Achieving lasting peace requires parties to negotiate with adversaries – no matter how difficult this may be.

Ever since conflict erupted in Sudan on 15 April 2023, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been engaged in an attritional war, with support from various armed allies and proxy actors. The war is complicated by power struggles and ideological differences at both domestic and international levels, and has ethnic undertones.

Can multiparty negotiations resolve the conflict that has killed an estimated 16 000 people and displaced millions? And how feasible would talks be, given the zero-sum stakes involved?

The SAF and RSF have numerous armed and unarmed allies that can become significant forces in their own right. The two are also proxies for a network of international actors, such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States (US), and Russia. These groups’ and Sudanese interests in continuing the conflict or resolving it aren’t always aligned. Amid this, the civilian group Taqaddum is positioning itself as an alternative and interlocutor between the RSF and SAF.

Areas of control in Sudan

Source: Sudan War Monitor

When the conflict started, multiple mediation channels were opened. The initial attempt was the May 2023 Saudi-US mediation process, which led to unsuccessful negotiations in Geneva in August 2024. The African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Quartet, Egyptian initiative, and United Nations Envoy are also engaged in separate but supposedly coordinated processes.

These efforts have been ineffective due to the SAF’s preconditions, the RSF’s battlefield successes, and a lack of mutual acknowledgement by all factions. Additionally, the mediation entities have recently been competing with one another or taking sides with the factions. All processes appear to lack the leverage required to facilitate dialogue between the parties.

Although these factors contribute to prolonging conflict, they’re not the main barriers preventing the factions from resolving their disagreements. The numerous unsuccessful negotiations suggest that the parties have different preferences for mediation formats and strongly oppose each other.

Furthermore, the various mediators’ strategies follow a predictable incremental logic, starting with a humanitarian ceasefire and aiming for a power-sharing arrangement. All parties can anticipate the steps in this process and are hesitant to engage in processes that could result in outcomes similar to the failed pre-conflict setup.

More importantly, Sudan’s various factions have different visions for the country’s future.

The RSF’s unwillingness to integrate into the national army, as stipulated by the political Framework Agreement, indicated their suspicion of National Congress Party (NCP) members who hold high-ranking positions in the SAF. This mistrust sparked the conflict.

Since then, their ambitions have evolved, principally due to the SAF’s inept diplomacy, and now encompass acquiring political power and radically altering Sudan’s political landscape. The RSF’s vision for Sudan excludes NCP members and purported Islamists, whose fusion of state and religion is partially blamed for the country’s misrule.

On the other hand, SAF members who are remnants of the NCP and Islamists perceive the RSF as their protégés, amateur soldiers, and even traitors who are undeserving of leadership roles. In contrast to the SAF’s lower ranks, the NCP holds deep resentment towards the RSF and believes military action is a fitting response to what they view as a betrayal. Similarly, the SAF is displeased with the RSF for failing to implement Jeddah agreement commitments. It also seems the SAF is more inclined to break apart than to share power with Taqaddum, who are believed to be internationally influential but insignificant in domestic politics.

Despite professing impartiality, Taqaddum’s antipathy towards the Islamists and NCP has resulted in their association with the RSF, despite their denial of any formal ties. However, Taqaddum competes for influence with offshoots of the Forces of Freedom and Change, Democratic Bloc, and Resistance Committees, making it hard to assert leadership in a fragmented civilian landscape. These perspectives are shaped by ideological differences among the parties involved, making a swift resolution improbable.

Parties are hesitant to engage in processes that could result in outcomes similar to the failed pre-conflict setup

The NCP and Islamists present a singular challenge for Taqaddum and the RSF. The RSF, which includes ethnic groups linked to the NCP and Islamists, must engage in negotiations with an opponent whose fundamental beliefs challenge its very existence. In contrast, a secular government in post-conflict Sudan is an unnegotiable demand for many Darfur armed movements. This position is acceptable to Taqaddum and the RSF – but it is a red line for the Islamists and NCP.

Negotiating with the RSF poses significant legal and ethical challenges for all parties, given its checkered history of human rights abuses dating back to the 2003 Darfur conflict and its continuing transgressions. Despite this, the RSF’s control over almost half of Sudan’s landmass makes its participation indispensable in any peace process.

While the full extent of Taqaddum’s ambitions remains uncertain, one could speculate that their end goal is to gain political power. To achieve this, they must either ally with one of the armed factions, openly or secretly, or enhance their standing among civilian groups. Nonetheless, partnering with the SAF or RSF comes with political risks. Despite this, some consider the RSF a more dependable choice than the SAF, owing to its perceived history of reliability.

The inflexibility of all parties is transforming Sudan into a hybrid of Libya and Somalia, with implications for the broader Horn of Africa. Taqaddum’s equivocation at July’s Cairo Conference of Political and Civil Forces and the AU preparatory Inter-Sudanese dialogue meeting weakened both processes.  

By declining to join the January IGAD summit and the Geneva discussions in August, and pulling out of the less publicised but more practical Manama talks, the SAF enabled the RSF to present itself as more open to peaceful resolution. Nevertheless, this shouldn’t be interpreted as a genuine willingness on the RSF’s part to engage in negotiations. It’s also been hesitant to implement the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan, even though doing so would remove the SAF’s primary reason for not participating in many processes.

Despite opposing parties’ sharp differences, achieving peace requires engaging in negotiations with adversaries, regardless of how reprehensible they may be. This approach is consistent with the recommendations of IGAD, AU, and UN for an ‘all-inclusive’ process. If the parties insist on a ‘most-inclusive’ solution, they’ll exclude key factions, leading to inevitable post-conflict relapse and the real possibility of disintegrating Sudan.

Sudan’s parties can learn from their own past experiences and those of countries like South Africa, Columbia and former Yugoslavia with multi-level and multimodal negotiations. These involved antagonistic actors and issues but led to outcomes that helped alleviate armed conflict.

By addressing core issues first, they can realistically tackle the interests of secondary actors such as the UAE, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, US and Russia, which are increasingly overshadowing internal Sudanese disagreement and dominating the conflict.

Written by Moses Chrispus Okello, Senior Researcher, Horn of Africa Security Analysis, ISS Addis Ababa