Domestic stability concerns in Mozambique relate primarily to a single narrative of tensions and renewed violence between the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo - the official opposition party and former guerrilla movement that took part in the 1975-1992 war) and the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo - the elected ruling party).⁽²⁾ Renamo and Frelimo press statements, printed and radio media coverage, both within and outside Mozambique, statements by investment and tourist companies as well as by academic discourse informs the narrative. The cause of renewed tensions relates primarily to Renamo’s search for political relevance and access to economic resources.⁽³⁾ The narrative therefore contains indirect reference to both Frelimo and Renamo’s power relations and how to create acceptability within a democracy still in the process of consolidation.⁽⁴⁾ This paper advocates for the need for a more inclusive narrative, representative of civil society stakeholders, whereby the attainment of conflict resolution is not only a cooperation agreement between the two main parties.

Renewed tensions

Tensions between Frelimo and Renamo have flared up since October 2012. Incidents culminating in tensions included the government’s raid on Renamo’s headquarters in Muxungue (about 650km north of Maputo), Renamo’s threats to disrupt economic activities in the north, deployment of government security forces in the Muxungue area, isolated skirmishes between Renamo and government security forces, as well as road blocks by Renamo.⁽⁵⁾ Tensions have resulted in foreign embassies issuing warnings that only essential travel be considered through the Muxungue region. Economic consequences were felt when the Anglo-Australian company, Rio Tinto, the second largest coal producer in Mozambique, suspended coal shipments on the Sena railway at the end of June 2013.⁽⁶⁾ The impact of these events on citizens is illustrated by the following statement from Jose Mucote, a director of Radio Save, a Deutsche Welle partner station in the region: "We live in a climate of fear. Local residents next to the affected area appear unruffled, but people from neighbouring regions fear civil war could be about to return."⁽⁷⁾

Reasons for tensions

The narrative’s causational frame primarily relates to Renamo demands, which are viewed as attempts to maintain political relevance. Renamo leader, Alfonso Dhlakama, has cited the Mozambican government’s failure to meet Renamo’s demands, which ranged from electoral reform, security force integration of the Mozambique national military and equal distribution of wealth from mineral resources.⁽⁸⁾

With municipal elections scheduled for November 2013, and presidential and parliamentary elections for October 2014, one of the main issues causing friction between Renamo and Frelimo is electoral reform.⁽⁹⁾ One particular point of contention is representation in the National Electoral Commission (CNE).⁽¹⁰⁾ According to Mozambican electoral law, political parties have fewer representatives in the electoral watchdog than civil society, and only parties with more seats in parliament gain more representatives.⁽¹¹⁾ Seeing this as unfair, Renamo has demanded more power to political parties and that all major political forces in the CNE be given equal say under the principle of parity.⁽¹²⁾ Renamo has threatened to boycott upcoming elections if these demands are unresolved.⁽¹³⁾

Another Renamo grievance concerns natural resources and funding. The opposition party is calling for greater access to the benefits of this booming resource wealth.⁽¹⁴⁾ In a letter addressed to the Mozambican Cabinet in April 2013, the Renamo leadership said: "it does not understand why it remains excluded from enjoying the wealth which resulted from the peace it helped to achieve and maintain during the past 20 years."⁽¹⁵⁾ The letter also states that Renamo needs access to more wealth if it is to complete the transition of its military branch into a political force peacefully.

The narrative also views Frelimo and Renamo’s direct opposite political power projections as cause for renewed tensions. In this regard, Renamo is desperate to maintain political relevance against Frelimo’s control over state institutions.⁽¹⁶⁾ These opposites are central to the narrative’s contention of the probability of sustained renewed violence.⁽¹⁷⁾

