Who is on the ballot, and what is at stake?

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party remains by far the strongest political force nationally. The party controls most federal and regional state institutions. The incumbent faces more than 45 opposition parties that are contesting the election. These include the Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice, the National Movement of Amhara, Enat Party, the Freedom and Equality Party and the Oromo Federalist Congress.

But the result will not necessarily indicate broad political inclusion. This partly stems from widespread restrictions on opposition parties, such as arbitrary arrests and preventing meetings. This has been documented by rights groups, including the US-based Freedom House.

Most of the parties face organisational, financial and security constraints too. Others have limited regional reach.

Some of the country’s most influential political actors are either weakened, fragmented or excluded altogether. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, long the dominant political force in Tigray and previously central to Ethiopian politics for nearly three decades, has been banned from the election by the National Election Board. As it now controls the region, an election there is highly unlikely.

So, there is little uncertainty over who will govern after the votes have been counted. Instead, the key election issue is whether the process itself will be regarded as sufficiently inclusive and legitimate across Ethiopia’s highly diverse regions and political constituencies.

How significant is the shadow of conflict on the election?

The elections will take place against the backdrop of multiple overlapping conflicts. These have displaced millions and weakened state authority in several parts of the country. Insecurity is expected to limit voting in large areas. Among constituencies reportedly considered too unstable for normal polling operations are Humera, Raya Alamata and Tselemti in northern Ethiopia.

The central question will be how much of the population can realistically participate.

In the north-western Amhara region, fighting between federal forces and Fano militias has continued since 2023. Armed conflict persists in parts of Oromia to the south, involving the Oromo Liberation Army. In both regions, insecurity, displacement and communications restrictions have complicated political organising and voter mobilisation. Elections are therefore unlikely to be organised across large areas.

In the northern region of Tigray, large-scale fighting formally ended in 2022. Nevertheless, unresolved disputes over territory, political representation and the return of displaced populations continue to fuel tensions. The fragile post-war environment is further complicated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front being barred from contesting the election. The party’s legal status was cancelled by the National Election Board of Ethiopia in May 2025 for failure to hold a national assembly within the legally mandated period.

In addition, tensions within the movement have produced rival factions. In early May, Tigray People’s Liberation Front chairman Debretsion Gebremichael assumed full control of the region, pushing out Addis Ababa-backed Tadesse Werede. These developments raised tensions with the federal government.

The government needs to hold elections to demonstrate its legitimacy. But with Tigray not participating, as well as major parts of Amhara and Oromia, that legitimacy will be in doubt.

What are the other factors shaping the election?

The economy is one main factor.

Ethiopia has high rural poverty, a mounting public debt burden and the economic, social and humanitarian consequences of years of conflict and displacement.

The last general election was held in 2021. This was before the economic impact of the Tigray war hit the country. Since then, the currency has been devalued, contributing to rising inflation and living costs. Higher prices of imported goods and fuel placed additional pressure on households already affected by conflict and economic hardship.

Deteriorating economic conditions could fuel further internal unrest and strengthen the position of armed movements in parts of the country.

Regional tensions could also influence the political atmosphere and security environment surrounding the election. Relations with Eritrea have deteriorated sharply in recent months amid disputes over Red Sea access and growing fears of renewed confrontation between Addis Ababa and Asmara.

Ethiopia’s involvement in the wider Sudan conflict is another source of tension. An escalation with Eritrea or further spillover from Sudan could intensify nationalist rhetoric and divert political attention away from domestic reform. It could further complicate already fragile security conditions during the electoral period.

Civic and political space has also narrowed in recent years. Journalists, activists and opposition figures have faced arrests, harassment, travel restrictions and pressure from security forces, particularly under emergency measures introduced during the conflicts in Amhara and Oromia.

Several opposition parties have accused the government of using state institutions and security structures to tilt the political playing field in favour of the ruling party. This further undermines faith in the electoral system.

How does the election shape Ethiopia’s federal project?

Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic federal system was introduced in 1991. It was designed to accommodate diversity and grant significant autonomy to regional states. But in practice it has also sharpened struggles over territory, autonomy and access to political power.

Today those unresolved tensions are visible in the insurgency in Amhara, the conflict in Oromia and the fragile post-war order in Tigray. If voting cannot take place across those three major regions and ethnic groups, then the elections lose legitimacy.

Rather than resolving competing claims, the federal system has in many cases institutionalised them by linking territory, political representation and state power to ethnic identity. For some the system has failed as power was highly centralised. For others it contributed to the development of ethno-nationalism at the expense of a common national identity and nationhood.

The result is that identity has been turned into a central axis of political competition.

What conclusions do you draw?

Without broader political dialogue and efforts to address the underlying conflicts, the election risks reinforcing divisions.

A better approach would be to resolve the conflicts and then convene an election where the entire population can participate.

There is scope for the European Union and the US to play a constructive role. They have the capacity to exert pressure on the Ethiopian government given their strong economic, military and diplomatic ties, and their weight in international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

There may be little appetite in Brussels or Washington for such moves.

Written by Redie Bereketeab, Associate Professor of Sociology and Senior Researcher, The Nordic Africa Institute

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.