The Egyptian presidential election that took place on 24 June 2012 was noted as one of the many milestones of the Arab Spring.⁽²⁾ What was remarkable about the event was not only that it was Egypt’s first ever democratic election, but that it brought to power a candidate from an organisation (the Muslim Brotherhood) which had been banned for the greater part of the last 60 years.⁽³⁾ A year later, on 3 July 2013, after protests calling for him to resign,⁽⁴⁾ President Mohamed Morsi was removed from his seat by way of a military coup d’état, led by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). Developments in the months following Morsi’s ouster included a referendum on Egypt’s new constitution and plans for another presidential election. Over the last 10 months, the North African country has seen continuing protests against the coup d’état in some circles, and in others, an odd fixation with the man who led the coup d’état, former Commander of the Armed Forces Abdel Fattah Sisi.

While the results of the election scheduled for 26 and 27 May 2014 are already certain and the election itself is merely symbolic at this stage, other important elements are less clear. This paper seeks to highlight the issues that call into question the legitimacy of the election and will further indicate why prospects for a true democratic transition have been severely stunted by the current regime.

Current climate and the question of legitimacy

Aside from Sisi, only one other candidate is poised to run for the presidency, socialist and Egyptian Popular Current leader, Hamdeen Sabbahi, who managed a third place in the 2012 election. Other potential candidates have refused to partake in the election, citing a lack of legitimacy as the reason for the boycott. Abdel Moniem Fotouh, presidential candidate in the 2012 election and current Strong Egypt Party leader, has cited a military-appointed candidate running for president and the large number of young people who boycotted the January referendum (an indication of mass dissatisfaction with the process) as some of his primary concerns.⁽⁵⁾

Moreover, it is important to consider the current air of repression which will undoubtedly have an impact on the integrity of the process. Since Morsi’s ousting in July 2013, an already precarious human rights situation has degenerated further. The most troubling incidents include:

• The detention of both domestic and foreign journalists by the regime, held on a number of dubious charges ⁽⁶⁾ or in some cases, no charges at all.⁽⁷⁾
• The infamous Minya trial whereby 529 people were sentenced to death on 24 March for rioting and the death of a police officer, and the sentencing of a further 683 people on similar charges a month later on 28 April. United Nations (UN) Human Rights Commissioner, Navi Pillay, condemned the trial, citing that it was fraught with irregularities and in contravention of international human rights law.⁽⁸⁾
• The banning of the Muslim Brotherhood, on yet-to-be substantiated terrorism charges, which closely mirrors tactics used by successive Egyptian governments over the last six decades as a way to eradicate dissent.
• The imprisonment of over 15,000 ‘Islamists’⁽⁹⁾ in under a year, along with mass arrests of secular, liberal activists as well.
• The “Rabaa Massacre” as it has come to be known, which Human Rights Watch has named the worst mass killing in modern Egyptian history,⁽¹⁰⁾ whereby the state violently dispersed a sit-in of (mostly unarmed) demonstrators, killing at least 800 ⁽¹¹⁾ and injuring many more. Moreover, no serious efforts towards accountability have been taken by the regime.
• Successive attempts to silence opinions opposed to the new constitution earlier this year by arresting those campaigning for a ‘no’ vote.⁽¹²⁾ Transparency International (who monitored the referendum process) stated that:

Government officials openly promoted a vote in favour of the amendments; private and public media provided one-sided coverage in favour of the draft constitution; and the government harassed, arrested, and prosecuted peaceful critics, closing democratic space to promote views and debate before the referendum.⁽¹³⁾

Adequate representation and equal opportunity

The Muslim Brotherhood was once again consigned to the sphere of the unwelcome in April 2014, when an Egyptian court banned its members from participating in the election ⁽¹⁴⁾ - the rationale behind the decision being the attacks on government installations allegedly committed by the Brotherhood. With regard to one of these attacks (the bombing of a police station in the Nile Delta city of Mansoura), Human Rights Watch noted that the government had placed the blame for the incident on the Brotherhood without investigating and in lieu of any evidence linking the group to the incident.

