On 21 September 2013, al-Shabaab raided the Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi, which culminated in a three-day standoff and left approximately 68 people dead and more than 200 injured.⁽²⁾ During the incident non-Muslims were executed, hostages were taken to prolong the raid, and well-trained al-Shabaab fighters succeeded in holding off security forces. In addition, the raid gained significant international publicity.⁽³⁾ This incident re-introduced the notion of prejudiced terrorism as a viable means for terrorist organisations to achieve success. Prejudiced terrorism refers to the planned intent of using violence against predetermined victims to generate fear within specific communities, in pursuit of radicalised objectives. Whereas indiscriminate terrorism’s objective is to cause casualties irrespective of convictions, prejudiced terrorism is characterised by a specific target list informed by a terrorist leadership with fanatical intolerance and hatred.⁽⁴⁾

This paper draws on the Westgate incident to provide insight into the nature of prejudiced terrorism, with specific reference to the manifestation thereof within al-Shabaab.⁽⁵⁾ The paper also reflects on counter terrorism strategies for prejudiced terrorism within the African context.

The nature of prejudiced terrorism

Intensification of jihad inspired violence

The Nairobi attack marks the continuation of a trend in a growing number of African states, namely the intensification of religious extremism.⁽⁶⁾ There is an escalation of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, for example, as well as the continued Islamist jihad in Mali. Moreover, various authorities in Tunisia, Central African Republic, Tanzania, Senegal and Niger have all expressed concern about the potential for jihadist movements to take root in their countries.⁽⁷⁾

Turning to the Westgate example, these concerns have been validated as the incident demonstrated that al-Shabaab is coordinating its attacks with a strategy laid out by al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, as announced on 13 September 2013.⁽⁸⁾ This strategy is as follows:

• First, ensure the target is Western. Those killed in the Westgate example included three British citizens, two French nationals and two Canadians. Furthermore, the mall is Israeli owned and known for representing consumerism of expatriates, politicians and the affluent.⁽⁹⁾ In his 13 September message, al-Zawahiri warned against attacks on non-Western states unless the regime was part of "the American forces." Kenya, with its long tradition of close relationships with Western militaries, fits that bill.⁽¹⁰⁾
• Secondly, take hostages where possible. Whereas most recent acts of terrorism have relied on high impact and short lived events, the Westgate incident presented an intentionally pro-longed event whereby maximum publicity was ascertained. Al-Zawahiri recommended taking “the citizens of the countries that are participating in the invasion of Muslim countries as hostages so that our prisoners may be freed in exchange.”⁽¹¹⁾
• Thirdly, avoid Muslim casualties. Al-Shabaab claimed on its Twitter feed that the gunmen escorted Muslims out of the mall, before turning on the “disbelievers” inside.⁽¹²⁾ Witnesses noted that the gunmen at the Westgate mall tried to identify Muslims by asking shoppers the name of Mohammed's mother. They shot those who did not know.⁽¹³⁾
• Fourthly, a redirected focus on “soft targets”. While al-Shabaab’s acts of terror were previously limited to African Union peacekeeping troops there is now a shift to “soft targets”.⁽¹⁴⁾ This implies possible attacks on public places such as shopping malls and even specific communities. Such attacks will strengthen Mukhtar Abu Zubayr intent to transform al-Shabaab into an al Qaeda affiliate.⁽¹⁵⁾

Ascendancy of militant factions

Prejudiced terrorism is hybrid in nature as the organisations that perpetrate it are led by militant factions linked to al-Qaeda. The Westgate incident reflects the success of Ahmed Abdi Godane’s (leader of al-Shabaab) efforts in transforming al-Shabaab from a Somali clan-based Islamist militancy group to an al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group, therewith expanding its possible targets beyond that of the immediate region.⁽¹⁶⁾

Given the tempo, nature, location and frequency of al-Shabaab attacks in the last year (inclusive of Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya), reports of a diminishing al-Shabaab capacity, or that the incident is but a ‘desperate’ cry for publicity amid infighting, are deceptive.⁽¹⁷⁾ The Westgate incident rather reflects a change in the balance of power within al-Shabaab in support of its top leader Ahmed Abdi Godane due to the death (Ibrahim al-Afghani, Omar Hammami), silence (Mukhtar Robow), capitulation (Fu'aad Shongole) or fleeing (Hassan Dahir Aweys) of dissidents.⁽¹⁸⁾ Vanda Felbab-Brown at the Brookings Institution correctly states, for example, that while al-Shabaab, by April 2013, was "much weakened," many "fighters have simply gone to the ground ... with their weapons."⁽¹⁹⁾

