Instead of reinforcing borders, African and Western governments should handle unprecedented migration levels by negotiating skilled-worker agreements.

The future will almost inevitably see large-scale migration on a level unknown in several generations, possibly centuries. It won’t happen in the next two years but will steadily ramp up so that by mid-century, hundreds of thousands of people globally will likely be on the move annually. 

Large-scale migration will happen because of push and pull factors. The push effects will be caused by climate change and the lack of opportunity in regions such as Africa and the Middle East. The pull factor will be from declining populations and demand for labour in countries such as Germany, China, Russia, Poland, Japan and South Korea. 

The push effect of climate change is already evident in regions that include some of the poorest countries globally, such as the Horn of Africa and West Africa, and is exacerbated by deprivation.

Research by the Institute for Security Studies’ African Futures and Innovation team indicates that growth requirements of more than 15% a year are needed to end extreme poverty in Africa before mid-century. China and the Asian Tigers managed sustained growth rates approaching a much more modest 10% a year. In an era of slow growth globally, Africa is unlikely to approach even that rate. The result in Africa will be many economies with a surplus of educated people but limited formal sector job opportunities.

As we see in our long-term employment forecasts, the implication is that many Africans will survive in the informal economy and remain poorer than in most other regions, although their situation will steadily improve. They will inevitably search for opportunities abroad –eventually pushing against an open door as demand for labour elsewhere increases. This will happen even as African governments work to create employment opportunities, constrain outward migration and grow their economies.

The pull effect will be provided by the declining populations of regions such as Europe, with its high standards of living, freedom and infrastructure. This year, the population numbers of 29 countries globally – including Finland, South Korea, Germany, Russia, Japan and Ukraine – are in absolute decline.

Already in 2022, Europe had six-million vacant jobs. Technology can compensate for the decline in the size of the labour force as a percentage of the total population, but artificial intelligence does not cut hair, drive garbage trucks and look after the elderly.

The pull effect of labour shortages in rich European countries and elsewhere will eventually create an unstoppable momentum. Consider, for example, that in the European Union, 112-million people are currently aged over 65 years – roughly 22% of the total population. By 2050 it will have increased to 142-million (30% of the population).

No amount of investment in hard borders and other controls will succeed in the face of massive demand for elder care, or compensate for Europe’s labour force reduction from its current 251-million to 228-million. The challenges with stricter border control are evident in how countries like the United States (US), Italy, Spain and others struggle to contain the current trickle. 

By 2050 the populations of 64 countries will be in an annual decline. In China, that trend starts in 2026. By the end of the century, the number of countries with falling populations will have more than doubled to 147 out of 188 countries in our database, including India (from around 2057) and the US (from around 2082).

Most countries still experiencing a population increase by 2100 will be in Africa, with a few possible outliers such as Canada and Australia (due to high rates of expected inward migration). This also includes a poor country such as Afghanistan with its tenaciously high fertility rate. The only countries with large populations that will still increase would be Nigeria (then the fourth largest population globally) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (sixth largest population globally). 

The world will have to consider the ramifications of these changes and design appropriate strategies. In the short and medium terms – before the labour shortages in destination countries become acute – increased migrant flows will polarise electorates and energise nationalist and nativist movements. This is already evident in the US, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden and elsewhere.

Eventually, in those countries with declining populations that don’t attract migrants, rural and urban areas will be scarcely populated, with low or no demand for additional housing. Employers will struggle to recruit staff. The consequences in authoritarian countries such as China, North Korea and Russia are less clear and more likely to contribute to economic stagnation and eventually regression.

Richer, democratic countries that attract large-scale migration will struggle with cultural matters, including social tensions if migrants are not well integrated. On the other end of the equation, large outflows of skilled and semi-skilled people could undermine sending countries’ economies. The effect of a brain drain is already decimating the health profession of Nigeria and Ghana, for example.

In previous centuries, when large-scale migration occurred, such as from many European countries to the US, an entire logistics value chain was established to process and manage the flows legally. We will probably eventually see the same, with flows this time from Africa.

Instead of hardening border protection, African and Western governments should negotiate bilateral agreements where Africa supplies skilled workers to Europe as part of formal, government-to-government arrangements. This could help Europe meet its skills gaps while African governments gain funds to train and educate more people.

For this reason, the World Bank encourages strategic migration management by making labour migration an explicit part of the development strategy in migration-origin countries. Governments in destination countries need to match migrants’ skills and attributes with their labour needs. The alternative – migration as part of organised crime – is simply too ghastly to contemplate.

Written by Jakkie Cilliers, Head, African Futures and Innovation, ISS Pretoria

This article was first published in Africa Tomorrow, ISS’ African Futures blog