The Kenyan Government's struggle against the Al-Shabab terrorist organisation has been an explosive transnational contest. Responding to Al-Shabab's activities, the Kenyan military sent troops to the African Union (AU) stabilising mission in Somalia, which in turn prompted two years of guerrilla attacks on Kenyan soil, finally culminating in the worst terror attack in East Africa since the 1998 Al Qaeda embassy bombings. The government's response as of today: occupying Kenyan troops are not going anywhere and a flawed counter-terror regime at home is to be maintained. This CAI discussion paper explores possible policy routes for the Kenyan Government to take when considering the dangers of terrorism as well as the consequences of counter-terrorism in Kenyan society.

The transnational battleground

Armies on the move, rapid political transition, and mass insurgencies have set a tone of insecurity for the eastern sector of the African continent. Within this context, many of the region's nations have struggled to build their economies as well as their security. Some have been less successful than others. Sudan's brutal wars have spanned nearly the entire length of the nation's existence; Ethiopia's armies have been tangled with those of the Eritrean breakaway state as well as rebellious provinces; and Somalia has existed as a state-vacuum for more than 20 years, spawning the region's most powerful sub-state actors, Al-Shabab, or the ‘Taliban of Africa’.

Somalia's anarchic pattern of warlordism has churned the Horn of Africa into a transnational battleground, pulling in armies from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Uganda and the United States (US), who all strive to settle the region. Unfortunately for these regional participants, as well as alarmed international observers, Al-Shabab has survived the Horn's bloody narrative and now controls sizeable portions of southern Somalia. While observers in the American intelligence community have noted a decline in Al-Shabab might, recent events indicate otherwise. Al-Shabab guerrilla units stage regular deadly attacks in the capital Mogadishu.⁽²⁾ On 10 February a suicide car-bomb targeting government officials in a United Nations (UN) convoy detonated in Mogadishu, killing six.⁽³⁾

But more importantly, the organisation launched perhaps its most audacious operation ever on 21 September 2013, when between 10 and 20 trained Al-Shabab militants assaulted a shopping mall in Kenya's capital city Nairobi with automatic weapons, killing 67 civilians. The bloody terror attack shocked the nation of Kenya, but was celebrated by Al-Shabab who believe the attack was a 'PR victory' in the face of Kenyan intervention in Somalia.⁽⁴⁾ The Al-Shabab Westgate Mall attack brought the 20 year ongoing Somali conflict to the doorstep of the Kenyan people and government in a level of carnage not yet seen. Following this heinous attack, questions arose regarding the overall security level in Kenya. What are the next logical steps in dealing with Al-Shabab threat? Is Kenya taking the best approach?

Close game or far game: In which direction should Kenyan soldiers march?

The current conventional military answer to Somalia's instability is provided by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is an active, regional peacekeeping mission, which conducts its operations with the approval of the UN. The mission was created by the AU’s Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007. Its mandate, which was initially only for six months, is to conduct peace support operations and to stabilise the country so that humanitarian activities can safely take place and allow for an operational take-over by the United Nations.⁽⁵⁾

However, historically speaking, Somalia has not been receptive to foreign armies, nor any of a variety of outsider-installed polities in Mogadishu. Indeed, of the small club of contemporary nations that have experienced similar lengths of conflict, Somalia could very well be the least governable. Even Afghanistan existed as a state in between its wars with foreign powers. Since 1991, Somalia has not had a real polity and international efforts at halting the chaos and achieving stability have not been successful — African efforts included. Different paths present themselves to the current occupying force: should Kenyan generals pack up their forces and leave AMISOM with thousands less soldiers, or should they initiate an American styled 'surge' to root out and destroy all Al-Shabab elements in the Horn by using a show of force yet to be seen in the region? Al-Shabab has demonstrated its resilience in the face of a stationary AU army, perhaps illustrating the necessity of a novel approach to a repetitive scenario. In the months of November and December in 2013, the UN's first-time use of a strong military 'Intervention Brigade' in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) routed the M23 rebels across the border to Rwanda. The Intervention Brigade went beyond the historically normal scope of a UN intervention and completed the objectives that the United Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) could not. Should Kenya go beyond the historically disastrous scope of AU intervention?