Renamo/Frelimo – Polar opposites

Renamo’s return to disruptive strategies seems to be derived from awareness that it is unlikely to gain political power through formalised democratic processes.⁽¹⁸⁾ This was evident in the most recent election results of 2009 where Frelimo garnered 75% of the vote, and seems to have consolidated its position, whereas Renamo’s position was significantly weakened.⁽¹⁹⁾ Furthermore, Renamo’s current position is impeded by a lack of funds and an inability to reinvent itself as a fully-fledged opposition party.⁽²⁰⁾ A continuous increasing lack of electoral support during elections is evidence of Renamo’s weakened position. After gaining 33% of the vote in 1994, Renamo’s share of the vote dropped to about 16% in 2009.⁽²¹⁾ The narrative also projects Renamo’s sustained militarised organisational structure.⁽²²⁾ Statements by Dhlakama and senior party members, who advocate the restoration of former military bases coupled with intermittent threats of violence, reflects this continued military organisational context.⁽²³⁾ Instead of seeking electoral support, Renamo therefore focuses on its traditional rivalry with Frelimo, resulting in concerns of renewed violence and negative economic implications.⁽²⁴⁾ Reinforcing this perspective is Renamo’s tendency to isolate itself at Muxungue with accompanied speculations that supporters are engaged in military training.⁽²⁵⁾

Renamo’s precarious position stands in contrast to Frelimo’s political authority, as Frelimo has consolidated its electoral support, primarily within Mozambique’s urban and southern districts.⁽²⁶⁾ However, two pertinent aspects are generally raised with regard to Frelimo. First, Frelimo is under increased pressure to address corruption and socio-economic inequality amongst citizens as the majority of Mozambicans live on US$ 400 per annum despite economic growth rates of 7.5% over the past five years.⁽²⁷⁾ Moreover, there are no contradictions between the executive and Frelimo in parliament, which restrains policy debate and reduces parliament to a secondary role.⁽²⁸⁾ Renamo’s power to influence the policy-making agenda therefore remains severely constrained, resulting in increased dissatisfaction and an unwillingness to cooperate within government’s institutional arrangements.⁽²⁹⁾ Neo-patrimonialism marks Frelimo’s position, where appointments and promotions are based on favouritism and patronage therewith emulating “politics of the veranda”, whereby modern state features in Africa are engulfed by informal relationships.⁽³⁰⁾ President Armando Guebuza is criticised by opponents for using his position to expand family businesses, inclusive of ports, logistics, construction and tourism, with a popular nickname for this exploitation as “Guebusiness.”⁽³¹⁾ This view, focused on Frelimo’s centralisation and exploitation of power, is shared by other stakeholders such as diplomats from the G-19 group of principal donors and the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM), which was formed by Renamo dissidents and currently holds eight parliamentary seats.⁽³²⁾

Secondly, with presidential and parliamentary elections due in 2014, Frelimo will enter a phase of intra-party succession discourse, as Guebuza cannot stand for a third term.⁽³³⁾ A re-directed focus by Frelimo on this matter could negate immediacy in seeking compromise with Renamo or even allow the latter to see this as an opportunity in strengthening its armed position in the north.

A frame of conflict resolution

With these opposite positions, current attempts at resolving the political impasse between Frelimo and Renamo by means of inter-party negotiations presents a frame of mistrust. A historical context of the parties being adversaries in Mozambique’s 16-year civil war exacerbates such mistrust.⁽³⁴⁾

Such mistrust is evident in Renamo’s intermittent threats of a return to violence as well as Frelimo’s appointment of a former freedom fighter and Frelimo loyalist, Graca Tomas Chongo, as military head. The immediate deployment of security forces to the Sofala province and arrest of Renamo’s information spokesperson, Jeronimo Malagueta, reflect the level of mistrust between the parties.⁽³⁵⁾ Mistrust is also observable in the setting of pre-conditions to agreements. Renamo, for example, has demanded that government remove police and military units stationed near Satungira, in Gorongosa, prior to any meeting between President Guebuza and Dhlakama.⁽³⁶⁾ For its part, Frelimo demands that meetings are held in Maputo and not Gorongosa.⁽³⁷⁾

Finally, mistrust is also observable in the language used by both Frelimo and Renamo. Frelimo press statements, for example, accuse Renamo of “political blackmail” and of setting “extensive conditions” that are contradictory to the “urgent measures the country needs.” On the other hand, Renamo accuses Frelimo of “designing a scenario of war” and maintains its initial statements of intended disruptions of municipal elections, scheduled for November 2013.⁽³⁸⁾ It also has not changed its stance in refusing to participate in the elections.⁽³⁹⁾ Current negotiations are therefore likely to become more complex with discussions regarding the demilitarisation of Renamo and security force integration. This would demand of Renamo to surrender its most powerful commodity: the ability to engage in violence.

