In 2011, Syrian opposition groups opposed to the national government, led by the authoritarian leader Bashar al-Assad, participated in mass, country-wide demonstrations for deep reform in the Syrian Government. The government responded by killing, jailing, and torturing protestors and alleged subversives. A boiling point was reached as more protesters were killed, and more protesters took to armed revolt, resulting in a full-fledged civil war. This civil war has become a protracted, brutal conflict that has lasted for four years, incurring over 140,000 casualties,⁽²⁾ creating 2.6 million refugees,⁽³⁾ testing the international norm of non-usage of chemical weapons,⁽⁴⁾ and inspiring Jihadists and rebel-sympathisers the world over to go fight and die in Syria. Becoming a regional power vacuum in the Middle East, much like Somalia in East Africa, rebel held territory has become a transnational war-zone, with over 30 countries represented in the conflict by fighters, as well as massive amounts of logistical support involving training, intelligence cooperation, and weaponry. The capitals of the West, the East, the Middle East, and Africa all want to get their hands on this Syrian war, and still many other sub-state actors are ready to take up arms on behalf of the rebellion.

This CAI discussion paper seeks to specifically investigate the role of African fighters within the Syrian Civil War's internationalisation, along with connecting issues such as ideology and weaponry. The actions, motivations, and commitments by African citizens demonstrates the incredible drawing power of the Syrian Civil War — a war flashing as a beacon for change in the Middle Eastern world at large, whose labyrinthine Shia-Sunni proxy-war narrative has held political salience for thousands of years and has given no sign of abating.

The internationalised battle for Syria: Origins and developments

The transition from protest to rebellion in Syria is rooted in a history of public unrest that has revealed itself on several occasions (1964, 1977-1982, 2000, and 2004) — all of which were crushed by the government.⁽⁵⁾ But, following the momentum caused by the Arab Spring revolts in many North African and Middle Eastern nations, the Syrian regime finally faced widespread, powerful opposition. Waves of protest were sparked by an incident that took place in the Syrian town of Dara'a. Security forces there were responding to children who were accused of writing anti-regime graffiti. The children were arrested and allegedly tortured. Mass peaceful protests erupted on 18 March 2011 in response.⁽⁶⁾ The government responded by opening fire, killing four people. This caused even more gatherings of protesters. Observers review this pivotal moment as the first deaths in the Syrian uprising.⁽⁷⁾

In the context of a broadening opposition movement, powerful international actors began to jockey for influence of the unwinding events. Wide international distaste and hostility to the Assad regime spread quickly to encompass a large international anti-Assad coalition. In the following months many foreign actors began to intervene.⁽⁸⁾ The United States (US), Turkey, Qatar and France took a harsh stance, calling for Assad's deposition,⁽⁹⁾ and the Arab League kicked Syria out of its ranks in November 2011.⁽¹⁰⁾ Additionally, the Syrian opposition movements and protests on the ground became internationalised; many activists had direct connections to international and Western groups/NGOs. Allegedly the protestors received funds from Saudi Arabia as well.⁽¹¹⁾ Over the course of 2011, Turkey worked to undermine Syria in a broad fashion and in a very public manner; relations with Syria had deteriorated during the eight months long violence against protesters. Turkey condemned the Syrian Government and requested for Assad to step down from his presidency. All of these events inside and outside of Syria influenced the Syrian conflict-spiral. What started as the ‘Damascus Spring’ movement transformed from organised protest to full-scale insurgency.

Another internationalising factor is that the Syrian Government itself has had outside backers. These nations, including Russia, China and Iran, provide Assad's regime with weapons, training, materials, and in the case of Iran/Hezbollah, actual boots on the ground. While serving as a means to bolster the Syrian Government to its current level of advantage over the rebels, these Assad-allied foreign third parties also dissuade the rebels' international backers from fully intervening. Geopolitical concerns, such as provoking a larger war, are perhaps the greatest enemy to rebel designs of gaining more Western help. Yet, while facing these geopolitical concerns, support from several key backers in the Middle East and Africa have brazenly buttressed the rebel struggle against the Assad regime.

