This paper discusses France’s military intervention in Mali and the factors that led to France taking the lead of the first phase of the intervention. The security situation in Mali deteriorated rapidly during 2012 as chaos erupted when an Islamist alliance and ethnic Tuareg insurgents launched a rebellion in northern Mali. France, concerned with the possibility that Mali could turn into ‘Afrighanistan’, an Islamist sanctuary for terrorism on Europe’s southern fringes, closely monitored the situation. French president, François Hollande, led the efforts to organise an African intervention, but as the security situation worsened in Mali, it became evident that West Africa would not deploy troops soon enough, so the French president took a unilateral decision to act against the advancing Islamic militants and ordered an immediate deployment of French military forces.

Deteriorating situation in Mali

In August 2012, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that “it is essential for Malians to take ownership and show leadership,” adding that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) together with the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), key regional countries and bilateral partners should support Mali in this endeavour.⁽²⁾ Previous months had seen increasing instability and insecurity resulting from clashes with insurgency groups, an increased Islamist militant presence, the proliferation of armed groups as well as political instability in the wake of a coup d’état in March 2012.

When discussing the expanding insurgency in Mali, it is important to understand that there are several different insurgent groups driven by a wide range of motivations, issues and factors. The most influential insurgent groups are the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which has a secessionist agenda for the Tuareg people, and the Islamist insurgent groups, such as Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Din, and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA/MUJAO). In the beginning of 2012, the MNLA fought against the Malian government together with the Islamist insurgent groups, but a few months later the Islamists turned on the MNLA and imposed Sharia law in the occupied territories. After that, the Islamists ruled the north alone until France intervened.⁽³⁾ This paper does not focus on the  conflicts and differences within the insurgency as they all represent anti-government forces, but rather discusses the French intervention aim to support the Malian government by combating all Malian insurgency groups, no matter what their motivations are.

As the security situation in Mali deteriorated rapidly during 2012, the risks of it spilling over into neighbouring countries, with potentially deleterious regional affects, became apparent. France, which had major interests in the region, monitored the situation closely. One of their main concerns, which they share with other Western governments, was the possibility that Mali, with its vast desert and isolated mountainous regions, could turn into a training ground for Islamic militants.⁽⁴⁾ Having a large territory controlled by Islamist militants on Europe’s southern fringes was not something France or any other EU member state appreciated,⁽⁵⁾ or could accept. France was possibly the most outspoken opponent to the international community’s apathy toward Mali’s struggle, and had for a long time been a vocal backer of military action against the insurgency. The French clearly felt strongly for assisting the Malian government against the expanding insurgency, as the main order of business for the French during the second half of 2012 was to build consensus among concerned parties, and ensuring that African countries took the lead role in a military intervention in Mali.⁽⁶⁾

Hollande’s return to traditional policy in the French ‘backyard’    

It is often said that France views Africa, and especially North Africa, as their own backyard,⁽⁷⁾ and during President Hollande’s short tenure, France has pushed more aggressive Africa politics than during Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency. Karl Sörenson of the Swedish National Defence College stated that, “Sarkozy was clear that he wanted to break with the colonial embossed Africa policy. President Hollande has an entirely different attitude and his line is a return to a more traditional French approach”⁽⁸⁾ where France assumes the role of lead international player in la francophonie, the French-speaking world. The French engagement in the Mali conflict is one indication of this policy shift. It was the French president who led the efforts to organise an African intervention by ECOWAS, resulting in a UN Security Council resolution that authorised the international community to intervene in Mali as well as a commitment from ECOWAS to deploy troops and lead the intervention.⁽⁹⁾

An intervention in Mali is not only an African responsibility, and the international community has been involved in the planning and preparation for the operation. France was the leading partner in this and together with military experts from Africa, the EU, the United States (US), and the UN they started to cultivate a common strategy to support the Malian government, recapture northern Mali and stop the expanding insurgency.⁽¹⁰⁾ These plans comprised both ground and air forces and involved thousands of military personnel, mostly from West African countries.⁽¹¹⁾ France insisted that the intervention be led by ECOWAS and that its military contribution would be limited to providing logistics, training and intelligence support.⁽¹²⁾

Wanted: ECOWAS to lead the intervention

France repeatedly stated that a military intervention should be led by ECOWAS intervention forces, but as the West African regional grouping remained politically and organisationally divided, France started to play an increasingly central role behind the scenes.⁽¹³⁾ An African intervention force seemed more like an idea than a reality while the security situation in Mali continued to deteriorate. In early 2013, it become clear that France had two options: either they put the intervention on hold as they waited for ECOWAS to resolve its issues, start collaborating and deploy the troops committed to the intervention, or they let the developments in Mali decide the time for the intervention, even if it meant that France would take ownership of the first phase of the intervention in order to accelerate the process.⁽¹⁴⁾ There was some level of urgency attached to the military intervention as the increased instability and insecurity not only threatened Mali but also West Africa and Europe.