Currently, AMISOM is comprised of troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Uganda, who are deployed in four sectors covering south and central Somalia.⁽⁶⁾ Kenyan troops, at 5,000 strong, make up a large portion of the roughly 17,000 man army. Kenya's leaders seem committed to maintaining these troop levels; Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta does not want to lose face nor destabilise the mission areas. However, a conventional military answer by Kenya individually may not be necessary at all. Heading in the direction of using bigger force, longer occupation, and a bigger fight is not the only policy option available, especially when the Ethiopians are willing to fight as well. The AU Mission in Somalia is strong in its own right: victory at the port city of Kismayo in 2012 was a heavy blow to Al-Shabab and on 22 January of 2014, fresh Ethiopian troops joined the Mission bringing AMISOM to a total of 22,000 men. Additionally, the overall AMISOM mission may expand its operations, especially in the face of a potentially unstable 2014: Al-Shabab is already making threats against Ethiopia for putting its troops in Somalia, which could be an explosive move considering the history between the two nations.⁽⁷⁾ Past meddling, such as the American backed Ethiopian invasion in 2006, is a sore subject; the troop movement could make Al-Shabab more appealing in the eyes of non-extremist Somalis who are nationalistic.

When taking all of these factors into consideration it appears that the transnational nature of this war may be reason alone for Kenya to leave escalation up to its de facto allies. It could also be a reason to look internally for a solution to its most fundamental of mandates: protecting its people. While it would seem that the most necessary and practical move would be to crush Al-Shabab in its Somali nest, an asymmetrical war such as this one will not be conventionally won — especially by a nation with a sizeable community that identifies ethnically and religiously with those being targeted. Just as the Intervention Brigade pushed the M23 underground into Rwanda to be hosted by their ethnic Tutsi brethren, a revamped AMISOM could push Al-Shabab underground into the large Kenyan Somali community, the difference being that Al-Shabab is at war with Kenya. An Al-Shabab diaspora would be volatile, to say the least. Thus, neither escalation nor withdrawal appears to be pragmatic, given the circumstances.

Kenya's home-front: A controversial, problematic and ineffective counter-terror regime

“We know there are elements sympathetic to al-Shabab…and there may be some of them around here” - George Saitoti, head of Kenyan Internal Security.⁽⁸⁾

While Kenya's regular army has been sent to stabilise Somalia and prevent an open land for Al-Shabab, counter-terror units have been operating for years on the home-front. A deep Kenyan counter-terrorism defence network, bolstered by the Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU), was established to deter attacks on civilians. This massive counter-terror regime was constructed with American cooperation, training and funds — the fifth biggest such US programme in the world. Kenya was prioritised by the US due to its neighbour Somalia (with which it shares a 600 mile border), previous attacks on US interests in Kenya, and the specification of Kenya as a key partner in the strategic US ‘War on Terror’. American security aid came following the 1998 Al-Qaeda embassy bombings and has yet to cease to this day.⁽⁹⁾ After the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the United States, Kenya endorsed UN Security Council resolution 1373 calling for international counter-terror cooperation. This signalled the beginning of a decade of increases in the institutionalisation of counter-terrorism policies. In March 2013, the top US military commander for the region said this effort was bearing fruit and that Al-Shabab had been seriously weakened.⁽¹⁰⁾ Despite these efforts, counter-terrorism experts routinely warned about Kenya's terrorism vulnerabilities. The long, unguarded border with Somalia is used by smugglers to ferry weapons and other contraband.⁽¹¹⁾

Much criticism has been levelled at Kenya's counter-terrorism methods. Observers note the amount of influence the US exerts over Kenya through its counter-terror aid and cooperation. Some have warned of a dangerous counter-terror regime that has been wedged into place as part of American power-jockeying in Africa, only using aid as a proxy-tool to gain influence and further pursue their own goals.⁽¹²⁾ Still others note the long list of human rights violations committed by security personnel against civilians.⁽¹³⁾ There is also the broader issue of governments in the region citing the need to fight terrorism as a pretext to crack down on political opposition, human rights defenders, and lawful expressions of dissent — a pattern familiar in much of East Africa.⁽¹⁴⁾

