Kigali’s threat to remove its security forces exposes the limits of Mozambique’s fragile, natural resource-driven security strategy.

Senior Rwandan government figures have threatened to withdraw their troops from Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province if sustainable international funding for the mission is not found.

Kigali’s 14 March threat coincided with Mozambican President Daniel Chapo’s visit to Brussels to discuss continued cooperation. It followed reports that the European Union (EU) would not renew funding for Rwandan troops in Mozambique beyond May.

Since 2022, this funding has totalled around US$46-million. That accounts for just under 17% of Rwanda’s reported total Cabo Delgado deployment costs, while providing important political and diplomatic backing for the operations.

Rwanda also faces international scrutiny for its support of the M23 rebellion and covert deployment in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). That situation led the United States (US) to impose sanctions on the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and senior officials on 2 March.

The EU has faced internal divisions over funding the RDF through the European Peace Facility and its broader position on Rwanda in the DRC-M23 conflict. A key issue is whether backing RDF operations in Mozambique undermines the EU’s stance on the DRC, or whether it is necessary to protect European energy interests in Cabo Delgado and maintain ties with Rwanda.

These energy interests have grown since the Ukraine war pushed efforts to reduce reliance on Russian gas. They are expected to increase as Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports diminish following US and Israeli strikes on Iran. Mozambique’s gas reserves could make it a top 10 global producer and account for 20% of Africa’s output by 2040.

Rwandan troops have played a key role in securing Cabo Delgado, allowing major LNG projects by TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil to resume operations after years of suspension due to the insurgency in the province.

Rwanda initially deployed around 1 000 RDF soldiers and police in 2021 to support combat operations and stabilise Cabo Delgado. Insurgents had overwhelmed Mozambican troops, seized key areas like Mocímboa da Praia, and attacked Palma near the TotalEnergies LNG site. Rwandan troops quickly retook Mocímboa da Praia and secured areas around the site.

Nearly five years later, the insurgency continues. Rwanda’s deployment has reached over 4 000 troops, focusing mostly on protecting natural gas areas in Palma and controlling strategic towns. A 2025 Status of Forces Agreement between Rwanda and Mozambique, centred on territorial containment and the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Mozambique, provided security guarantees for TotalEnergies to resume operations.

After the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique withdrew from Cabo Delgado in 2024, Rwanda’s exit would be a major setback. Despite EU and US support, Mozambique’s security forces face serious shortcomings, including accusations of abuses against civilians, poor logistics and delayed salaries.

The country cannot independently secure its territory, leaving civilians and critical gas infrastructure reliant on foreign troops, and exposing Mozambique to more insecurity if external support diminishes. Insurgents have claimed over 6 500 lives since 2017, and remain active.

But Rwanda may also see little benefit in withdrawing. The Islamic State Mozambique insurgency is driven largely by local factors, including social, political and economic exclusion by the Maputo central government. But its reported connections to other Islamic State-affiliated groups in the region, such as the Allied Democratic Forces in eastern DRC, incentivise Rwanda to ensure broader regional security.

Kigali’s deployment in Cabo Delgado also serves economic interests. Besides the Status of Forces Agreement, Rwanda and Mozambique entered into a memorandum of understanding to develop their investment and trade relationship.

This strategy is not new to Rwanda. In the Central African Republic, Rwanda’s military presence has enabled Rwandan-linked firms to expand. In Cabo Delgado, private security companies like Isco Segurança and construction companies like Radar Scape – both connected to the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front – have entered into gas-related projects. With LNG operations resuming, these activities will likely grow, making Cabo Delgado an increasingly important area of influence for Kigali.

Politically, the deployment has helped Rwanda position itself as a credible regional security provider and dependable partner, strengthening its diplomatic standing while deflecting scrutiny over its role in the DRC. By threatening to withdraw from Cabo Delgado, Rwanda is pressuring the US not to tighten sanctions and the EU not to withdraw funding. So warnings about removing its troops may not be genuine.

For the EU, the situation highlights the risks associated with the European Peace Facility. While the facility enables the bloc to provide direct security support to military actors, its use often reflects EU members’ divergent political priorities rather than a coherent strategy.

In the Great Lakes Region, the European Peace Facility is funding both the Rwandan and Congolese armed forces. The EU would not want its RDF funding in Cabo Delgado to support covert RDF operations in the DRC – but it’s almost impossible to monitor that or enforce such a condition.

United Nations reporting points to operational links between the two deployments, and the US has justified its RDF sanctions on the Rwandan army’s alleged institutional involvement in the M23 conflict.

Nevertheless, while the EU cannot politically defend continued financial support for the RDF, it is unlikely to favour Rwanda’s withdrawal from Cabo Delgado without a credible alternative to secure European energy interests in Mozambique. The US might also consider waiving some RDF sanctions to avoid jeopardising billion-dollar US investments in Mozambique, including a natural gas megaproject funded by American oil giant ExxonMobil.

This apparent contradiction reflects a growing shift to resource-driven, transactional engagement by both the US and Europe. It also shows that focusing on securing strategic energy infrastructure does not necessarily address the structural conditions – such as economic exclusion – that drive recruitment into the insurgencies.

The current approach in Cabo Delgado prolongs instability, undermines human security and maintains reliance on external security support. Continued dependence on the RDF reveals the structural vulnerability of Mozambique’s stabilisation strategy. It exposes the country to high-stakes and unpredictable risks driven by disputes between external actors and unresolved local grievances.

Written by Borges Nhamirre, Researcher, Transnational Threats and Organised Crime, ISS; Bram Verelst, Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention, Management and Peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region, ISS; and Said Abdullahi, Research Intern, Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region, ISS Nairobi