Born out of the former Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) affiliate group, incubated in the vacuum of the Syrian Civil War and sweeping into Iraq having exploited the alienation of Sunni tribes, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Islamic State (IS) insurgent organisation as of October 2014 controlled a belt of territory from Kobane, a Syrian town on the Turkish border, to the outskirts of Baghdad, Iraq. Notorious for its brutality and executions of Western hostages, IS has also gained notoriety in the Western world for its ability to recruit significant numbers from Western countries such as Britain, Australia and the United States (US).⁽²⁾ As such, current analyses concerning the impact of IS have centred on the conflict in Iraq and Syria and the threat posed by returning Islamist fighters to Western countries.⁽³⁾

Considering the instability that has swept across much of North, West and East Africa in recent years and the economic and military power of IS in comparison to its Al Qaeda rival, its impact on already active African jihadist militias is worthy of examination. This paper therefore addresses this issue by examining the key jihadist insurgencies in Africa and the impact the IS insurgency has had on the groups by referring to material, operational and ideational factors. It argues that IS has had a varying impact, mainly inspiring tactics and propaganda but also providing experienced returning fighters and formal and informal connections with the group. On the other hand, the IS phenomenon has fuelled factional power struggles and infighting between IS-loyal jihadists and more conservative Al Qaeda affiliates, a product of the emerging rivalry sparked by Al Qaeda’s rejection of IS.⁽⁴⁾ It concludes by iterating the importance of the outcome of the global power struggle between Al Qaeda and IS, suggesting that IS may deepen ties with insurgents on the African continent if sympathetic elements are able to emerge victorious from this struggle.

Al Shabaab – Losing ground

Having lost its leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, to a US air strike in September 2014 and losing eight towns including the strategic port of Barawe in the September-October period, the Somali insurgent group Al Shabaab appears to have entered a state of disarray, with rumours circulating of a growing internal power struggle within the group.⁽⁵⁾ A driving offensive by African Union (AU) forces and a government amnesty have pushed the group onto the defensive, while defections to IS forces in Syria and Iraq by those disillusioned with Godane further weakened the group. Officially still an affiliate and ally of Ayman al Zawahiri’s Al Qaeda Core,⁽⁶⁾ the outcome of these internal disputes within Al Shabaab, which reportedly pit a conservative faction mistrustful of foreign influence against a reformist faction encouraging reconciliation with estranged members,⁽⁷⁾ will be crucial in determining whether defectors to IS will return or re-establish ties with their former comrades.

Boko Haram

Since 2009, Boko Haram has been fighting an insurgency against the Nigerian government. Although talks of peace surfaced during October, their combination of attacks and insurgent activity renders the prospects of peace unlikely. The group’s notorious leader, Abubakar Shekau, praised IS leader al-Baghdadi in a July speech, though he also praised the opposing global jihadist faction leaders, Ayman al-Zawahiri of Al Qaeda and Mullah Omar of the Taliban, suggesting that these speeches do not demonstrate a significant bayat, or pledge of allegiance.⁽⁸⁾ Indeed, Boko Haram, other than receiving training from Sahel-based groups such as Al-Mourabitoun (formerly the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa),⁽⁹⁾ largely operates independently. Such declarations of support for all jihadist movements therefore may tell us more about the erratic personality of Shekau and his intentions to elevate the global status of Boko Haram.⁽¹⁰⁾ Despite this, the group has reportedly changed tactics and is moving away from warlord-style raiding attacks and attempting to control territory, announcing the creation of an IS-style “Caliphate,” suggesting that Boko Haram may well have been inspired by IS’s impressive ability to hold vast tracts of territory in Iraq and Syria.⁽¹¹⁾ Therefore, the IS impact upon Boko Haram can largely be said to be inspirational rather than of an operational nature.

The ‘incubator’ - North Africa

In North Africa, however, huge flows of foreign fighters to Syria have brought greater ties between local jihadist groups and IS. Tunisian government sources, for example, have recorded that 2,560 of their own citizens have fought in Syria, with 80% of these rumoured to be with the IS,⁽¹²⁾ a staggering figure higher than those of Saudi Arabian and Jordanian citizens fighting in Syria.⁽¹³⁾ More alarming for the Tunisian government is the fact that, firstly, these estimates are conservative, with some estimates reaching up to 5,000 Tunisians, and secondly, that 9,000 Tunisians have been prevented from travelling to Syria to fight.⁽¹⁴⁾ Furthermore, Algeria and Morocco have also witnessed large numbers of their own citizens leaving to fight with IS.⁽¹⁵⁾