Furthermore, the regime alleged that the Brotherhood was behind the attack even after a militant group operating in the Sinai Peninsula, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, claimed responsibility for the attack. Human Rights Watch was of the opinion that the regime was using the attack as part of a larger agenda, which is to “vilify the group”⁽¹⁵⁾ and “crush a major opposition movement.”⁽¹⁶⁾

During its one year tenure under President Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to translate the democratic aspirations of Egyptians into reality. Rather than working to build a framework for cooperation, the Brotherhood managed to alienate sectors of Egypt’s already polarised society by pursuing greater unchecked powers and by denying other parties opportunities to actively participate in recreating a new democratic order. Along with this, there was little evidence of economic progress, which was of significant importance, seeing as the uprisings were (in part) spurred on by the desire for economic stability.

Despite these and other failures, as well as the recent banning of the Brotherhood, the group still commands a large and loyal following. A number of Brotherhood leaders have been imprisoned (among them former President Mohamed Morsi) along with other ‘Islamist’ leaders. The official charges brought against such individuals range from inciting violence and belonging to a banned group,⁽¹⁷⁾ to insulting state organs.⁽¹⁸⁾ It is, however, widely accepted that such arrests are politically driven to quell opposition against the current regime.

With various movements outlawed, a number of Egyptians are left without options, a sense of inclusion or representation in the upcoming election. It must be asked at this juncture whether a process can be truly democratic if it relegates large swathes of a population to the margins of society in this way. As analyst, Michael Wahid Hanna noted, “Egypt cannot have a functioning and stable civilian-led political process if critical Islamist voices far removed from violence don't have a place in the political process.”⁽¹⁹⁾

International response

The European Union (EU) has concluded an agreement with Egyptian authorities through which the EU will monitor the election process. In light of all the above concerns, the question that begs to be answered is whether it is wise for the international community to confer legitimacy on a flawed and exclusive process, thereby tacitly condoning a military coup and subsequent government abuses. On the other hand, some argue that observers should be present in spite of imminent discrepancies so that critique may be formed from first-hand accounts, thus offering credibility to such accounts.⁽²⁰⁾

The United States (US), Egypt’s long-time ally, has deigned to speak out against the state’s abuses. US President Barack Obama has admitted: “...our approach to Egypt reflects a larger point: The United States will at times work with governments that do not meet, at least in our view, the highest international expectations, but who work with us on our core interests.”⁽²¹⁾ Washington’s view of Egypt as a highly important strategic partner will see to it that no severe reprimand is to be expected in spite of the regime’s excesses. The relaxation of the US arms embargo on Egypt in early April ⁽²²⁾ and more recent plans to resume aid ⁽²³⁾ to Egypt attest to this notion.

The African Union (AU) has taken a markedly different approach. Aside from suspending Egypt’s membership after the July 2013 coup, the AU has refused to partake in any observer missions for the upcoming election, citing that the nomination of Sisi as a presidential candidate violates the AU Charter for his part in a coup which ousted a democratically elected president.⁽²⁴⁾

Propaganda

Heavy-handed tactics aside, the Egyptian regime has made use of softer approaches to garner support and also to conceal the abnormalities inhibiting a democratic transition. One such approach has been to portray Sisi as a “strongman figure”⁽²⁵⁾ who will be successful at restoring some stability to the country, which has undergone close to four turbulent years in which many sectors (most notably the economy and security sectors) have suffered. Not well known before Morsi had appointed him head of SCAF, Sisi has enjoyed his fair share of support since July 2013.