The rebels, especially moving forward from the Geneva peace talks, are widely viewed as losing the war.⁽¹²⁾ They have faced massive setbacks, such as the loss of key cities, the dissolution of a central command, and general technological and logistical material problems brought on by an inability to get strategically important hardware en masse.⁽¹³⁾ Most devastating is the fact that the rebels have been divided by four factions: the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Islamic State of Sham and the Levant (ISIS), and the al-Nusra Front. Due to these factors, the Syrian Civil War is an asymmetric conflict with the rebels as the weaker side. The fact that the insurgents cannot face the Syrian Army in the open battlefield and must resort to asymmetric tactics, such as suicide bombings as well as targeted assassinations, illustrates this as well.⁽¹⁴⁾ An even more visible indicator of asymmetry is the amount of armoured units and aircraft being deployed by the Syrian Army against the rebels, who have been relying chiefly on light weapons. Thus, outside efforts are increasingly important for the rebels, who depend entirely on foreign suppliers of weapons and ammunition, and are assisted in a secondary capacity by foreign fighters. But to what extent are foreign fighters relevant? And where are they coming from? The case of Africa in the Syrian Civil War shows one part of the story.
Foreign African fighters: A wildly diverse legion

“I would like to go to Syria … God willing, if it works out” (Anonymous Tunisian man).⁽¹⁵⁾

The idea of the 'foreign fighter' has been recorded and romanticised since the dawn of warfare. In Africa especially, the notion has received much attention. Whether it was a unit of Numidian cavalry assisting Hannibal's Carthaginian war elephants in the Punic Wars of the antiquity, or the Moroccan colonials going to do battle for Francisco Franco's fascists in the Spanish Civil War, African foreign fighters have had their say in the canon of world history. Indeed, third party foreign fighters — including Africans — have been a famous, or infamous (depending on one's political stance), element of the Syrian Civil War.

From the Mediterranean coasts of North Africa to the deserts of the Maghreb, young men have taken up arms and shipped to the Syrian Civil War to join the legions of likeminded fighters from around the world. As of December 2013, estimates on total foreign fighters in Syria are at roughly 11,000. The current worldwide mobilisation of foreign fighters in Syria is the largest since the 1980s Soviet-Afghan War. In fact, even though Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia have endured far longer internationalised conflicts, none have had as many foreign fighters as Syria.⁽¹⁶⁾ Large contingents of foreign fighters began to show up in 2012 — mostly from surrounding nations, followed by North Africa, and Europe. Five North African nations account for the brunt of the African force in the Syrian Civil War, but, surprisingly, there are also fighters from nations further south on the continent.

Geography is a factor that accounts for North African fighters, but so are the political events of recent years in their relative conjunction with those inside Syria. The 2011 NATO-assisted toppling of Muammar al-Gaddafi's regime in Libya proved to be a powerfully destabilising event, dispersing a colossal arsenal of Gaddafi-era weaponry (both advanced and rudimentary), as well as insurgent elements that had previously been reined in by the once functioning Libyan Army. Tunisia, which experienced far less violence in its relatively peaceful Arab Spring transition, has seen even more of its own citizenry shipping out to Syria. Egypt, which underwent various transitions, some less democratic than others, has contributed less fighters than both Libya and Tunisia — though this is not to say the estimated several hundred Egyptians are not a problem for Assad. Finally, Algeria and Morocco, with intact regimes, and much less civil unrest (Algeria's 2013 southern dissent went largely without effect), have seen the smallest number of citizens going off to the war.⁽¹⁷⁾ Fighters from Sudan, Mauritania and Somalia are reportedly in Syria as well, but form a contingent too small to be an independent military unit. After taking note of the wide swath of countries that have citizens leaving to fight, the situation begs the question: why Syria?

A quick answer is that many of these fighters were simply already there, fighting the Americans in Iraq. Additionally, some found it easy to join the rebellion because the networks were already in place: Assad had allowed for al-Qaeda linked insurgents to make their way into the Iraqi war-zone during the peak of the Iraqi insurgency in the mid-2000s. In a twist of fate, weapons and fighters now flow in the opposite direction; these networks were exhumed once insurgency became a Syrian problem as well. Thus, many insurgent-veterans of the Iraq War are finding themselves in Syria, along with new fighters — both using the well-established network. This network has been a foundational element in the facilitation of internationalising the Syrian Civil War.

This extended network has reached across the Mediterranean Sea into North Africa, where Jihad-inspired rebel factions draw manpower and have established networks there to recruit. The countries that contribute (unwillingly, in all cases) fighters face varying levels of foreign recruitment. Algeria's security forces are attempting to dismantle a recruiting ring for the al-Nusra Front. Interestingly, Algerian fighters are some of the most experienced, with some having fought against the Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq. This connection from one Jihad to the next means Algerians are perhaps more at risk to recruitment.⁽¹⁸⁾ A recruitment ring extending from Morocco through Algeria and Tunisia to Libya has also transported fighters to Syria.⁽¹⁹⁾ Libya appears to be the common jump-off point, as well as a training hub.⁽²⁰⁾ The Libyan Ansar al-Sharia armed group (responsible for the 2012 Benghazi attack on the US embassy) recruits and trains in Libya so effectively that Syrians themselves are reportedly travelling to Libya for training that they can then bring back to the Syrian front.⁽²¹⁾ Libyan fighters were some of the first to join the war, by travelling to Syria immediately after Gaddafi fell in 2011. Thus, not only were networks already available, but little to no governmental authority is available to challenge them there. Tunisia's border with Libya makes travelling to the fight even easier for its populace, who have supplied many jihadis to the war effort thus far.⁽²²⁾ Egypt has seen a fair share of youths going to fight, but there is no evidence of active recruitment by any organisation taking place, unlike Algeria, Libya and Tunisia.⁽²³⁾

