA, formed in 2009, was created for the exchange of regulatory practices among nuclear regulatory bodies in Africa, see ‘Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Africa’, IAEA, http://www.iaea.org.
(15) A recent example of this participation is the September 2013 training seminar that emphasised the importance of education in nuclear science, and was hosted by the IAEA member states in Tanzania, see ‘The First AFRA-NEST General Assembly took place in Tanzania’, IAEA, 10 September 2013, http://www.iaea.org.
(16) ‘Africa’s uranium routes: Africa’s uranium weighs on the world’s geopolitics and needs independent market regulation’, Consultancy Africa Intelligence, July 2013, http://www.consultancyafrica.com.
(17) One such programme, hosted at the Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana, connected stakeholders from customs, defence, police, and subject matter experts from Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, see Barnes, D., ‘Pentagon equips Kenya, Uganda against WMD threats’, Global Security Newswire (GSN), July 2013, http://www.nnsa.energy.gov.
(18) Barnes, D., ‘Pentagon equips Kenya, Uganda against WMD threats’, Global Security Newswire (GSN), July 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn.
(19) ‘Africa’s contribution to putting an end to nuclear explosions’, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), June 2012, http://www.ctbto.org.
(20) The CTBTO National Data Centres fall under the state National Authority designated to implement the Treaty and liaise with the CTBTO and other member states, see ‘Africa’s contribution to putting an end to nuclear explosions’, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), June 2012, http://www.ctbto.org.
(21) ‘Releasing the 2014 NTI Index, Nunn calls on leaders to address weaknesses in global nuclear security’, Nuclear Secrity Materials Index, January 2014, http://ntiindex.org.
(22)The Convention on Nuclear Safety, adopted in Vienna on 17 June 1994, aims to legally commit participating states operating land-based nuclear power plants to a high level of safety by setting benchmarks to which states would subscribe; full ref details should be given http://www-ns.iaea.org.
(23) Other international commitments include the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; UN Security Council Resolutions 1373; various IAEA documents such as the Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources; the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources (INFCIRC/663); the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/ Rev.4); and, the Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles (GC(45)/INF/14).