A more recent addition to the narrative is that of criminal activities likely to exploit current tensions between Frelimo and Renamo. Renamo has denied involvement in ambushes that resulted in two casualties on 21 June 2013.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Furthermore, Renamo denied similar involvement in attacks on Mozambique’s administrative post of Savane (Sofala), which resulted in the theft of military material as well as the death of seven soldiers.⁽⁴¹⁾ Responsibility for the attacks remains unaccounted for. However, the possibility of criminal groups seizing the opportunity for self-enrichment and accessing weapons cannot be excluded. A case in point is the presence of organised groups engaged in rhino poaching. There is increased evidence of an escalation of illegal consignments of elephant ivory and timber moving to and from Mozambique, with criminal networks’ reliance on weapons to execute illegal poaching activities.⁽⁴²⁾ The current presence of the government’s military in Sofala provides an ideal opportunity for such groups seeking access to more sophisticated weapons under the banner of Renamo. The possibility of collaboration between Renamo soldiers and criminal groups, whereby reciprocal financial and weapon advances could be gained, must not be excluded.

Risk implications

Three possible risk scenarios are discernible for Mozambique’s pre-election phase.

First, is the scenario of politics of exclusion. Irrespective of negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo, the high level of mistrust primarily informed by the threat of organised violence, results in the continuation of the current impasse. Renamo therefore views a return to armed mobilisation as the only means to secure relevance and force Frelimo to accommodate its demands. In response, Frelimo relies on security deployments in the north and arrests to counter Renamo acts of insurgency and to ensure its authority in the northern regions of Mozambique. This scenario contains a militarised context of conflict resolution with negative political and economic consequences for Mozambique. Though the narrative doubts Renamo’s resource capacity to re-launch full scale hostilities, the impact of isolated incidents generates frustration and fear among citizens and international investors.⁽⁴³⁾

Second, is the scenario of politics of inclusion. Negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo result in an agreement on resolving and even accommodating Renamo’s demands. Though these agreements require a process of implementation, the narrative takes on a more positive stance as the principal parties seek amity. This scenario, however, provides only short-term gains, whereby Renamo’s demands are partially met to secure stability and create an environment conducive to free and fair elections. Roadblocks and skirmishes with security forces therefore continue, albeit isolated, with a more criminal, rather than political, intent. Hence, stability concerns in light of increased criminalisation remain. In addition, the party political settlement negates direct attempts at addressing socio-economic inequalities, more specifically in the labour, education and health sectors, facilitating increased voices of frustration and protest actions.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Third, is the scenario of inclusive resolution, or, as the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) Senior Social Policy Specialist in Maputo, Lisa Kurbiel, states: “this should be a transformational opportunity."⁽⁴⁵⁾ This scenario provides for a more comprehensive solution to the current tensions within Mozambique, whereby actors, such civil society organisations, the media, business leaders and non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) actively engage in and contribute the search for long-term solutions. Such engagements inform both Frelimo and Renamo on Mozambique’s continued socio-economic needs and the need for stability.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Agreements are not only to seek immediate inter-party cooperation, but also to improve governance, institutional stability and development to the benefit of all Mozambique’s citizens.

If the current narrative, as presented in this paper, continues, Mozambique’s immediate future is likely to be that of the second scenario. This is attributed to a narrative of continued military talk between Frelimo and Renamo, two leaders unwilling to compromise their political relevance, and a traditional frame of fortified conflict resolution. The current lack of civil society and business sector participation in seeking a negotiated settlement allows both Frelimo and Renamo to seek agreements confined to party political interests.

Conclusion

The need for either an expanded or an alternative narrative for Mozambique is a necessity for stability, good governance and socio-economic development. Ideally, increased civil society discourse will enable greater awareness of a broader range of risks related to Mozambique’s political-economy, therewith enabling a more inclusive conflict resolution frame. If not forthcoming, the current narrative will prevail with accompanied increased frustrations, unfulfilled expectations and an elitist settlement, all of which will trigger greater short-term risks to Mozambique with the apprehension of a return to civil war.