North Africa provides fertile ground for the Algerian group “Soldiers of the Caliphate,” a former faction of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) that broke away as it declared allegiance to IS while AQIM’s leader, Abdel Malek Droukdel, renewed his allegiance to Al Qaeda, rejecting the IS Caliphate.⁽¹⁶⁾ The new IS-allied group, led by Gouri Abdelmalek, immediately seized and beheaded French citizen, Herve Goudel, justifying it as retaliation to French participation in the aerial campaign against IS.⁽¹⁷⁾ While clearly inspired and allied to the group, however, pro-IS groups in Tunisia and Algeria find themselves in an internal power struggle, resulting in claims, counter-claims and even skirmishes between Al Nusra Front and IS-affiliated jihadists. While it is likely that younger, more vibrant IS supporters will eventually supplant the old guard of Zawahiri’s comrades in AQIM, power struggles between the two factions may limit IS influence in the region for some time.⁽¹⁸⁾

Libya

Libya has served as part of a widespread arms trafficking route linking the Sahel, West Africa and the Middle East since the fall of the Qaddafi regime in 2011, providing a potential resource for jihadists continent-wide.⁽¹⁹⁾ The 2012 Benghazi Embassy attacks underlined the presence of Islamist militias in the country,⁽²⁰⁾ while instability throughout 2013 and 2014 has allowed Islamist groups such as Ansar Al Sharia and the Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room (LROR) to establish themselves. While claims linking these Islamist groups to Al Qaeda have remained spurious at best,⁽²¹⁾ Ansar al Sharia’s declaration of a Caliphate in Benghazi, and the Ansar-backed Shura Council of Islamic Youth’s (SCIY) pledge of allegiance to the IS suggest that the Libyan groups are strongly inspired by and may be developing ties with al-Baghdadi’s organisation.⁽²²⁾ Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that Ansar al Sharia has sent fighters to fight with IS, while a Libyan militia known as the al-Battar Brigade fought alongside IS in Syria.⁽²³⁾ Reports circulating that the al-Battar Brigade in fact returned from Syria during October 2014 and established itself in Benghazi imply that Islamist groups in Libya are directly benefitting from receiving battle-hardened veterans from IS,⁽²⁴⁾ suggesting a degree of operational cooperation, although the extent of this coordination is yet to become clear.

Egypt

The case of jihadist groups in Egypt, particularly in the Sinai Peninsula, is perhaps indicative of the broader impact IS is currently having on African jihadism and global jihadism, bearing considerable similarities to the way in which Boko Haram has endorsed and “copied” the group tactically. For example, Ansar Bayt al Maqdis, which escalated violence following the ouster of Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi, has increasingly engaged in “copycat” violence similar to the IS, beheading three suspected Israeli spies and conducting flash parades of force as a demonstration of strength.⁽²⁵⁾ The Soldiers of the Caliphate in Egypt group, meanwhile, in September 2014, declared its allegiance to IS and expressed its intentions to attack US interests, however there is little evidence to suggest that operational ties have developed between IS and any of the Egyptian insurgent groups to date.⁽²⁶⁾

Future IS Core-Affiliate relations: Like father, like son?

Indeed, IS appears to have primarily influenced African jihadists on an ideational rather than operational level, since most are primarily fighting in local conflicts.⁽²⁷⁾ That said, the unprecedented financial, military and political growth of IS and the cases of developing ties in Tunisia, Algeria and Libya, suggest that if IS, itself a former Al Qaeda affiliate, is able to supplant Al Qaeda, then it may develop relations with the emergent “Sons of the Caliphate” groups in a similar fashion to the way in which Al Qaeda Core provided financial, spiritual and logistical support to its affiliate groups such as Al Shabaab and AQIM. Recent AQIM statements condemning the US airstrikes against IS may suggest that Al Qaeda is in fact already being supplanted and is attempting to stem an exodus of defections that have plagued Al Qaeda affiliate groups across Africa.⁽²⁸⁾ If this is the case, the likely trend will be that of more defections, more pledges of allegiance to al-Baghdadi and more “copycat violence” by emerging, wannabe IS affiliates.