Criticism has been directed towards France for straining the situation and not giving ECOWAS sufficient time to prepare for an undertaking as complex and multifaceted as a large scale military intervention into foreign territory. One argument for postponing the intervention until ECOWAS intervention forces were able to deploy first, is that an intervention led by West African states would provide more legitimacy to the operation than one led by the former colonial power, France. This argument possibly has some validity but, thus far, the intervention has won support from most Malians and the international community,⁽¹⁵⁾ and in France the intervention in Mali has considerable support with much talk of a “just” or “necessary” war.⁽¹⁶⁾ Furthermore, the transitional civilian government of Mali requested France to intervene.⁽¹⁷⁾ In addition, the Chairman of the AU demanded that NATO act.⁽¹⁸⁾ France also had the legitimacy conferred by two UN resolutions calling for the “swift deployment” of an international intervention force.⁽¹⁹⁾ The main reason for France to act as they did was that the UN’s initial resolution in favour of a military intervention in Mali clarified that any forces were unlikely to deploy until September 2013,⁽²⁰⁾ even if there was a concrete risk that the south of the country, including the capital Bamako, would be overrun.⁽²¹⁾

Motivation: Threats to French interests in the region

The French sense of urgency can possibly be explained by France’s extensive interests in the region as well as a large expatriate community living under the growing threat of terrorism.⁽²²⁾ There are currently 6,000 French citizens in Mali ⁽²³⁾ and several thousand spread out across West Africa. In February 2013, it was reported that a total of 15 French citizens were held as hostages in West Africa, highlighting the danger to French nationals and interests in the region.⁽²⁴⁾ France views the threat to the French expatriate community, to French interests, and to France itself as very real, and as early as 2010, France’s then-Prime Minister, François Fillon, said that France is at war with al-Qaeda’s North African branch and will intensify military support to governments in the region combating the Islamist militants. Fillon also said France was on maximum security alert and several attempted attacks were thwarted on French soil and in neighbouring countries each year.⁽²⁵⁾ There is a fear in France that a radical Islamist Mali threatens France most of all, since most of the Islamists are French speakers and many have relatives in France, and French intelligence sources have identified aspiring Islamist militants leaving France for northern Mali to train and fight.⁽²⁶⁾

The French participation in the planning and preparation of the intervention intensified at the end of 2012 but even before that there were frequent reports suggesting that France had prepared for military involvement in Mali. Reports available in public sources in September 2012, for example, stated that France was moving drones out of Afghanistan to the region around Mali as well as deploying French Special Forces units to that region. The French military reportedly also outsourced intelligence collection, as they contracted surveillance of Mali to a private company.⁽²⁷⁾ The French leaders did not speak openly of preparations for a military intervention, but in October 2012, French Defence Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, hinted at an intervention when he said that the launch of the operation against the Islamist militants in Mali was “a question of weeks.”⁽²⁸⁾ This comment, however, was later denied by diplomatic sources who said that such a timetable was too hasty and that the comment was taken out of context.

Insurgency: We are waiting for the French or African troops

Even if there was some uncertainty in 2012 in Europe about a possible international military intervention in Mali, the Malian insurgency was expecting and preparing for an upcoming military confrontation with international forces. The official spokesperson for Ansar al-Din said that “the war that the world is planning to wage against us is a war against Islam and all that is related to Islam. Its goal is to combat God’s Sharia, and therefore, all mujahedeen have to stand by our side.”⁽²⁹⁾ Five months before the intervention was launched, another insurgent said that “we are ready for battle; we are waiting for the French or African troops to arrive.”⁽³⁰⁾ The insurgents were well aware of what the international community had in mind and while France tried to build consensus among the partners from Africa, the EU, the US and the UN, the Malian insurgency used this time wisely, training and organising recruits, which often originated from West African nations. While most of the Malian insurgency is locally recruited, a large portion of the insurgency is made up of foreign fighters from West African countries such as Togo, Benin, Niger, Nigeria, Guinea, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast. There are also reports suggesting that Egyptians, Algerians and Pakistanis have joined ranks with the Mali insurgency.⁽³¹⁾