The Westgate attack further indicates that the hard-line factions allied to al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane are strong, cohesive and capable of striking domestic and external enemies. The incident also confirms the ascendancy of al-Shabaab's most militant faction and its leader Mukhtar Abu al Zubayr (aka Ahmed Abdi Godane). Zubayr's increasingly tight grip on al-Shabaab, due to his use of the group's intelligence wing, Amniyat, in pursuing opponents appears to have forestalled the collapse of al-Shabaab, and may have made it more dangerous.⁽²⁰⁾ Zubayr has threatened a direct attack on the United States (US), for example, which prompted the US to offer a US$ 7 million reward for information locating him. Due to Zubayr’s control, the attack in Nairobi most probably received his “blessing,” and it may be a sign of things to come as al-Shabaab takes its war to other parts of East Africa.⁽²¹⁾ The Westgate incident presents first indications of the increased threat of al-Shabaab in staging attacks irrespective of international boundaries.⁽²²⁾

A low cost option

Prejudiced terrorism does not require extensive financial resources to enact acts of terror. Al Shabaab’s transformation from a guerrilla movement with an objective of gaining control in Somalia, to a hybrid terrorist organisation, means that less financial resources would be required to engage in acts of terror like Westgate. Jonathan Schanzer, the Vice President for research at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, estimated that the attack on the Nairobi mall probably cost the group “’close to US$ 100,000,’ calculating the price of the automatic rifles, bullets and grenades that were used, along with training costs and possibly rent for a store in the mall that investigators suspect may have been used as a weapon depot before the attack.”⁽²³⁾

Countering prejudiced terrorism requires a multi-layered response

To counter future al-Shabaab attacks, an integrated approach will be required at a national and international level. Such strategies should contain an inter-dependent response, comprised of military and intelligence operations, effective and efficient governance as well as inclusive societal recognition and engagement.

The African Union’s (AU’s) vision of “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa driven by its own citizens” can only be accomplished through the commitment of governments, citizens, regional and international stake holders.⁽²⁴⁾ Addressing transnational threats such as prejudiced terrorism in Africa requires collaboration among AU member states, regional economic communities (RECs), the United Nations (UN) and other international organisations, such as the European Union (EU).⁽²⁵⁾ At a regional level, counterterrorism partnerships are essential, such as the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI), West Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (WACTI), South Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (SACTI), and Nast Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (NACTI).⁽²⁶⁾ Hence counter terrorism collaboration does not require the introduction of additional measures and/or institutions, but rather the successful implementation of those measures and institutions that have already been established.

Moreover, military and intelligence operations must focus on individuals likely to engage in prejudiced terrorism. Such a strategy would require a regional and international integrated dimension in which intelligence dissemination, military resource deployments and training are ascertained and deployed on specific targets.⁽²⁷⁾ They require accountability and must be accessible to all citizens to create an environment of respect and trust. If not, such operations are likely to create a sense of insecurity, leaving communities more vulnerable to acts of terror.⁽²⁸⁾

It has further been noted that most African states vulnerable to terrorism lack effective and efficient governance structures. Abdi Aynte, Executive Director of the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies in Mogadishu, supports this notion, as he states that with porous borders and corrupt police officers, it was relatively easy for al-Shabaab to cross into Kenya with a bribe at the border.⁽²⁹⁾ He adds that al-Shabaab recruits have come from as far as Britain, Burundi, Chad, Uganda and the US. This potentially expands the group’s ability to take advantage of local passports, accents and communities to operate.⁽³⁰⁾

Good governance, focused on both possible primary and secondary targets of terrorism, must ensure the management of economic resources, maintenance of law and order, and realise an inclusive political sector that encompasses all ethnic, religious and racial communities. If not, prejudiced terrorism incidents are likely to rely on community discontent as a conduit for support. Several media reports alluded to the Westgate incident as proof of a growing radicalism of Kenya’s “own neglected, disaffected Muslim population,” for example.⁽³¹⁾

As a result, effective and efficient governance that is supported by the community would enable governments to win the hearts and minds of its citizens thereby weakening the prospects for prejudiced terrorism.

Conclusion

The Westgate incident contains definite implications not only for Kenya and Somalia, but also for the African continent. Overall, it serves as reminder that al-Shabaab, as other terrorist groups, may not succeed in attaining political and religious objectives, but has the ability to enact incidents with both short and long term implications. Prejudiced terrorism’s most noticeable feature is the choice of soft targets determined by intolerance against religion and/or nationality and accompanied by extreme radicalisation. The successful countering of prejudiced terrorism will depend on a sense of urgency and participation by African governments within local, national, regional, continental and international institutions and mechanisms.