Aside from leading the coup d’état that deposed Morsi in a clear political rather than humanitarian move, there is little known about the man himself or his seemingly ordinary military career. For this reason, it is perhaps strange that Sisi has garnered the type of fanatical support witnessed over the last year. Lauded as the ‘saviour of Egypt’ for deposing an unpopular leader, reverence for Sisi can now be seen on the streets of Egypt in a number of forms. Everything - from food items to clothing and even Smartphone gaming applications - convey the man’s popularity among some Egyptians.⁽²⁶⁾

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has had its fair share of disastrous Supreme Leaders, Commander Generals and Brother Leaders to know the dangers of elevating leaders to demagogue status. The fanatical support for Sisi among some Egyptians is not an indication of popular consensus. Rather, it could be seen as a product of the one-sided notions being propagated by the SCAF and an indication that support for others has been outlawed. Another reason could be that, when it comes to leadership, the country has severely lacked inspiring alternatives since the outset of the transition.⁽²⁷⁾

In February 2014, state news agencies in Egypt announced the invention of a device that was able to detect and cure both AIDS and hepatitis C. The doctor heading the project made sure to mention that the invention was made possible with the assistance of the army as well as the guidance of Sisi.⁽²⁸⁾ The miraculous device was coincidentally called the ‘CC-D device’ and could not be held up to independent scrutiny by the outside world because, as the military claimed, the ‘West’ would steal it.⁽²⁹⁾ Though the incident was brushed off by most as yet another national embarrassment, there were others who lauded the so-called development.

Beyond the election

For a large number of Egyptians, debates over legitimacy and accountability are superfluous. After almost four tumultuous years, stability is of prime concern to the Egyptian public. Despite the SCAF having committed atrocities against the people and never having lived up to promises to protect the values of the Revolution, many still view the army as the safety net which protects Egypt from descending into total chaos or a situation akin to the one currently being played out in Syria.⁽³⁰⁾ Decades of authoritarian rule have perhaps entrenched notions of the army as a source of national pride, maintainer of order and protective force, even in the face of blatant evidence to the contrary.

The relative ease with which Morsi was deposed is an indication that though Hosni Mubarak, the individual, may have been overthrown, the regime that had been sustaining his 30-year rule was not dismantled. The army’s position is the one thing that has remained constant throughout Egypt’s transitional period. Reports drawn up by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) give detailed explanations of how the SCAF has attempted to secure its supremacy over the state, state organs and the law by, among other things, giving itself extensive legislative and executive powers and, this time, attempting to entrench such powers into actual laws.⁽³¹⁾ The ICJ has also detailed the way in which the SCAF has, since 2011, pushed forward draft constitutions without public consultation.⁽³²⁾ This has highlighted the lack of civilian oversight mechanisms not only in Egypt, but in other countries which were part of the so-called Arab Spring. From law enforcement to the judiciary to presidential powers, measures need to be put in place to see to it that the rule of law is upheld and that no power goes unchecked. This is perhaps yet another reason why a civilian president would be more complementary to a democratic transition.

The army thus remains unaccountable and has tried at various junctures to entrench its position. One way was through the inclusion of ‘supra-constitutional principles’ in the constitution which aimed to restrict control over the SCAF by civilian authorities and which also aimed to shield the SCAF from oversight, effectively placing it above the rule of law. Though the principles were left out after widespread protests, Sisi recently caused concern by voicing the opinion that civilian officials should not have authority over the military, indicating that the idea has not been discarded.⁽³³⁾

Those on the more optimistic side of the Egyptian electorate will vote Sisi in, hoping for stability. Given the extent of Egypt’s economic woes, it is difficult to understand how Sisi will manage the situation successfully. In the event of revolts against Sisi’s rule, the worrying question is how the army will deal with such protests, especially after being able to consolidate its power once more after having its authority challenged over the last three years.

Concluding remarks

The current regime, which Sisi has headed since July 2013,⁽³⁴⁾ has ensured that Egyptians will, once again, have little opportunity for meaningful political participation. The election will see Sisi voted in as president. The fact that he will be voted in rather than deployed should not, however, give the mistaken illusion of democracy in progress. In all likelihood, voter turnout will be low. Egypt’s constitutional referendum in January 2014 (said to indirectly gauge the extent of public support for the SCAF)⁽³⁵⁾ saw a turnout of only 38%.⁽³⁶⁾ Egyptians have been left with limited options and, in addition, have had to contend with an atmosphere of intimidation and violence which shows no tolerance for differing views or preferences. This, together with the number of parties that have been directly or indirectly excluded from the election and the growing number of human rights abuses leading up to the election call into question the legitimacy of the election.