While the Malian insurgency was planning and preparing for an international military intervention, France was doing the same. Launching a complex operation such as a military intervention into a foreign state requires that the operation is thoroughly planned and resourced. The operational shape phase set the framework for the operation and it is important that the operational environment is properly analysed and all aspects of the operation is prepared appropriately. However, the international community only had a limited amount of time to shape the operation, as the security situation in Mali deteriorated rapidly. Reports of kidnappings, human trafficking, use of child soldiers, stoning and amputations increased pressure for military intervention. Human rights abuses were widespread, refugees continued to flee across Mali’s borders and there was a severe food shortage.⁽³²⁾ The Malian population’s situation was already dire, but when the insurgency expanded outside northern Mali as the insurgents launched a southern offensive, France started the transition from shape-to-clear phase. The day after the insurgents launched the southern offensive President Hollande took a unilateral decision to act against the advancing Islamic militants and ordered an immediate deployment of French military forces.⁽³³⁾

“A decision can’t be ducked”      

France’s military intervention, launched on 11 January 2013 with ‘Operation Serval’, is a classic case in which a decision cannot be ducked.⁽³⁴⁾ France repeatedly stated that they do not intend to lead the invasion of Mali as this should be done by African troops,⁽³⁵⁾ but France and the partners from Africa, the EU, the US and the UN were divided on the pace of an intervention;⁽³⁶⁾ ECOWAS agreed to contribute intervention forces but these were not ready to deploy; regional powerhouse, Algeria, wanted to move slowly, as they preferred a negotiated solution; while France sought a swift war.⁽³⁷⁾ Considering the deteriorating security situation in Mali, France assessed that the situation had to be addressed immediately, even if this meant that France needed to take the lead in the first phase of the intervention. The French president later said, “The decision I made was necessary because if it hadn’t been made, it would have been too late to make later,”, and continued by saying, “Mali would have been conquered by terrorists.”⁽³⁸⁾

For the better part of 2012, reports from northern Mali suggested increased instability and insecurity in the region. Now facing the risk of this spreading to southern Mali, France decided that they could no longer wait. There were several reasons for France’s urgency. First, the insurgency was endangering Mali’s very existence and the transitional civilian government of Mali, weak as it is, asked France to intervene,⁽³⁹⁾ even in the absence of any bilateral assistance agreement.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Second, the insurgency, especially the Islamist alliance itself, threatened not just Mali but also all of West Africa and Europe, as well as France,⁽⁴¹⁾ as AQIM designated France a prime target for attack.⁽⁴²⁾ Third, the French feared Mali turning into ‘Afrighanistan’, an Islamist sanctuary for terrorism.⁽⁴³⁾

France may have initiated the intervention, but they still insisted that a military intervention be led by ECOWAS, and argue that their participation in the clear phase of the intervention will not nullify the UN-backed plan, but rather accelerate it.⁽⁴⁴⁾ The French mission scope is significantly more limited than ECOWAS’ as France’s military objectives are principally to repel the insurgency and re-establish Mali’s territorial integrity;⁽⁴⁵⁾ the French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said, “The goal is no longer to stop Islamist rampage, but to help Mali's army to retake the entire northern part of the country from the Islamists.”⁽⁴⁶⁾ The French military will stay until they, together with the Malian Army, have reclaimed control of the country as well as eradicated any insurgency.⁽⁴⁷⁾ The objective is to hold the country until ECOWAS intervention forces, together with the Malian Army, will be able to take ownership of the battlespace and carry on the fight.⁽⁴⁸⁾

Transition: Clear-to-hold phase

As stated above, one of France’s objectives in Mali is to repel the insurgency. Offensive operations are predominant during the clear phase, and French forces will aim to remove all insurgency groups as well as organised resistance in the area of operations (AOO). The French forces, together with Malian and Chadian forces, are therefore separating the insurgency from the general population, which denies the insurgents support, safe havens, and freedom of movement. By removing the insurgency from the battlefield, they are creating an initial zone of security, but judging by history, it is no easy task that France has assumed and there are some challenges to consider. At the beginning of the French intervention, President Hollande talked about pushing back the Islamists, but no one knows to where.⁽⁴⁹⁾ This is one of the problems with fighting an insurgency: they are fighting on their home ground with nowhere to go.

