The political transition in Cotonou opens a window for regional de-escalation that the African Union should seize.

Romuald Wadagni’s election as Benin’s president on 12 April may prove to be more than a routine domestic transition. It could reopen dialogue between Niger and Benin and help ease wider regional tensions. The African Union (AU) remains one of the few actors still able to play a credible facilitation role.

Since the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on 29 January 2025, political tensions have increasingly played bilaterally, notably between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin and Niger. The Cotonou-Niamey relationship stands out as particularly strained, marked by deep mistrust, personalisation and mutual accusations.

Triggered by Niger’s 2023 coup, the crisis quickly turned confrontational. Beninese President Patrice Talon’s backing of ECOWAS’ stance on reinstating Mohamed Bazoum, including by force, prompted Niamey to close the border, which remains shut despite sanctions being lifted in February 2024.

The dispute has since crystallised around Nigerien claims of a French military presence in northern Benin, which Cotonou denies. Benin’s attempted coup in 2025 further hardened positions, fuelling mutual allegations.

Although Niger’s President General Abdourahmane Tiani denied involvement, the episode triggered reciprocal diplomatic expulsions in early 2026. Relations deteriorated further after the March Islamic State attack on Niamey airport, with Tiani directly accusing Talon, France’s President Emmanuel Macron and Côte d’Ivoire’s President Alassane Ouattara of supporting the assault.

Benin’s leadership change nonetheless reshapes the prospects for dialogue that two years of personalised tensions had rendered unlikely. During his campaign, Wadagni signalled intent to rebuild trust with estranged neighbours.

As a recognised technocrat unburdened by the most contentious phases of Niger’s post-coup period, he is well placed to leverage this opening. A bold regional initiative would signal the change his administration is expected to deliver, while offering a degree of political differentiation that economic continuity alone cannot provide.

Crucially, Niamey could also benefit from the strategic breathing space that normalisation would offer. Initially deployed as a pressure lever, the border closure has become a security, economic and diplomatic liability. Easing tensions along its southern flank would allow Niger’s authorities to refocus on a stalled political transition.

These dynamics are underpinned by resilient economic and security interdependencies that maintain a floor of engagement. The Niger-Benin oil pipeline illustrates this dynamic. Despite mutual weaponisation – Cotonou blocking exports in 2024 and Niamey shutting the valves weeks later – neither side has moved to permanently dismantle the arrangement. The infrastructure has continued to operate, albeit intermittently, even as diplomatic ties collapsed.

For Niger, restoring access to Benin’s maritime corridor would ease supply constraints and reduce reliance on longer, costlier routes that have driven rising prices. Trade has continued through informal networks, and the reopening of the Tsamiya-Kamba corridor via Nigeria points to a partial easing.

But these workarounds remain limited. Without a formal reset with Cotonou, Niamey’s economic outlook will remain constrained.

For Benin, normalisation would mean reviving activity at Cotonou’s port, whose transit traffic – historically driven by Niger for over 90% – has yet to recover to pre-crisis levels. Between the first quarter of 2023 and the same period in 2024, the number of vessels calling at the port fell by around 24% and imports dropped by 34%.

Security-wise, closer coordination between Niamey and Cotonou in the W-Arly-Pendjari Complex would serve shared interests. It would strengthen Niger’s ability to contain armed groups exploiting cross-border coordination gaps.

For Benin, it would help ease pressure on overstretched forces facing intensified incursions into Alibori and Atacora. Violence across the Benin-Niger-Nigeria border area rose by 86% from 2024 to 2025. In April 2025, a Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin attack killed 54 Beninese soldiers in what was the country’s deadliest year on record.

Most importantly, normalisation between Niamey and Cotonou could generate wider regional momentum. In the context of AES solidarity, a thaw with Niger could encourage Ouagadougou to soften its own stance towards Benin, particularly on military coordination in the Kourou-Koalou area, where armed group activity intersects with an unresolved border dispute.

A joint security arrangement for the area was already agreed in principle during Talon’s visit to Ouagadougou in February 2023, but remains unimplemented due to regional tensions.

More broadly, a bilateral reset between Niamey and Cotonou could help reopen pragmatic cooperation across the subregion. At the same time, the terms of separation between the AES and ECOWAS are still being worked out. It would not resolve underlying political differences, but could create space for a minimal framework of engagement between the two blocs, especially on security.

The question of a French military presence in Benin however remains a sensitive complication. Paris’ recent acknowledgement of special forces deployed in support of Benin’s counter-terrorism efforts lends retrospective weight to Niger’s concerns.

But Niamey cannot realistically make this a precondition for re-engagement without encroaching on Benin’s sovereign defence choices and foreclosing any prospect of dialogue.

A more workable path would be to anchor normalisation in mutually agreed, formalised assurances on the use of each other’s territory – aimed at dispelling concerns about potential use for hostile or destabilising purposes – and commitments to refrain from deploying foreign forces near the shared border.

Ultimately, the transition in Cotonou creates a small window of opportunity. Allowing it to close would prolong a political impasse with growing costs for both parties and the wider region. The AU could play a facilitation role here, drawing on a capacity for engagement that other regional actors have largely lost.

The AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel, through its mandate, its Bamako base, and its engagement with both AES and ECOWAS member states, remains the AU’s most credible institutional instrument for facilitation. Its Special Representative has already initiated consultations across both blocs.

Addis Ababa should build on this momentum through stronger political backing, enabling the AU to assert its leadership amid growing regional fragmentation.

Written by Djiby Sow, Senior Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel; Hassane Koné, Senior Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel; and Leylatou Saïdou Daoura, Bosch Research Fellow, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel