On 11 April 2011, the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), backed by French military troops, arrested the long-time partner of Western interests in the region, the then-President, Laurent Gbagbo. The arrest was a response to a tumultuous post-electoral period in which Gbagbo and his opponent, Alassane Ouattara, had both claimed victory in the 28 November 2010 presidential election. Since April 2011, the country has remained unstable and prone to waves of violence in a post-election crisis that has left more than 3 000 dead and displaced about half a million people.⁽²⁾

This CAI paper discusses how a system of ‘big men’ politics (patronage)⁽³⁾ has continued to profit from the protracted political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, turning the country’s most prized commodity, cocoa beans, into an opaque industry. The ‘blood beans’ practice, as referred to by some, shows the role played by cocoa in a country where identity politics and the dependence on the export of cocoa beans as a major cash crop have been deeply rooted in Ivorian politics since independence.⁽⁴⁾ Côte d’Ivoire, which produces over 30% of the world’s cocoa,⁽⁵⁾ is a case in point on how politics and economic interests can have a lasting impact on the environment. This article will illustrate how environmental degradation linked to the cocoa industry in Côte d’Ivoire is eclipsed by politics and economic interests from cocoa pay-outs – a practice which often outweighs any concern for human or environmental security.

The Ivorian cocoa industry: Challenges and state of affairs

The changes that took place in Côte d’Ivoire following Ouattara’s entry into power aimed for structural reform in several sectors of the country’s economy. The reform of the cocoa industry was one of the tasks given by the newly elected President Ouattara to his Cabinet in November 2011. Ouattara’s decision was driven in part by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, international financial institutions well-known for their ability to reform a country’s resources.⁽⁶⁾ The goal outlined in the reforms calls for a structural microeconomic policy through an extensive US$ 4 billion IMF and World Bank debt relief programme which, combined with other debt relief, will amount to US$ 7.7 billion in debt reduction.⁽⁷⁾ According to the IMF, the debt reduction consists of “US$ 3.1 billion in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief, US$ 1.3 billion in debt relief from multilateral creditors under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), and US$ 3.3 billion from the Paris Club of official bilateral creditors.”⁽⁸⁾

For the debt relief to reach its ‘HIPC completion point’, Côte d’Ivoire will have to observe policy measures in several sectors of its economy. Particularly in the cocoa commodity sector, the IMF requires “a new institutional and regulatory framework, coupled with lower taxation of cocoa production.”⁽⁹⁾ For these reforms to be meaningful, this paper argues that Côte d’Ivoire and its new president will have to tackle the issues that have now plagued the country’s cocoa industry for decades, and continue to threaten human and environmental security, which are interdependent components of future resource-environmental management policies.

These issues include the eradication of nefarious practices of cocoa smuggling out of Côte d’Ivoire, notably to Ghana ⁽¹⁰⁾ where cocoa prices have been set 25% higher than in Côte d’Ivoire;⁽¹¹⁾ bribery and extortion at illegal roadblocks by police, soldiers, customs officials and by road gang cartels that continue to racketeer producers and ipso facto contribute to the ‘blood beans’ economy.⁽¹²⁾ These activities fuel the purchase of illegal weapons, occult financing and political subversion. Furthermore, unchecked, these incidences may tie into the endemic child labour and human trafficking practices that hurt the long-term socio-economic prospects for the youth who are the future of Côte d’Ivoire. Furthermore, years of ‘big men’ politics, driven in part by the power of cocoa pay-outs, have left little space for concrete long-term environmental vision linked to the long-term side effects of intensive cocoa farming on human and environmental security.

As ‘well-intentioned’ as the IMF and World Bank reforms might be, the historicity of cocoa within the Ivorian narrative ought to be taken into account if the country is to reform in a truly significant and sustainable way for all Ivorians.

‘Blood beans’: The politicisation of the cocoa-conflict nexus

Extensive research and reports have already been dedicated to the fragile situation in Côte d’Ivoire.⁽¹³⁾ These reports illustrate the role that cocoa has played in the war economy that has intermittently ravaged Côte d’Ivoire. Two recent reports published by Global Witness ⁽¹⁴⁾ and the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC)⁽¹⁵⁾ stand out in the depth to which they catalogue the protracted role of cocoa trade in the various Ivorian crises. They underline a system of patron-client relations that have been in place in Côte d’Ivoire since Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who ruled the country under an autocratic-one party system, took power in 1960 and retained it for 33 years until his death in 1993.⁽¹⁶⁾

Côte d’Ivoire, under Houphouët-Boigny, has been referred to as a beacon of West African ‘democratic success’. Although the term democratic could be debated, Côte d’Ivoire had an economy that accounted for over 40% of the economy of Francophone West Africa,⁽¹⁷⁾ thanks in part to the cocoa boom. With the Houphouët-Boigny liberal free-enterprise policies of the 1970s and 1980s, farmers found themselves in a spiral in which social bargaining was used as the means to seize the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to enrich themselves from the new cocoa cash crops.⁽¹⁸⁾ Richard Crook, who has written extensively on West Africa, details a government policy that created “a ‘free-for-all’ on land acquisition and labour migration [in which the cocoa boom’s] political costs ethnically mobilised political conflict and freedom for the state to regulate land access through arbitrary, centralised patronage.”⁽¹⁹⁾ A success story that would be short-lived as the cocoa prices fell with the worldwide economic recession at the beginning of the 1980s.

The decline of cocoa prices in the 1980s was the reflection of years of parastatal laissez-faire policies that were the signature of Houphouët-Boigny’s grip over Ivorian affairs. A situation that one could argue has left Côte d’Ivoire on life support since. In the era that followed Houphouët-Boigny, a leader who had managed to keep a lid on ethnic tensions, the nation’s events have been regularly marred by social tensions: a military coup d’état (1999), an army-led rebellion (2002), and a fragile peace agreement (2003), to cite a few. These events, often built around identity and political violence, have done little to revive the morale and the trust of the population in the Ivorian institutions.⁽²⁰⁾ It is under Gbagbo, who took power in 2000, that the reports published by Global Witness and the BICC shed light on the role of cocoa trade revenues towards the funding of armed conflict. They document how actors at all levels developed a system “for enrichment from cocoa through corruption and misuse of revenues, both by the government and the rebel group Forces Nouvelles.”⁽²¹⁾

As mentioned above, while Côte d’Ivoire attempts to rebuild herself, the country continues to be plagued by the challenges posed by cocoa smuggling, notably to Ghana. In a repeat of Ivorian cocoa history, the culprits are to be found within the cocoa farming industry, but most importantly, among the governmental structures with customs officers, police and army personnel who perpetuate the old habits of racketeering and corruption.⁽²²⁾ The Ivorian Government is well aware of the situation and has already taken action by strengthening its support for special units, such as the Unité de Lutte Contre le Racket and the Observatoire de la Fluidité des Transports, tasked with preventing racketeering and smuggling of coffee/cocoa.⁽²³⁾ However, the situation epitomises the Ivorian state of affairs when one considers that the State has a monopoly of violence over its territorial area. How does a state that at this point cannot even keep its security forces under control, eliminate other opaque sides of the cocoa trade in Côte d’Ivoire, such as, for example, the illegal child labour and human trafficking problems linked to the cocoa ‘economy’?

Politics of identity and natural resources: An unchecked environmental impact

During his years in power, Houphouët-Boigny had encouraged foreigners, mostly Muslims from Mali and Burkina Faso, to seek employment in the Ivorian cocoa plantations.⁽²⁴⁾ The result is a country in which population migration and in-country migrants represent upwards of 25% of its population, mainly in the cocoa regions of the country.⁽²⁵⁾ Knowing the importance of identity in Ivorian politics, the historicity of the population flow from neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso is directly associated with the cocoa-growing industry and the ensuing ethnic tensions that became palpable during the crisis in the 1980s, and thereafter, ethnic violence in the 1990s and 2000s.

Playing into the ethno-religious identity politics, massive in-migration and emigration waves from Mali and Burkina Faso began under Houphouët-Boigny, along with an economy that was dead set on cashing in on the cocoa production.⁽²⁶⁾ Some of the long-term environmental consequences are observed in the scope of deforestation, soil erosion and extensive use of pesticides that have affected the cocoa regions of Côte d’Ivoire. The consequences also reach into the very social and political fabric of the country, in which migration through ethno-religious narrative was used by successive governments to pit one community against the other. One example of politics’ role in deforestation is seen in Houphouët-Boigny’s policy of ‘the land belongs to those who develop it’, which encouraged members of his ethnic group, Baoulé, to migrate to forested areas and plant cocoa.⁽²⁷⁾ As a defensive response, local inhabitants also started cutting primary forest to plant cocoa.⁽²⁸⁾ Arguably, the process of deforestation was driven in part by an advance in technology and the inflow of migrants, which grew from 10-20% each year during the cocoa rush, and led to massive deforestation throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s.⁽²⁹⁾

Environmental stress stemming from the cocoa crop is linked to the technological advances that enabled farmers to give up traditional methods in lieu of methods set on increasing agricultural yield.⁽³⁰⁾ One example being in the multipurpose role of shade trees, which are linked to the overall habitat and hydrological functions of the soil.⁽³¹⁾ The shift in the traditional shade-growth techniques towards the extensive use of full-sun cocoa production resulted in the “removal of forest, demand greater amounts of water, and require[s] a much heavier use of pesticides and fertilisers.”⁽³²⁾ In these luxurious and rich primary forests, the intensive deforestation linked to human activity has created a vacuum for incalculable “loss of biodiversity and decline of soil fertility.”⁽³³⁾ Consequently, the effects of extensive cocoa agriculture have had a lasting health impact and financial costs on farmers and their families. A profusion of documents exist noting the negative impact of chemicals, their misuse and their associated effects on human health.⁽³⁴⁾ These chemicals, often a cheaper alternative to traditional methods and perfect for intensive agriculture, have been used to increase yield of cash crops (cocoa in this case), with often serious consequences on the health of farmers’ and their families, as well as on overall cocoa production.⁽³⁵⁾ Similarly, they seep into the drinking water supply and adjacent water basins, thus adding another variable to environmental degradation and to future political and economic policies with regard to human and environmental security.⁽³⁶⁾  

The way forward: Social, political and environmental responsibility

The case of Côte d’Ivoire is telling of the role played by the cocoa sector within a nexus of socio-economic and political factors in which institutions have the duty to regulate major issues such as corruption, child labour and illegal business practices. The ramifications of cocoa farming in Côte d’Ivoire are complex and rooted in historicity that is a sine qua non factor to developing forward-looking policies. Child labour, human trafficking and the politicisation of the cocoa industry are some of the elements explored in this article, but should not limit the reader from exploring other equally important avenues. Some of them include the task of monitoring immigration flow through the enforcement of human trafficking and child labour policies, as well as the continuing smuggling and corruption that continue to plague the cocoa trade in Côte d’Ivoire.

At the international level, evidence of commitments for more equitable human rights, and the respect thereof, is visible in the self-regulatory procedures put in place by many international chocolate companies. One example of commitment is the Harkin-Engel Protocol which aims “to assure consumers that chocolate companies were acting ethically and ending forced and trafficked child labour in their cocoa supply.”⁽³⁷⁾ Although encouraging, the Harkin-Engel Protocol remains overshadowed by its voluntary basis, which in practicality does not translate into an effective enforcement mechanism in the many cocoa plantations. Instead, it emphasises the goodwill of multinationals and their middle men to take the necessary measures in regard to ending child labour and in taking steps for increased environmental, social and economic standards.⁽³⁸⁾

Certain environmental, social and economic development standards have come from third party certification schemes that have been put in place in Côte d’Ivoire. They include Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance and UTZ Certified.⁽³⁹⁾ However, reports indicate that very few farmers actually belong to any cooperative structure, which limits the scope of these standards.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Given the reforms that are underway in Côte d’Ivoire, the Conseil du Café Cacao (CCC) ensures coordination with the private sector, thanks in part to the setting up of a plateforme de partenariat public-privé (Public Private Partnership) to monitor the development and transparency within the cacao-coffee sector.⁽⁴¹⁾ These reforms remain prone to social, political and economic constraints that are directly tied into governance stagnation that has hampered Côte d’Ivoire’s way out of its current crisis. In so doing, environmental responsibility is tied into the state’s ability to tackle some of the political and economic variables discussed thus far.

Concluding remarks: Cocoa in a multidimensional narrative

From a strictly environmental perspective, cocoa policies cannot be effective unless they take into account the social, political, economic and cultural dimensions that link cocoa to the history of the country and its place in West Africa. This article has merely illustrated the tip of a complex nexus that ties cocoa in all structures of the state. Reforms in the cocoa sector are welcoming signs that Côte d’Ivoire is looking forward to improving the situation of a sector that benefits hundreds of thousands in the country.

While many options are being undertaken to create more weather- or pest-resistant trees, the questions that linger today on the role of cocoa in the future of the country are a reflection of the social and political legacy that have shaped Côte d’Ivoire since its independence. Which group of Ivorians will be able to purchase these new crops; the smallholders or the rich corporations? Who will have a say in land ownership? What are the policies in place in regard to changing weather patterns? What are the likely effects of conflict dynamics in neighbouring Mali which may trigger new massive migration waves? Given the intimate role of cocoa in shaping Ivorian politics, one can only wonder how the country will live up to its promises outlined in its international agreements, such as the one outlined in its governmental Rio+20, which commits to good environmental governance as one of three pillars set forth by Côte d’Ivoire’s leadership.⁽⁴²⁾ Unfortunately, the IMF’s and World Bank’s track record of ‘imposing’ their neo-colonial policies and reforms in Africa is not encouraging for Côte d’Ivoire. For many Ivorians, cocoa will ultimately continue to have a bittersweet taste for its impact reaches beyond environmental paradigms and into the very social and political fabric of Côte d’Ivoire.