The heavy-handed anti-terror approach used by the ATPU has received criticism for ignoring due process and other basic rights, as well as persecuting the Muslim population. In the city of Mombasa (which has a large Muslim population), people are arbitrarily arrested and there are allegations of widespread disappearances. One report specifically cited the ATPU as an organisation prone to use torture and force confessions. Official investigations have yet to be carried out into the disappearances and killings of at least 20 individuals suspected of terrorism-related activities. This included two Muslim clerics alleged to have links to Al-Shabab who were assassinated in Mombasa. There have been illegal renditions to Somalia and Ethiopia in 2007 and at least nine suspects were rendered to Uganda in 2010 following the World Cup bombings in Kampala, Uganda. Some suspects were killed in shoot-outs, and others fled the country to avoid prosecution. In May of 2013, Kenyan police had “unleashed 10 weeks of hell” in Nairobi’s Somali refugee communities, torturing, abusing and stealing. Reportedly police had rounded up at least 1,000 people and raped several of them.⁽¹⁵⁾ It is also problematic that Kenya does not have specific counter-terrorism legislation.⁽¹⁶⁾ The current legislation provides leeway for a military approach; its security bills polarise the country with an ‘us versus them’ attitude.

Moreover, the Kenyan security forces are, at times, ineffective. The police in particular are seen as poorly trained and widely corrupt.⁽¹⁷⁾ Police officers are badly paid at only about 17,230 Kenyan shillings (US$ 200) a month. The security forces personnel are sometimes members of corrupt networks in which money supersedes law.⁽¹⁸⁾ While the government derailed several terrorist attacks prior to intervention in Somalia, the counter-terror apparatus was unsuccessful at thwarting a massive wave of Al-Shabab retaliatory assaults in 2011-2013. Following Kenya's support for AMISOM in 2011, there have been at least 17 attacks in which grenades or explosive devices were used. At least 48 civilians died in these explosions, and around 200 people were hurt. The targets included police stations, police vehicles, nightclubs, bars, churches, a religious gathering, a shopping centre, and a bus station. Another two simultaneous assaults took place on churches on 1 July 2012. In this attack, 17 people were killed and about 50 people were injured.⁽¹⁹⁾ This campaign of bombings and attacks was attributed to the Kenyan intervention in Somalia.⁽²⁰⁾

The greatest attack yet has been the 21 September 2013 West-gate Mall attack. The response was swift and local police units fought the gunmen, most likely saving many lives in the process by killing or routing the terrorists.⁽²¹⁾ However, the attack brought the already criticised Kenyan counter-terror regime into public ridicule once more. The attack revealed individual flaws that day, such as the lack of adequate mall security and the failure to secure the perimeter once the siege began (resulting in the alleged escape of some of the gunmen), and the fact that security agencies received three warnings of impending attacks during the course of 2013, yet were unprepared for the West-gate attack.⁽²²⁾ Nairobi senator Mike Sonko claimed that he had forwarded the information to the National Intelligence Service (NIS), which refused to act on it. Lawmakers also expressed outrage at the security lapse that allowed the terrorists, among them foreigners, into the country with weapons.⁽²³⁾

Human rights violations and incompetence undermine the effectiveness of the Kenyan security forces in going after Al-Shabab. Much work is needed to be done, but Kenya is not a lost cause. Other societies have faced large terror threats and collectively worked together to take them on.⁽²⁴⁾ Currently, efforts are in the works. President Kenyatta has stated that he wants a strengthened intelligence agency with more resources and skills. There are also talks of creating an inter-agency body to increase communication and coordination amongst the national security agencies.⁽²⁵⁾

Al-Shabab says they will strike again soon; Kenyan security has received messages and is on high-alert. The question is where will they strike next, and when?