Written by Jasmine Opperman ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Jasmine Opperman is a Research Associate with CAI and a Southern Africa-based researcher and commentator on conflict trends and developments in Africa. Contact Jasmine through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Elections & Democracy Unit ( elections.democracy@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Nicky Berg.
(2) Vines, A., ‘Mozambique’s 20 years of peace at risk?’, Chatham House, 11 April 2013, http://www.chathamhouse.org; Fletcher, P., ‘Insight - “Donors’ darling” Mozambique looks less loveable after attacks’, The Star Online, 23 July 2013, http://www.thestar.com.my.
(3) A narrative refers to perspectives on a subject matter as to attain meaning to the issue at hand. Narratives are the combinations of various frames of stakeholders that provide insight into how issues are constructed. Frames are essential to the issues at hand, as problems are not objective facts, but are constructed by those involved.
(4) ‘Renamo’s threat to block road and rail stifles investor confidence’, ABN Digital, June 2013, http://beta.abndigital.com.
(5) Lopes M., ‘Guerrilla attacks Harm tourism’, Thompson Reuters Foundation, 4 July 2013, http://www.trust.org; Scherer, F., ‘RENAMO needs to reinvent itself to stay relevant in Mozambican politics’, Political Analysis South Africa, 9 April 2013, http://www.politicalanalysis.co.za; Dzinesa, G. and Wache, P., ‘Frelimo and Renamo needs to detoxify their relationship’, Business Day Live, 17 July 2013, http://www.bdlive.co.za; Fletcher,P., ‘Insight – “Donors’ darling” Mozambique looks less loveable after attacks’, The Star Online, 23 July 2013, http://www.thestar.com.my.
(6) ‘Security worries grow in Mozambique after rebel attacks’, DW, July 2013, http://www.dw.de; ‘Renamo’s threat to block road and rail stifles investor confidence’, ABN Digital, June 2013, http://beta.abndigital.com.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Lopes, M., ‘Guerrilla attacks Harm tourism’, Thompson Reuters Foundation, 4 July 2013, http://www.trust.org; Dzinesa, G. and Wache, P., ‘Frelimo and Renamo needs to detoxify their relationship’, Business Day Live, 17 July 2013, http://www.bdlive.co.za.
(9) ‘Mozambique: Government and Renamo reach partial consensus’, Nam News Network, 17 July 2013, http://www.namnewsnetwork.org.
(10) ‘Mozambique govt, opposition Renamo resume talks 1st July’, StarAfrica.com, 15 June 2013, http://en.starafrica.com; ‘Mozambique: Government and Renamo reach partial consensus’, Nam News Network, 17 July 2013, http://www.namnewsnetwork.org.
(11) Dzinesa, G. and Wache, P., ‘Frelimo and Renamo needs to detoxify their relationship’, Business Day Live, 17 July 2013, http://www.bdlive.co.za.
(12) Ibid.
(13) ‘Mozambique: Government and Renamo reach partial consensus’, Nam News Network, 17 July 2013, http://www.namnewsnetwork.org; ‘Mozambique: MDM presents more candidates’, All Africa, 4 August 2013, http://allafrica.com.
(14) Dzinesa, G. and Wache, P., ‘Frelimo and Renamo needs to detoxify their relationship’, Business Day Live, 17 July 2013, http://www.bdlive.co.za.
(15) Scherer, F., ‘RENAMO needs to reinvent itself to stay relevant in Mozambican politics’, Political Analysis South Africa, 9 April 2013, http://www.politicalanalysis.co.za.
(16) Scherer, F., ‘RENAMO needs to reinvent itself to stay relevant in Mozambican politics’, Political Analysis South Africa, 9 April 2013, http://www.politicalanalysis.co.za; Dzinesa, G. and Wache, P., ‘Frelimo and Renamo needs to detoxify their relationship’, Business Day Live, 17 July 2013, http://www.bdlive.co.za; Do Rosario, .D.M, ‘From negligence to populism: An analysis of Mozambique’s agricultural political economy’, Future Agricultures working paper, http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk.
(17) ‘Renamo’s threat to block road and rail stifles investor confidence’, ABN Digital, June 2013, http://beta.abndigital.com.
(18) Scherer, F., ‘RENAMO needs to reinvent itself to stay relevant in Mozambican politics’, Political Analysis South Africa, 9 April 2013, http://www.politicalanalysis.co.za.