Finally, a factor that will continue to inspire African fighters to go and fight is the religious contextualisation of the war being used by many in the Muslim world. The initial flow of foreign fighters was insignificant, but since then many more have arrived, which has helped to unmask motivations, most of which are religious. For many Muslims around the world, the struggle against Bashar al-Assad's regime has come to represent a religious war, which is fought along sectarian lines. This motivating factor for foreign fighters (especially those outside of the Middle East) has been trumped up and exploited by popular global jihadist religious/political leaders. These public figures, some of whom are linked to al-Qaeda, incite citizens to go fight, as they have turned the conflict into an Islamic holy war. A Mauritanian leader of this calibre, noted by some observers as the most influential recruiter-ideologue, has publicly endorsed the al-Nusra Front rebel group (al-Qaeda's official franchise in Syria).⁽²⁴⁾ Al-Qaeda has painted Syria as a religious war as well, and al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri has been calling for all Muslims to join the fray.⁽²⁵⁾

Martyrs’ operations and secret heavy-weapons: Weighing African impacts on the war

The sheer diversity of the rebel fighter recruitment pool demonstrates the far-reaching influence of the Syrian Civil War on its surrounding regions. But, conversely, how much are these foreign recruits influencing the Syrian Civil War? Foreign recruitment data suggests that roughly 10% of the rebellion is foreign, and of this percentage an even smaller amount is African. African fighters have had an overall limited effect on the Syrian insurgency, yet some African nationalities stand out as having a particularly strong presence. Egyptian, Tunisian and Libyan foreign fighters have the most effective African presence in Syria, and have participated in several crucial campaigns. Currently, a brigade in the rebel group ISIS, called Katibat Al-Battar, is entirely comprised of Libyans. ISIS has proven to be one of the few rebel groups to survive the war thus far, escaping the clutches of Assad's jet fighters as well as those of the other enemy rebel groups who have been participating in the brutal in-fighting of the insurgency. Mahdi al-Harati, a leader of the reportedly 6,000 strong Liwa al-Ummah brigade (600 of which are Libyans), brings his experience directly from Libya. During the Libyan Civil War, he formed the Tripoli Brigade as a foreign fighter (he is originally from Ireland), and then went on to join the Syrian rebels.⁽²⁶⁾ In addition to this Libyan unit, is the Harakat Sham al-Islam rebel group, which was founded by Moroccans in the summer of 2013 and has participated in two offensives in conjunction with the al-Nusra Front.⁽²⁷⁾ African commitment to rebel operations, though marginal next to the overall fighting strength of the rebellion, has had effect on the ground.

In addition to the impact of African fighters being called to arms, is the impact of African arms themselves. Weapons are universally appealing to rebel groups, who request time and again for more weapons, and especially more powerful weapons. Many states, both close and far, have reportedly been aiding the Syrian rebels with weapons and ammunition, in some cases clandestinely. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are all evidenced to have facilitated the transfer of arms to the rebels as well as procured arms for them.⁽²⁸⁾ The US and the United Kingdom (UK) have publicly provided non-lethal aid to the rebels, but many reports cite a CIA arms-through-Turkey scheme.⁽²⁹⁾

Libya and Sudan have also revealed themselves to be key arms providers for the rebels, with Libya losing control of its massive Gaddafi arsenal in 2011, and Sudan selling Chinese-made shoulder-fired rocket launchers. Libyan arms contributions have included the staples of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), namely rifles, machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds, and small arms rounds. But Libyan arms transfers include more powerful items such as anti-tank recoilless rifle rounds, and more importantly, Konkurs-M Russian-designed guided missiles that the rebels have been using to destroy tanks with.⁽³⁰⁾

Sudan has solely transferred items considered much heavier on the spectrum of SALWs, by supplying anti-aircraft shoulder-fired rocket launchers — the type of weapons system that the rebels have needed the most, due to the effectiveness of the Syrian Government’s air force in killing rebels. This Sudanese transfer is viewed by some observers as simply financial — Sudan’s government desperately needs funds due to its current financial crisis. But, Sudan maintains close relations with Iran and China (which helped Sudan build its arms manufacturing capacities), which both back Assad. Also intriguing in regards to Sudan’s Asian relations, is that other high-powered weapons (such as Chinese anti-material sniper rifles anti-tank missiles) have begun to show up in rebel hands and nobody knows where they could have come from, except for Sudan. The arms transfers to rebels are very much a Sudanese about-face to its foreign policy in the region. Sudan’s government has denied all allegations of secret Ukrainian cargo-planes leaving Khartoum.⁽³¹⁾ These weapons transfers to rebels, in an effort to off-balance Assad's arsenal, assure that the war will continue, and also assure additional risk for the international community. Their impact is clearly significant to the overall conflict.