Looking forward: Pragmatic counter-terrorism reform needed

Challenges have emerged in the growing war between Kenya and Al-Shabab. The rationale for the terrorists' attacks is based on a Kenyan intervention mission that is critical to Somalia’s stability. This intervention will not end until Somalia is stable — a scenario unlikely in the near future. Thus, the incentive for attacks remains. The means to counter these threats is presently ineffective. Kenya's internal security infrastructure is poorly organised, corrupt, intrusive and anti-Muslim. Deep reform is required in order to handle all of these issues.

Reform should begin by way of legislation. Counter-terrorism definitions, and the agencies charged with addressing them, need to be outlined by national law. Sometimes it takes a large-scale, tragic terrorist attack to move a country to make new laws of this nature (in France it took several). Security goals, with human rights in mind, should cautiously guide the framing of new laws — reactionary and intrusive goals made with haste should not (as in the case of the US Patriot Act). Institutionalising said laws is a greater step. With a legal framework guiding them, the judicial and executive branches need to work together in investigations.

Finally, a balance of solid counter-terrorism methodology and respect for human rights is needed, both for the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism itself, and for the legitimacy of counter-terror actions. Security and human rights are not mutually exclusive. Infringing on rights and marginalising segments of a population can even act as a catalyst in producing more terror. Isolating, harassing and profiling the large Somali minority in Kenya is fundamentally counter-productive. Other initiatives are required instead, such as increasing border security as well as the task of strengthening intelligence networking and cooperation. Intrusive Kenyan anti-terror policies are based on its heavy borrowing of US counter-terror policy. Kenya should instead focus on policies most relevant to its own specific war, rather than ones modelled with the US global war in mind. An independent, Kenya-tailored response is required for an effective fight against Al-Shabab. The Kenyan Government can better defend its people by taking a new perspective on counter-terror and moving away from unsuccessful policies.

Written by Cameron Evers ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Cameron Evers is a Research Associate with CAI with a research and analysis focus on African conflict and politics in several sub-regions, particularly East Africa. Contact Cameron through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Conflict & Terrorism unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Nicky Berg.
(2) 'Ethiopians Join Force in Somalia', IOL News, 22 January 2014, http://www.iol.co.za.
(3) 'At least six dead in car bomb attack at Mogadishu airport', Al Aribeya News, 13 February 2014, http://english.alarabiya.net.
(4) Woodruff, J., ‘Al-Shabab terrorists in training find inspiration in Kenya mall attack', PBS News, 7 January 2014, http://www.pbs.org.
(5) AMISOM website, http://amisom-au.org.
(6) Ibid.
(7) 'Ethiopians Join Force in Somalia', IOL News, 22 January 2014, http://www.iol.co.za.
(8) Calamur, K., 'Somalia's al-Shabab: 4 Things to Know', National Public Radio, 23 September 2013, http://www.npr.org.
(9) Presholdt, J., 2011. Kenya, the United States, and counterterrorism. Africa Today, 57(4), pp. 2-27.
(10) Shbley, G. and Rosenau, W., 'The charcoal connection: U.S. security assistance and Kenyan counterterrorism', War on the Rocks, 30 September 2013, http://warontherocks.com.
(11) Myre, G., 'Why is Kenya an inviting target for terrorists?', National Public Radio, 24 September 2013, http://www.npr.org.
(12) Presholdt, J., 2011. Kenya, the United States, and counterterrorism. Africa Today, 57(4), pp. 2-27.
(13) 'Kenya and counterterrorism: A time for change', Redress and Reprieve, February 2009, http://www.redress.org.
(14) 'Counterterrorism and human rights abuses in Kenya and Uganda: The World Cup bombing and beyond', Open Society Justice Initiative, November 2012, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org.
(15) “You are all terrorists”, Human Rights Watch, May 2013, http://www.hrw.org.
(16) 'Kenya notes on anti-terror laws’, Institute for Security Studies.
(17) Myre, G., 'Why Kenya is an inviting target for terrorists', NPR, 24 September 2013, http://www.npr.org.
(18) Gastrow, P., 'Termites at work: Transnational organized crime and state erosion in Kenya', International Peace Institute, 14 February 2012, http://ipinst.org.
(19) 'Travel warning – Nairobi, Kenya', United States Embassy Nairobi, Kenya, http://travel.state.gov.
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