The region has seen six successful coups and several attempted ones in the last four years. Examples include Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger, Guinea-Bissau, Benin and Sierra Leone. Since 2015, there have been at least 17 coups and attempted coups in the region.

Terrorism and insurgencies have become visible security threats. The Sahel has become the epicentre of global terrorism, as both Islamic State (Isis) and Al Qaeda have established strong footholds in the region.

Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have broken away from the regional body, Ecowas, to form a new alliance, L’Alliance des États du Sahel (Alliance of Sahel States). Their decision followed Ecowas’s threat to intervene militarily following the coup in Niger.

The geopolitical landscape is changing in west Africa. The US, France, Russia and China are vying for influence, putting the region at the centre of cold war-style rivalries.

As a west African security researcher, I believe Mahama is uniquely positioned to champion regional stability. This is because he has played a pivotal role in the region over the past decade, particularly within Ecowas.

During his first term as president of Ghana from 2013 to 2017 Mahama was elected Ecowas chairman in March 2014. Unusually, his chairmanship was extended for another term in recognition of his leadership and successes. These included the creation of a multinational task force which assisted in the reversal of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2015, and his handling of the Ebola crisis.

Terrorism

Unconstitutional power changes are not new to west Africa. But lately coup leaders have justified their actions on the grounds of addressing terrorism.

Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin and the Islamic State Sahel Province have expanded across the central Sahel. During Mahama’s Ecowas chairmanship and when he left office in 2017, the Middle East was still the centre of global terrorism. Boko Haram was still largely a Nigerian insurgency. Burkina Faso remained relatively free from the insurgency in Mali.

Since then, Mali and Niger have become hotbeds for insurgencies, threatening the stability of their coastal neighbours, including Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Benin. Each of the last three countries have experienced terrorist attacks.

Ghana’s northern regions, which share borders with Burkina Faso, face risks of infiltration and radicalisation.

The breakaway

If Mahama is re-elected as the next Ecowas chair, his first official visit will likely – or should – be to the Alliance of Sahel States.

This breakaway group withdrew from Ecowas in September 2023. It started as a mutual defence pact and involves the three central Sahel states of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

Since the alliance emphasises sovereignty and regional security cooperation outside Ecowas, it has weakened Ecowas and west African unity. This reduces the collective ability of west African states to meet transnational threats.

Mahama’s experience as a former Ecowas chairman will help. His administration must explore collaboration while remaining committed to good governance and democracy.

Rebuilding trust among member states and attending to the root causes of the breakaway will be crucial to healing the rift.

At the same time, Ghana must strengthen its bilateral and multilateral partnerships so that the Sahel alliance does not undermine broader regional security initiatives. Balancing diplomacy with firm support for democratic norms will be key in this complex challenge.

Return to ‘cold war’ rivalries

Mahama’s greatest challenge will be west Africa’s changing geopolitical landscape. Global powers are vying for influence amid the regional rift and military coups. This puts the region at the centre of cold war-style rivalries.

The Africa Corps – formerly the Wagner Group – has driven pro-Russian sentiment in parts of the Sahel. Ukraine provided information that enabled Tuareg separatists to attack Malian soldiers and Africa Corps fighters in July 2024. Such foreign interference mirrors the proxy dynamics of the cold war.

Mahama’s socialist inclinations and academic history align with Russian ideology. His challenge will be to navigate the dynamics while maintaining Ghana’s strategic autonomy and regional leadership.

But he has to do so by managing great power competitions and interests. Russia’s provision of arms, security support through the Africa Corps, and a non-interference policy make it a key partner for Sahel alliance countries.

Western powers are adjusting their strategies. After leaving several Sahel countries, the United States has already expressed interest in forging stronger ties with Ghana. France’s increasing interest in Nigeria, an anglophone state, reflects its diminishing influence in the francophone Sahel and its attempt to secure relevance elsewhere.

Mahama’s ability to engage constructively with western allies and powers like Russia and China will be critical to ensure Ghana avoids entanglement in the rivalries destabilising the region.

Some answers

Insecurity and military dictatorships have ended multilateral initiatives such as the UN mission in Mali (Minusma), dissolved the G5-Sahel and seen the departure of several western counterinsurgency coalitions in the Sahel.

Multilateralism, however, remains the surest way for the new president to navigate the region’s challenges. As the credibility of regional leaders like Bola Tinubu of Nigeria and Alassane Ouattara of Côte d'Ivoire is compromised, Mahama could position Ghana as a new mediator.

Burkina Faso’s leader was the only member of the Sahel alliance to attend Mahama’s inauguration on 7 January 2025. Engagement between Ghana and Burkina Faso could be a safe starting point towards a multilateral engagement with the alliance states.

Accra also houses the headquarters of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area, so the new president could use trade to soften the stance of Sahel countries. Similarly, the Accra Initiative, a cooperative regional security mechanism, includes all Sahel alliance countries. It could be a vehicle to deal with growing instability.

If Mahama succeeds in returning the Sahel alliance countries to Ecowas, it will be his most important foreign policy achievement when he leaves office in January 2029.

Written by Muhammad Dan Suleiman, Adjunct Research Fellow, Curtin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.