Most of the insurgents are gone but not fully neutralised,⁽⁵⁰⁾ so it is probably too early to state that northern Mali has been cleared and it is likely that offensive operations will continue for some time, but the preparations for increased stability operations will begin. The  conflict is about to enter the so-called hold phase and Malian forces will, together with ECOWAS intervention forces, hold areas cleared from insurgent control and ensure that the areas remain under the control of the Malian government. The success or failure of this phase depends first on effectively and continuously securing the population and second on effectively establishing or re-establishing government presence at the local level. However, there are some worrying reports suggesting that there is a lack of confidence in the ECOWAS intervention forces, and even less in the Malian army ⁽⁵¹⁾ and whether their presence will be sufficient to bring lasting peace to the region.

France to stay in Mali until stability is restored

Less than two months after the French intervention, France has stated that they want to start withdrawing from Mali,⁽⁵²⁾ but it is unclear how quickly the ECOWAS intervention forces, expected to replace the French forces when they withdraw, can advance into Mali.⁽⁵³⁾ The different timetables that have been presented have been altered as it difficult to apply a definitive timetable to something as unpredictable as an armed conflict. During the initial phase of the Mali intervention, the French stated that it would be over in “a matter of weeks”⁽⁵⁴⁾ and the plan was to begin the withdrawal of their troops in early March.⁽⁵⁵⁾ This timetable was publicly set and was supported by the Malian Prime Minister, Diango Cissoko.⁽⁵⁶⁾ However, nearing the announced time for withdrawal, it appears that the French timetable needs to be amended and France’s UN ambassador Gerard Araud said that he did not expect ECOWAS intervention forces to take over the security responsibility until at least April, adding that French troops would hand over control “when security conditions allow it.”⁽⁵⁷⁾

The apparently open-ended French commitment to stay in Mali until the security conditions allow a handover to ECOWAS is encouraging. However, the intervention forces pledged by neighbouring West African nations have not yet arrived and are far from being ready for handover/takeover (HOTO) from the French.⁽⁵⁸⁾ During the first phase the French forces have been involved in offensive operations but it is not likely that they, as currently organised and resourced, have the wherewithal to be able to spend months and months in the desert and mountains hunting insurgents.⁽⁵⁹⁾

Long term strategy: Let the locals sort it out

France never had the intention to launch a full-scale war in Mali. The French strategy is to function as an operational spearhead, accelerate the intervention, and then hand over to regional partners. This strategy is the result of a broad consensus that has been formed by Western governments about “how terrorism should be fought around the world; assist, yes; pay, sure; send in drones, planes and even small amounts of troops if you have to. But over the long term, let the locals sort it out.”⁽⁶⁰⁾ This is due to lessons learned in other counter-insurgency operations. As Raffaello Pantucci, a specialist on Saharan Islamist groups at the Royal United Services Institute said, “Afghanistan dragged on and on and there is an eagerness not to repeat that.”⁽⁶¹⁾

This initial intervention phase has been rather successful from a French perspective and they have been able to remove most insurgency forces as well as other forms of organised resistance from the populace centres.⁽⁶²⁾ Reports suggest that many insurgents fled into the desert or the mountainous area close to the Algerian border, while others say that many insurgents shaved their beards and are attempting to blend in with the general population.⁽⁶³⁾ French forces met little resistance during the initial offensive that drove out the insurgents; in most parts of the AOO, the clear phase ended but there are pockets where the fighting continues, and French, Chadian and Malian forces, are now facing a guerrilla campaign ⁽⁶⁴⁾ that includes insurgent ambushes, suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices. Nearing a French withdrawal, the question is whether the ECOWAS intervention forces have the capabilities and motivation to fight the Malian insurgency in a guerrilla war.