Moreover, prospects for a true democratic transition look bleak. Sisi’s comments in the weeks preceding the election give the impression that he (along with the military apparatus which backs him) is unwilling to introduce reforms. His open disregard for the revolutionary values that Egyptians have died for, together with the condescending tone he employs (favoured by both deposed leaders Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi) when addressing the Egyptian people are worrying indications of a leader who is all too sure of himself. To illustrate, Sisi recently held a meeting with Egyptian journalists in which he challenged the idea of freedom of speech, alleging that such ideas will only worsen the country’s current instability. He went further to say “If you have information on an issue, whisper it in the ear of an official instead of exposing it.”⁽³⁷⁾

Democracy and freedom do not thrive beneath the watch of an army tank. Moreover, a lesson which many transitional states have painstakingly learned is that the true value of democracy extends far beyond merely being able to cast a vote once every four or five years. It therefore remains to be seen whether the regime will actually heed any of the people’s demands - even for appeasement’s sake, or whether Egyptians will once again take to the streets demanding change.

Written by Raeesah Cassim Cachalia ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Raeesah Cassim Cachalia is a Consultant with CAI and freelance researcher with special interest and experience in conflict, human rights law and law enforcement in Africa and the Middle East. Contact Raeesah through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Elections & Democracy Unit ( elections.democracy@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Liezl Stretton. Research Manager: Daniela Kirkby.
(2) The ‘Arab Spring’ is a collective term referring to the uprisings which began sweeping through various North African and Middle Eastern countries in December 2010. Initially sparked by an incident of police brutality in Tunisia, mass demonstrations erupted across the region in a short space of time with protestors calling for greater civil liberties and reforms, among other things. Some of these countries underwent revolutions which saw the toppling of dictators, most notably Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. The Arab Spring is understood to be a continuing process with many countries (such as Egypt) viewing their revolution as incomplete.
(3) The Muslim Brotherhood, which started out as a religious and social movement in 1928, became politically active during later years when it began to oppose British rule in Egypt. The group was first banned in 1948 and had, by that time, turned into a formidable movement with a strong support base among Egypt’s poorer classes. This was in part due to the social work it undertook (such as the building of clinics and schools) where the government had failed to provide. The Brotherhood was unbanned after supporting Gamal Abdel Nasser’s revolution in 1952 and (after a falling out with Nasser when he became president) was banned once again in 1954. In 1971, President Anwar Sadat granted amnesty to Brotherhood members but officially banned the movement once again. In 1984, President Hosni Mubarak allowed the Brotherhood to exist as a social organisation but banned the group from any political activities. Overall, it may be argued that the Muslim Brotherhood was the one force which could have disturbed Egypt’s status quo and for this reason, Egypt’s leaders have always made sure that the movement couldn’t gain political power. Sisi has vowed to end the movement once and for all. Interestingly, Nasser made the same assertion in the 1950’s.
(4) ‘Morsi should resign for the good of Egypt: ElBaradei’, Ahram Online, 22 June 2013, http://english.ahram.org.
(5) Bassiouni, M., ‘Aboul Fotouh justifies decision to boycott Egypt elections’, Al-Monitor, 21 February 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com.
(6) The three Al Jazeera English journalists currently being held have been charged with aiding terrorism, tarnishing Egypt’s reputation and the fabrication of news. Kingsley, P., ‘Egyptian judge wishes al-Jazeera trio a happy Press Freedom Day then refuses bail’, The Guardian, 3 May 2014, http://www.theguardian.com.
(7) As is the case with Abdallah Elshamy, a correspondent for Al Jazeera’s Arabic channel who has been in detention since August 2013.