(19) ‘Mozambique election results’, http://psephos.adam-carr.net.
(20) Do Rosario, D.M., ‘From negligence to populism: An analysis of Mozambique’s agricultural political economy’, Future Agricultures working paper, http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk.
(21) Mozambique election results’, http://psephos.adam-carr.net.
(22) Scherer, F., ‘RENAMO needs to reinvent itself to stay relevant in Mozambican politics’, Political Analysis South Africa, 9 April 2013, http://www.politicalanalysis.co.za.
(23) Dzinesa, G. and Wache, P., ‘Frelimo and Renamo needs to detoxify their relationship’, Business Day Live, 17 July 2013, http://www.bdlive.co.za.
(24) Scherer, F., ‘RENAMO needs to reinvent itself to stay relevant in Mozambican politics’, Political Analysis South Africa, 9 April 2013, http://www.politicalanalysis.co.za.
(25) Ibid; Fletcher, P., ‘Insight – “Donors’ darling” Mozambique looks less loveable after attacks’, The Star Online, 23 July 2013, http://www.thestar.com.my.
(26) Do Rosario, D.M., ‘From negligence to populism: An analysis of Mozambique’s agricultural political economy’, Future Agricultures working paper, http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk; ‘Mozambique election results’, http://psephos.adam-carr.net.
(27) Dzinesa, G. and Wache, P., ‘Frelimo and Renamo needs to detoxify their relationship’, Business Day Live, 17 July 2013, http://www.bdlive.co.za.
(28) Do Rosario, D.M., ‘From negligence to populism: An analysis of Mozambique’s agricultural political economy’, Future Agricultures working paper, http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk.
(29) Ibid.
(30) Lockwood, M., ‘Adaptation policy, governance and politics in sub-Saharan Africa’, Institute of Development Studies of Sussex, March 2012, http://www.adaptgov.com; Do Rosario, D.M., ‘From negligence to populism: An analysis of Mozambique’s agricultural political economy’, Future Agricultures working paper, http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk.
(31) Fletcher, P., ‘Insight – “Donors’ darling” Mozambique looks less loveable after attacks’, The Star Online, 23 July 2013, http://www.thestar.com.my.
(32) Ibid
(33) ‘Political tensions and a weak infrastructure among risks for oil and gas projects in Mozambique’, Maplecroft, December 2012, http://www.maplecroft.com; ‘Mozambique and the fear of resource curse’, The Southern Times, 5 August 2013, http://www.southerntimesafrica.com.
(34) Dzinesa, G. and Wache, P., ‘Frelimo and Renamo needs to detoxify their relationship’, Business Day Live, 17 July 2013, http://www.bdlive.co.za; ‘Mozambique and the fear of resource curse’, The Southern Times, 5 August 2013, http://www.southerntimesafrica.com.
(35) ‘Mozambique faces growing political instability’, United Worldwide, June 2013, http://maputo.wantedworldwide.net; Fletcher, P., ‘Insight: Donors darling Mozambique looks less loveable after attacks’, The Star Online, 23 July 2013, http://www.thestar.com.my.
(36) Dzinesa, G. and Wache, P., ‘Frelimo and Renamo needs to detoxify their relationship’, Business Day Live, 17 July 2013, http://www.bdlive.co.za.
(37) Ibid.
(38) Fletcher, P., ‘Insight – “Donors’ darling” Mozambique looks less loveable after attacks’, The Star Online, 23 July 2013, http://www.thestar.com.my.
(39) ‘Mozambique: Government and Renamo reach partial consensus’, Nam News Network, 17 July 2013, http://www.namnewsnetwork.org.
(40) ‘Three Mozambique soldiers arrested for highway robberies’, Daily Nation, 29 July 2013, http://www.nation.co.ke.
(41) ‘Renamo’s threat to block road and rail stifles investor confidence’, June 2013, http://beta.abndigital.com.
(42) ‘Rhino poaching: It’s war!’, Daily Maverick, 1 March 2013, http://www.dailymaverick.co.za; ‘Killing fields. Africa’s rhinos under threat’, Time Magazine, 2011, http://www.time.com.
(43) Fletcher, P., ‘Insight – “Donors’ darling” Mozambique looks less loveable after attacks’, The Star Online, 23 July 2013, http://www.thestar.com.my; ‘Mozambique army attacks former rebel camp’, Pan Africa News, July 2013, http://panafricannews.blogspot.com.
(44) Ibid.
(45) Ibid.