Concluding remarks          

France was more or less forced to launch the intervention in Mali as the country was about to be overrun by the insurgents. France had been working on an intervention with the international community, and even if ECOWAS was supposed to take the lead in the intervention, the situation spun out of control rather fast and France had to act swiftly. The initial phase of the intervention has been relatively successful. The French units have removed most of the insurgents from the battlefield, but some have withdrawn to the desert or mountains, from where they continue the fight. No one would argue that Mali is now cleared of insurgents, but their influence and grip on the civilian population has definitively been reduced.

The next phase of the intervention is less clear. France will be leaving as soon as possible. They have not deployed enough soldiers, material, or other resources to continue to fight an insurgency and control the whole country. The next phase is therefore dependent on how ECOWAS intervention forces, together with the Malian Army, hold areas cleared of insurgent control and ensure that the areas remain under the control of the Malian government. No one really knows what to expect from ECOWAS intervention forces, but some reports suggest that few have any real confidence in them and even less in the Malian Army. There is a possibility that the next phase of the Mali intervention will be more challenging than the initial phase.

Written by Alexander Holmgren ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Contact Alexander Holmgren through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Conflict and Terrorism Unit (conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com). This CAI discussion paper was developed with the assistance of Claire Furphy and was edited by Nicky Berg.
(2) ‘Mali: At Security Council meeting, Ban urges more action, including targeted sanctions’, United Nations News Center, 8 August 2013, www.un.org.
(3) Perry, A., ‘The crisis in Mali: Will French air strikes stop the Islamist advance?’, Time Magazine, 11 January 2013, www.world.time.com.
(4) Diallo, T., ‘Military planners prepare for war in Mali’, Reuters, 6 November 2012, www.reuters.com.
(5) Keaten, J., ‘France to send drones to Mali region’, Associated Press, 22 October 2012, www.news.yahoo.com.
(6)  Ibid.
(7) Hussey, A., ‘Algiers: A city where France is the promised land – and still the enemy’, The Observer, 27 January 2013, www.guardian.co.uk.
(8) Ritter, A., ‘Suddig måltavla’, Fokus,  28 January 2013, www.fokus.se.
(9) Perry, A., et al., ‘In and out of Africa’, Time International (Atlantic Edition), 4 February 2013.
(10) Radin, C.J., ‘US, France assemble coalition to confront Islamists in Mali’, The Long War Journal, 18 November 2012, www.longwarjournal.org.
(11) Diallo, T., ‘Military planners prepare for war in Mali’, Reuters, 6 November 2012, www.reuters.com.
(12) Radin, C.J., ‘US, France assemble coalition to confront Islamists in Mali’, The Long War Journal, 18 November 2012, www.longwarjournal.org.
(13) Keaten, J., ‘France to send drones to Mali region’, Associated Press, 22 October 2012, www.news.yahoo.com.
(14) Perry, A., et al., ‘In and out of Africa’, Time International (Atlantic Edition), 4 February 2013.
(15) Marchi, M., ‘The snares of an inevitable operation’, Euro Press Research, 24 January 2013, www.europressresearch.eu.
(16) Roy, O., ‘The intervention trap’, New Statesman, 7 February 2013, http://www.newstatesman.com.
(17) Perry, A., et al., ‘In and out of Africa’, Time International (Atlantic Edition), 4 February 2013.
(18) Marchi, M., ‘The snares of an inevitable operation’, Euro Press Research, 24 January 2013, www.europressresearch.eu.
(19) Perry, A., ‘The crisis in Mali: Will French air strikes stop the Islamist advance?’, Time Magazine, 11 January 2013, www.world.time.com.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Marchi, M., ‘The snares of an inevitable operation’, Euro Press Research, 24 January 2013, www.europressresearch.eu.