(8) ‘Mass Egypt death sentences ‘breach international law’’, BBC News, 25 March 2014, http://www.bbc.com.
(9) ‘Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood faces election ban’, Al Jazeera, 15 April 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(10) ‘Egypt security forces used excessive lethal force’, Human Rights Watch, 19 August 2013, http://www.hrw.org.
(11) Elshamy M., ‘The rise and fall of Rabaa (June 2013-September 2013)’, http://www.mosaabelshamy.com.
(12) Kingsley, P., ‘Egypt's new constitution gets 98% ‘yes’ vote’, The Guardian, 18 January 2014, http://www.theguardian.com.
(13) Ibid.
(14) ‘Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood faces election ban’, Al Jazeera, 15 April 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(15) ‘Egypt: Terrorist tag politically driven’, Human Rights Watch, 28 December 2013, http://www.hrw.org.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Messieh, N., ‘Muslim Brotherhood leader arrests’, Atlantic Council, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org.
(18) ‘Egyptian court jails Muslim Brotherhood leader for insulting judiciary’, Reuters, 19 April 2014, http://www.reuters.com.
(19) Jones, S., ‘The morning after Egypt’s Rabaa massacre’, The Daily Beast, 29 August 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com.
(20) ‘EU, Egypt agree to elections observation mission’, Al-Monitor, 15 April 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com.
(21) ‘Washington loosens Egypt’s arms embargo’, Al-Monitor, 23 April 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com.
(22) Ibid.
(23) Fahmy, D., ‘Egypt: Hearts and minds betrayed’, Al Jazeera, 9 May 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(24) ‘African Union’s PSC rejects monitoring Egypt’s elections’, Middle East Monitor, 22 April 2014, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com.
(25) Asher-Schapiro; A. and Hamid, S., ‘What next for Egypt?’, Brookings Center, 19 February 2014, http://www.brookings.edu.
(26) Nour, A. and Robinson, A., ‘Egypt’s Abdul Fattah al-Sisi ‘cult’ sees surge in merchandise’, BBC News, 31 March 2014, http://www.bbc.com.
(27) For example, in the 2012 presidential election, many voters were disillusioned by the prospect of having to choose between Morsi (an ‘Islamist’ with little support among liberal secularists) and Ahmed Shafik (who was seen as a remnant of the old regime and thus not the best option for a new democracy).
(28) Fahim, K. and El Shiekh, M., ‘Disbelief after Egypt announces cures for AIDS and hepatitis C’, New York Times, 26 February 2014, http://www.nytimes.com.
(29) Salem, M., ‘The conman’s paradise’, Daily News Egypt, 24 February 2014, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com.
(30) The Syrian uprisings, which began in March 2011 and called for government reforms, erupted roughly 4 months after the Egyptian revolts. The Syrian Government, however, responded with much greater force and violence in comparison with other states in the region facing similar unrest. By August 2011, Syria was gradually slipping into civil war and is at present in the midst of a full-scale war between government forces and those opposed to the regime. To date, the estimated death toll is above 150,000 and the number of displaced civilians is well over 9 million. In contrast to the Syrian army (which has remained loyal to the Bashar al-Assaad regime), the SCAF in Egypt has always portrayed itself as part of the people as well as a mediating force between the government and the people.
(31) ‘Egypt’s new constitution: A flawed process; uncertain outcomes’, International Commission of Jurists, November 2012, http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com.
(32) ‘Egypt - Upholding the Rule of Law and Human Rights Following the Ouster of President Morsi’, International Commission of Jurists, 13 January 2014, http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com.
(33) Elmasry, M., ‘Egypt’s elections: More of the same?’, Al Jazeera, 5 May 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(34) Though Adly Mansour was named the formal interim President of Egypt after the 2013 coup, Sisi has been the country’s de facto leader.
(35) Hessler, P., ‘If everyone votes yes, is it democracy?‘, The New Yorker, 17 January 2014, http://www.newyorker.com.
(36) ‘Egypt’s referendum: Deepening rifts’, The Economist, 25 January 2014, http://www.economist.com.
(37) Deshmukh, J., ‘Egypt's Sisi ‘has not learned lesson of Arab Spring’’, Mail & Guardian, 11 May 2014, http://mg.co.za.