Written by Jasmine Opperman ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Jasmine Opperman is a Research Associate with CAI and a Southern Africa based researcher and commentator on conflict trends and developments in Africa. Contact Jasmine through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Conflict & Terrorism unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Nicky Berg.
(2) Al-Shabaab, or ‘The Youth’, is an al-Qaeda-linked militant group and US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) fighting for the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Somalia. The group, also known as Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen, and its Islamist affiliates once held sway over Mogadishu and major portions of the Somali countryside, but a sustained African Union military campaign weakened the group considerably. Still, security analysts warn that the group remains the principal threat in a politically volatile, war-torn state.
(3) ‘The unquenchable fire’, The Economist, 28 September 2013, http://www.economist.com; ‘Al-Shabaab breaks new ground with complex Nairobi attack’, CNN, 23 September 2013, http://edition.cnn.com.
(4) Laqueur, W., ‘Terrorism: A brief history’, Walter Laqueur 2007, http://www.laqueur.net; ‘What is terrorism?’, International Terrorism and Security Research, http://www.terrorism-research.com.
(5) The al-Shabaab attack in Nairobi mirrored the Mumbai attacks, in which members of the Pakistani group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, a terrorist outfit affiliated with al-Qaeda, seized hotels and a Jewish centre and held out against Indian security forces for three days. More than 160 people were killed.
(6) ‘In prison with al-Shabab: What drives Somali militants?’, BBC News, 5 October 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(7) Campbell, J., ‘Is the Nairobi carnage bigger than just Kenya?’, Council on Foreign Relations, 23 September 2013, http://blogs.cfr.org.
(8) ‘Al-Shabaab breaks new ground with complex Nairobi attack’, CNN, 23 September 2013, http://edition.cnn.com; Lavery, K.R., ‘al-Qaeda’s 7 Step Plan’, Civitus Defendus, April 2009, http://civilusdefendus.wordpress.com; ‘The unquenchable fire’, The Economist, 28 September 2013, http://www.economist.com.
(9) ‘Fires of terrorism still spark in Westgate mall's cinders’, Mail & Guardian,4 October 2013, http://mg.co.za; ‘Extremist group gains foothold among Kenyans’, New York Times, 9 October 2013, http://www.nytimes.com.
(10) ‘Al-Shabaab breaks new ground with complex Nairobi attack’, CNN, 23 September 2013, http://edition.cnn.com; ‘Why Nairobi’, Atlantic Council, 26 September 2013, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org.
(11) ‘Al-Shabaab breaks new ground with complex Nairobi attack’, CNN, 23 September 2013, http://edition.cnn.com.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Ibid.
(14) ‘Evidence suggests that Al-Shabaab is shifting focus to 'soft' targets’, CNN, 27 September 2013, http://edition.cnn.com.
(15) ‘Ruthless leader aims to extend reach of Al-Shabaab, eyes the West’, CNN, 24 September 2013, http://edition.cnn.com.
(16) ‘Extremist group gains foothold among Kenyans’, New York Times, 9 October 2013, http://www.nytimes.com.
(17) ‘Competition between Islamist militants may fuel big attacks’, Reuters, 30 September 2013, http://www.reuters.com.
(18) ‘Analysis: The Westgate attack and Kenya’s approach to al-Shabaab’, Somalia Newsroom, 23 September 2013, http://somalianewsroom.com.
(19) ‘Al Shabaab: Background on the Somalia-based terrorist group that attacked a Nairobi mall’, Brookings, 23 September 2013, http://www.brookings.edu.
(20) ‘Ahmed Abdi Godane is Al-Shabab’s Osama bin Laden’, Daily Beast, 30 September 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com.
(21) ‘Who Is al-Shabab?’, Defense One, 23 September 2013, http://cdn.defenseone.com.
(22) ‘Extremist group gains foothold among Kenyans’, New York Times, 9 October 2013, http://www.nytimes.com.
(23) ‘Somali militants mixing business and terror’, New York Times, 30 September 2013, http://www.nytimes.com.
(24) ‘Vision of the African Union Commission’, African Union, http://pages.au.int.
(25) Transnational threats to peace in Africa’, Kujenga Amani, 26 September 2013, http://forums.ssrc.org.
(26) Ibid.
(27) ‘Security in the Sahel and the West's military fixation’, Think Africa Press, 12 February 2013, http://thinkafricapress.com.
(28) Ibid.
(29) ‘Extremist group gains foothold among Kenyans’, New York Times, 9 October 2013, http://www.nytimes.com.
(31) Ibid.