(22) Keaten, J., ‘France to send drones to Mali region’, Associated Press, 22 October 2012, www.news.yahoo.com.
(23) Perry, A., ‘The crisis in Mali: Will French air strikes stop the Islamist advance?’, Time Magazine, 11 January 2013, www.world.time.com.
(24) Vinocur, N. and Diallo, T., ‘France vows to not negotiate with kidnappers’, NBC News, 26 February 2013, www.worldnews.nbcnews.com.
(25) ‘French PM declares 'war' on al Qaeda after hostage killed’, France 24, 27 July 2010, www.france24.com.
(26) Perry, A., ‘The crisis in Mali: Will French air strikes stop the Islamist advance?’, Time Magazine, 11 January 2013, www.world.time.com.
(27) Keaten, J., ‘France to send drones to Mali region’, Associated Press, 22 October 2012, www.news.yahoo.com.
(28) Ibid.
(29) Oumar, J. and Idoumou, R.O., ‘Mujahideen flock to Mali’, Magharebia, 25 October 2012, www.magharebia.com; Roggio, B., ‘Foreign jihadists continue to pour into Mali’, The Long War Journal, 27 October 2012, www.longwarjournal.org.
(30) Roggio, B., ‘West African jihadists flock to northern Mali’, The Long War Journal, 28 September 2012, www.longwarjournal.org.
(31) Ibid.
(32) Merkiinghaus, D.P., ‘A time of year to celebrate?’, Military Technology,  December 2012.
(33)Gebauer, M., ‘Resisting Islamism: Life on the front lines in Mali’, Der Spiegel, 28 January 2012, www.spiegel.de.
(34) Marchi, M., ‘The snares of an inevitable operation’, Euro Press Research, 24 January 2013, www.europressresearch.eu.
(35) Radin, C.J., ‘US, France assemble coalition to confront Islamists in Mali’, The Long War Journal, 18 November 2012, www.longwarjournal.org.
(36) Brock, J., ‘West African bloc to commit 3,300 troops in Mali battle plan’, Reuters, 11 November 2012, www.reuters.com.
(37) Ibid.
(38) Perry, A., et al., ‘In and out of Africa’, Time International (Atlantic Edition), 4 February 2013.
(39) Ibid.
(40) Roy, O., ‘The intervention trap’, New Statesman, 7 February 2013, http://www.newstatesman.com.
(41) Ibid.
(42) Perry, A., ‘The crisis in Mali: Will French air strikes stop the Islamist advance?’, Time Magazine, 11 January 2013, www.world.time.com.
(43) Ritter, A., ‘Suddig måltavla’, Fokus, 28 January 2013, www.fokus.se.
(44) Perry, A., et al., ‘In and out of Africa’, Time International (Atlantic Edition), 4 February 2013.
(45) Roy, O., ‘The intervention trap’, New Statesman, 7 February 2013, http://www.newstatesman.com.
(46) Ritter, A., ‘Suddig måltavla’, Fokus, 28 January 2013, www.fokus.se.
(47) Perry, A., et al., ‘In and out of Africa’, Time International (Atlantic Edition), 4 February 2013.
(48) Roy, O., ‘The intervention trap’, New Statesman, 7 February 2013, http://www.newstatesman.com.
(49) Ritter, A., ‘Suddig måltavla’, Fokus, 28 January 2013, www.fokus.se.
(50) von Rohr, M. and Thielkem T., ‘Timbuktu after the Liberation: Malians Fear Return of Islamists’, Der Spiegel, 12 February 2012, www.spiegel.de.
(51) Ibid.
(52) 'Franskt tillbakadragande från Mali i mars', Dagens Nyheter, 6 February 2013, www.dn.se.
(53) von Rohr, M. and Thielkem T., ‘Timbuktu after the Liberation: Malians Fear Return of Islamists’, Der Spiegel, 12 February 2012, www.spiegel.de.
(54) Wilby, P., ‘First thoughts’, New Statesman, 18-24 January 2013.
(55) ‘French UN envoy: Mali peacekeeping force months away’, France 24, 28 February 2013, www.france24.com.
(56) ‘Mali ser slutet på terrorkriget’, Dagens Nyheter, 19 February 2013, www.dn.se.
(57) ‘French UN envoy: Mali peacekeeping force months away’, France 24, 28 February 2013, www.france24.com.
(58) Guguen, G., ‘Can France sustain an enduring peace in Mali?’, France 24, 31 January 2013, www.france24.com.
(59) Ibid.
(60) Perry, A., et al., ‘In and out of Africa’, Time International (Atlantic Edition), 4 February 2013.
(61) Roy, O., ‘The intervention trap’, New Statesman, 7 February 2013, http://www.newstatesman.com.
(62) ‘French UN envoy: Mali peacekeeping force months away’, France 24, 28 February 2013, www.france24.com.
(63) Perry, A., et al., ‘In and out of Africa’, Time International (Atlantic Edition), 4 February 2013.
(64) ‘French UN envoy: Mali peacekeeping force months away’, France 24, 28 February 2013, www.france24.com.