Written by Sébastien Jadot ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Contact Sébastien Jadot through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Enviro Africa Unit ( enviro.africa@consultancyafrica.com). This CAI discussion paper was developed with the assistance of Angela Kariuki and was edited by Liezl Stretton.
(2) ‘“They killed them like it was nothing”: The need for justice for Côte d’Ivoire’s post-election crimes’, Human Rights Watch, October 2011, http://www.hrw.org.
(3) Big men politics and patronage refers to a system in which “political obligations of politicians, bureaucrats or military chiefs are first and foremost to their kith and kin, their clients, their communities, their regions, or even their religion” rather than to the state and ipso facto to the constituency as a whole. See Chabal, P. and Daloz, JP. 1999. Africa Works: Disorder as political instrument. Indiana University Press: Bloomington.
(4) ‘Hot chocolate: How cocoa fuelled the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire’, Global Research, 8 June 2007, http://www.globalwitness.org.
(4) Guesnet, L., Müller, M. and Schure, J., 2009. Natural resources in Côte d’Ivoire: Fostering crisis or peace? The cocoa, diamond, gold and oil sectors. Bonn International Centre for Conversion, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com.
(5) See the following CAI paper on water privatisation.
(6) ‘IMF, World Bank back $4 billion Côte d'Ivoire debt relief’, International Monetary Fund, 26 June 2012, http://www.imf.org.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Ibid.
(9) In the 2011-2012 season alone, estimates put the number to around 50,000 to 70,000 tonnes of cocoa to have been smuggled out of Côte d’Ivoire into Ghana.
(10) McFarlane, S. and Aboa, A., ‘Cocoa smugglers rub hands over Ghana price’, Reuters, 18 October 2012, http://af.reuters.com.
(11) Aboa, A., ‘Increased extortion threatens Ivorian cocoa flows’, 25 October 2012, http://www.reuters.com.
(12) See for example Besada, H., 2009. From civil strife to peace-building: Examining private sector involvement in West African reconstruction. Wilfrid Laurier University Press: Waterloo; Crook, R., 1990. Politics, the cocoa crisis, and administration in Cote d’Ivoire. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 28(4), pp. 649-669.
(13) ‘Hot chocolate: How cocoa fuelled the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire’, Global Research, 8 June 2007, http://www.globalwitness.org.
(14) Guesnet, L., Müller, M. and Schure, J., 2009. Natural resources in Côte d’Ivoire: Fostering crisis or peace? The cocoa, diamond, gold and oil sectors. Bonn International Centre for Conversion, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com.
(15) Akindès, F., 2010. “Côte d’Ivoire since 1993: The risky reinvention of a nation”, in Mustapha, A. and Whitfield, L. (eds.). Turning points in African democracy. Boydell & Brewer: Rochester, NY.
(16) Azikiwe, I., 2009. Africa: Conflict resolution and international diplomacy. AuthorHouse: Central Milton Keynes.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Crook, R., 2001. Cocoa booms, the legalisation of land relations and politics in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana: Explaining farmers' responses. IDS Bulletin, 31(1), pp. 35-45.
(19) ‘Hot chocolate: How cocoa fuelled the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire’, Global Research, 8 June 2007, http://www.globalwitness.org.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Aboa, A., ‘Increased extortion threatens Ivorian cocoa flows’, Reuters, 25 October 2012, http://www.reuters.com.
(22) ‘Lutte contre le racket et les tracasseries routières: Le Conseil du Café-Cacao offre du matériel roulant à l’ULCR et à l’OFT’, Le Conseil du Café-Cacao, 29 October 2012, http://www.bcc.ci.
(23) Guesnet, L., Müller, M. and Schure, J., 2009. Natural resources in Côte d’Ivoire: Fostering crisis or peace? The cocoa, diamond, gold and oil sectors. Bonn International Centre for Conversion, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com.
(24) Ibid.
(25) Ibid.
(26) Ibid.
(27) Ruf, F., 2001. “Tree crops as deforestation and reforestation agents: The case of cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire and Sulawesi”, in Angelsen, A. and Kaimowitz, D. (eds.). Agricultural technologies and tropical deforestation. CABI Publishing: New York.
(28) Ibid.
(29) Gooding, K., ‘Sweet like chocolate? Making the coffee and cocoa trade work for biodiversity and livelihoods’, The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), December 2003, http://www.rspb.org.uk.
(30) Gockowski, J. and Sonwa, D., 2011. Cocoa intensification scenarios and their predicted impact on CO2 emissions, biodiversity conservation, and rural livelihoods in the Guinea Rain Forest of West Africa. Environmental Management, 48, pp. 307–321.
(31) Asare, R., ‘Cocoa agroforests in West Africa: A look at activities on preferred trees in the farming systems’,Forest & Landscape working papers no.6-2005, http://curis.ku.dk.
(32) Hatløy, A., et al., ‘Towards Côte d’Ivoire sustainable cocoa initiative’, Fafo, October 2012, http://www.nhomatogdrikke.no.
(33) See for example. Asenso-Okyere et al., 2011. Understanding the interaction between farm labor productivity, and health and nutrition: A survey of the evidence. Journal of Development and Agricultural Economics, 3(3), pp. 80-90.
(34) Ibid.
(35) Gooding, K., ‘Sweet like chocolate? Making the coffee and cocoa trade work for biodiversity and livelihoods’, The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), December 2003, http://www.rspb.org.uk.
(36) Responsible cocoa website, http://responsiblecocoa.com.
(37) Ibid.
(38) Hatløy, A., et al., ‘Towards Côte d’Ivoire sustainable cocoa initiative’, Fafo, October 2012, http://www.nhomatogdrikke.no.
(39) Ibid.
(40) ‘Réforme de la filière café-cacao de Côte d’Ivoire’, Conseil du Café-Cacao, May 2012, http://www.bcc.ci.
(41) ‘Rio+20 L'avenir que nous voulons’, UNDP and Ministère de l’Environnement et du Développement Durable, June 2012, http://www.uncsd2012.org.