Thus, perhaps it is through weapons, rather than fighters, that Africa has impacted the Syrian Civil War the most. African participation in rebel operations have assisted in victories, but the majority of rebel leadership has asked specifically for weapons rather than fighters. The rebels are very much outgunned, while foreign fighters, they claim, are adding a level of incoherence to the rebellion, especially the jihadis (most of the foreign fighters). Additionally, the accusations by Assad that the rebellion is illegitimate, because it is comprised chiefly of “foreign terrorists,” is damaging. Should the rebellion take on too much of a foreign flavour, then it could lose its favour within the Syrian citizenry at large — indeed, according to many Syrians, it already has, due to the issue of foreigners, among others.

Looking ahead: Rebel trajectory and threat assessment

The Syrian Civil War is not over, nor is it close to being over. Great forces outside of the battleground have much effect on driving the continuance of the war. Even the rebels' motivation to keep fighting is heavily influenced by the fact that outside support exists (as well as by their perception of outside support). But outside support through foreign volunteers is a peripheral, if not counterproductive, element for the rebellion.

A larger concern, for several African nations, as well as the West, is that the fighters will return home and launch their own domestic insurgency. States follow the logic that these fighters, once trained, armed and indoctrinated, will easily and readily turn their martial talents on their homeland (as was the case with some fighters following the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s). Not only have foreign fighters in the Middle East and North Africa turned their post-war efforts on their homelands in the past, but they have also turned westward, considering the US as a foe, and attacking as such.⁽³²⁾ Thus, the Syrian Civil War is of national security interest for any state that has its citizens fighting in Syria, as well as the US, which could potentially be targeted as well.

But, threat assessment of foreign fighters in the Syrian Civil War relies on the most important aspect of the war: the outcome. This is a topic on which no source can provide an adequate forecast, or even estimate. The war is too dynamic, even in its later stage today, to wager on —especially when the international community surrounding Syria is just as unpredictable. The Russian annexation of Crimea has further obfuscated the international order. The future seems uncertain, in this regard, as international norms are thrown out and larger regional players shift above Syria in no discernible pattern. While it is impossible to know who will win or lose, it appears that in either scenario the security layout on the world stage will be greatly affected. A crushing defeat of the rebels and the regaining of the entirety of Syria's territory by Assad's army would send thousands, if not tens of thousands of fighters, both Syrian and international, all over the world — fleeing execution, torture and any other horrors that face defeated belligerents of a civil war. Victory for the rebels, on the other hand, is nearly unimaginable. As multiple factions vie for control of the rebellion and not a single figurehead for the movement appears, observers and stakeholders are left without any cogent idea of what a Syrian opposition controlled state would look like. Some fear a radical theocracy styled along the government of post-revolution Iran (but Sunni, instead of Shiite), and others a failed state scenario like Somalia. But do the rebels have a chance at victory?

Interestingly, the very fact that foreign fighters are inside Syria indicates, historically, that the rebels still have a decent chance of winning. Datasets covering civil wars reveal that 50% of insurgencies with outside forces supporting them are successful (which is twice the success rate for all insurgencies).⁽³³⁾ Outside support is manifest in scores of categories, but the point remains that African fighters could very well augment and take part in a successful Syrian revolution, just as the data indicates. This notion, less stated and perhaps less apparent, is a principal motivational factor in the mind of any person who decides to join a foreign war. Should the rebellion's various forces reconcile behind a common banner, accommodate foreign fighters to a greater extent, and see a string of victories against Assad's army, then many Africans far from home may have a stake in this war. At present, however, the fate of Syria remains with Syrians, whose contest against one another has proven thus far to be inconclusive, and whose room for foreign fighters, especially Africans, has remained limited.

Written by Cameron Evers ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Cameron Evers is a Research Associate with CAI with a research and analysis focus on African conflict and politics in several sub-regions, particularly East Africa. Contact Cameron through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Conflict & Terrorism unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Nicky Berg. Research Manager: Leigh Hamilton.
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