Written by Alex Waterman ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Alex Waterman is a Research Associate at CAI with a focus in insurgencies, civil wars and counterinsurgency strategy. Contact Alex through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Conflict & Terrorism Research Unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Nicky Berg. Research Manager: Leigh Hamilton.
(2) ‘Foreign fighters flow to Syria’, The Washington Post, 11 October 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com.
(3) For example, see Traynor, I., ‘Major terrorist attack is “inevitable” as Isis fighters return, say EU officials’, The Guardian, 25 September 2014, http://www.theguardian.com.
(4) ‘Al Qaeda disavows ISIS militants in Syria’, BBC News, 3 February 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(5) ‘Al-Shabaab loses eight Somali towns since Sept: AMISOM’, World News Bulletin, 28 October 2014, http://www.worldbulletin.net; Abukar, H., ‘After Godane: Al-Shabaab’s new leadership fights internal reform’, African Arguments, 1 October 2014, http://africanarguments.org.
(6) Abukar, H., ‘Is ISIS allied to or influencing African jihadi groups?’, African Arguments, 28 October 2014, http://africanarguments.org.
(7) Abukar, H., ‘After Godane: Al-Shabaab’s new leadership fights internal reform’, African Arguments, 1 October 2014, http://africanarguments.org.
(8) Abukar, H., ‘Is ISIS allied to or influencing African jihadi groups?’ African Arguments, 28 October 2014, http://africanarguments.org.
(9) ‘Threats to peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel region’, United Nations Security Council report, 31 January 2012, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org.
(10) Abukar, H., ‘Is ISIS allied to or influencing African jihadi groups?’, African Arguments, 28 October 2014, http://africanarguments.org.
(11) Grant, M., ‘Boko Haram seek to imitate 'Inspirational' Islamic State and establish African Caliphate’, Newsweek, 24 September 2014, http://www.newsweek.com.
(12) Sullivan, K., ‘Tunisia, after igniting Arab Spring, sends the most fighters to Islamic State in Syria’, The Washington Post, 28 October 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com.
(13) ‘Foreign fighters flow to Syria’, The Washington Post, 11 October 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com.
(14) Abukar, H., ‘Is ISIS allied to or influencing African jihadi groups?’, African Arguments, 28 October 2014, http://africanarguments.org.
(15) ‘Foreign fighters flow to Syria’, The Washington Post, 11 October 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com.
(16) Fethi, N., ‘ISIS offshoot raises questions in Algeria’, Magharebia, 17 September 2014, http://magharebia.com; ‘The hunt for leading the global jihadist movement: The relationship dynamics of key jihadist players’, Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, 2014, http://www.trackingterrorism.org; ‘Al Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)’, Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, 2014, http://www.trackingterrorism.org.
(17) ‘French hostage Herve Goudel beheaded in Algeria’, BBC News, 24 September 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(18) Abukar, H., ‘Is ISIS allied to or influencing African jihadi groups?’, African Arguments, 28 October 2014, http://africanarguments.org; Miller, G., ‘Fighters abandoning Al-Qaeda affiliates to join Islamic State, U.S. officials say’, The Washington Post, 9 August 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com.
(19) ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, United Nations Panel of Experts on Libya report, February 2013, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org.
(20) Chivvis, C. and Martini, J., ‘Libya after Qaddafi: lessons and implications for the future’, RAND National Security Research Division report, 2014, http://www.rand.org.
(21) For an overview of Islamist groups in Libya and the emerging conflict dynamics in the country, see Waterman, A., ‘A return to civil war? Militias, coalitions and escalating violence in Libya’, Consultancy Africa Intelligence Discussion Paper, 11 September 2014, http://www.consultancyafrica.com.
(22) ‘Ansar al Sharia moves to consolidate power in Derna as locals look to liberation by Libyan army’, Libya Herald, 26 October 2014, http://www.libyaherald.com.
(23) Allison, S., ‘Think again: Goodbye Libya, and welcome to the Islamic Emirate of Benghazi?’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2014, http://www.issafrica.org; Nisman, D., ‘ISIS cancer spreading to North Africa’, New York Post, 13 October 2014, http://nypost.com.
(24) Abukar, H., ‘Is ISIS allied to or influencing African jihadi groups?’, African Arguments, 28 October 2014, http://africanarguments.org; Nisman, D., ‘ISIS cancer spreading to North Africa’, New York Post, 13 October 2014, http://nypost.com.
(25) Mezzofiore, G., ‘Egypt’s Ansar Bayt al Maqdis beheads three “spies for the Jews”’, International Business Times, 6 October 2014, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk; Nisman, D., ‘ISIS cancer spreading to North Africa’, New York Post, 13 October 2014, http://nypost.com.
(26) Garrett, J. W., ‘Is ISIS expanding into Egypt?’, Institute for the Study of War, 27 October 2014, http://www.understandingwar.org.
(27) For example, Ansar Bayt al Maqdis is primarily made up of the local Bedouin population, fighting what is largely a localised affair: ‘Ansar Jerusalem’, Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, 2014, http://www.trackingterrorism.org.
(28) Fethi, N., ‘ISIS offshoot raises questions in Algeria’, Magharebia, 17 September 2014, http://magharebia.com.