During the ANC and State Presidency of Jacob Zuma, one of the features of the organisation's changing character was the absence of debate, the loss of what it had meant to very many people, to belong to the ANC in an earlier period.    Members no longer saw themselves required to conduct themselves in a manner that advanced emancipatory goals, seen as part of a struggle that needed to continue in order to "deepen and broaden" democracy. 

Conditions were very different after 1990, compared with earlier periods.  At the time of unbanning many cadres grappled with what it would mean for the ANC (as well as the SACP) to become mass organisations, open to any person who then paid R12 membership fees. There were no apparent barriers.  I remember seeing Dirk Coetzee of Vlakplaas in the lift at ANC HQ. I had heard he had become an ANC member. I remember asking Joe Slovo about this, and he said he would never belong to the same organisation as Coetzee.  But there may well have been other people who recruited individuals like Coetzee, because of the information he provided or other reasons.  I mention this as one illustration of how any notion of preserving the "revolutionary purity" that may have previously prevailed to some or a large extent in the ANC membership, would have been hard to achieve.

I was then involved in ANC Political Education and what concerned us was how to address the influx of thousands of new members who had little knowledge of the history of the struggle and the problems that the organisation faced in the period of negotiations when state violence continued.  Those in the leadership were also trying to understand what had happened very quickly with the unbanning.  It was a complex political moment.

It was very difficult to adequately explain various issues concerning organisation building to the membership at large.  I recall how "maids and madames" would sometimes be part of the same branch in the cities and how multiple translations were required (but difficult to achieve). 

But we tried to raise the consciousness of the membership. This continued for some years.  It was moving to watch in rural areas, where sometimes teachers were the only or most literate people in a community, and they would explain the policy documents to the generally very attentive branch members.

At a broader level, it raised questions about the ANC and SACP's leadership role and issues of "vanguardism".  We were not then aware of developing critiques of notions of a vanguard party. But we then conceived of the mass character of the ANC (and SACP) coexisting with  playing a strategic leadership role in society. All of these issues occupied the strategy and tactics commission of the ANC at conferences and most meetings of the SACP leadership and in its other structures.

In this context of open membership, it is evident that there were many reasons why people supported and decided to join the ANC.  Some did so for purposes related to the often-heroic elements of the liberation struggle. But others could see that the ANC would win elections and become the government. That would mean that closeness to the ANC could lead to prestige and material benefits.

In the 1990s negotiations, the ANC did all that it could to isolate the regime. One of the forces that it sought to wean away from the apartheid government was bantustan leaders and Traditional leaders and invited them to form a broad alliance against the apartheid regime.  This also had its own logic in the history of the ANC where chiefs sometimes brought or were credited with bringing the entire chiefdom into the ANC. That was part of the background of many of the Robben Islanders, an often-softer approach to bantustan leaders than those who came from the struggles of the 1980s

It also led to the recruitment of many politicians from the tricameral parliament.  Many of these individuals may have undergone soul searching and had their eyes opened to the need to join in building a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic project. 

But the truth is that many who joined the ANC had habits of the past that were still very much with them. They never engaged in the search for understanding that one found in many of the new members in the branches.

Many joined the ANC for reasons quite unrelated to those that had led others to risk their lives to form that link in the past. 

Most who joined before 1990 had to fortify themselves to face the dangers involved and immerse themselves in the values of liberation.  They had the example of the lives and practices of some of its leaders.  But these characteristics were often also present in rank and file, relatively unknown members who recruits may have encountered.  There was a liberation ethic that guided many, even if there were some who did not abide by this even in the period of struggle, inside and outside the country. 

That this liberation ethos has become a butt for cynical jokes is because the ANC is no longer an organisation demanding sacrifice or engaging in serious debates on questions of freedom.

Such debates were not merely a feature of the UDF.    It is recorded that discussions in MK would start in one country and spread to other places where soldiers and civilians were located.  Sometimes these debates fed into the ANC underground and the UDF and its affiliates. Inside the country, these debates were more generally self-initiated by local organisations, about local problems.

The demise of internal debate and general depoliticisation of the ANC has fed into a broader lack of democratic discussion in society at large.  The reasons why people struggled, is now a distant memory, with leaders relating to members bureaucratically at best, but often through patronage or corrupt relationships. For many, in a time of increasing poverty, the ANC has become a route to limited economic security or great wealth. 

Some people who had no role in the liberation struggle and even some who had been on the "other side" were made cabinet ministers or came to hold other important positions, as a result of switching sides. It is doubtful that these overnight changes entailed serious self-reflection and understanding, especially when, over time, the environment did not require or encourage that.  These people joined the ANC, with which they had not previously been associated. But they joined at a time when the distinct qualities the ANC had previously borne in relation to freedom, had dissipated.

The election of Cyril Ramaphosa and "Politics without politics"

Many of us who may not have been part of the campaign to elect Cyril Ramaphosa as ANC president nevertheless provided a measure of support, especially concerning the pledge to eradicate state capture and corruption more generally.  That was not all that Zumaism entailed, and less attention has been paid, from the outset to the violence, patriarchy and other forms of abuse that characterised that period.  Regrettably, the post-Zuma period has not been buttressed by regeneration of the ANC in the sense of a revitalisation of the political values that need to be part of an unfolding democratic life.

What now seems likely, is that this was not an accidental deviation but part of the overall conception of the campaign to elect Ramaphosa, that it was a question of numbers, required to defeat alternative candidates, numbers of people and quantities of money.

There is now evidence that part of the vast sums raised to win the ANC presidency for Cyril Ramaphosa was to pay R 70 million in outstanding membership fees of some of those who were seen as voters for Ramaphosa at Nasrec and to ensure through accommodation, transportation and other means that these supporters would not stray and vote for Ramaphosa. Ferial Haffajee reports:

"Asked why membership fees needed to be paid for grassroots members, an official explained that an up-to-date membership card is like gold because it is the currency for grassroots members to be present at branches, then districts, then regional meetings and then provincial meetings to elect the delegates who eventually went to the conference.

"Often, these membership fees were outstanding by up to five years, all of which required a deep dig into the funds raised, mainly from big business, but also from Ramaphosa himself.

"Asked if the days of members paying their own R20 annual membership fee as a sign of commitment to and membership of the ANC was over, the source laughed. This means that most ANC membership is sponsored by patrons."

Organisers were paid to cover the whole country.  One of the reasons for substantial expenditure was that Ramaphosa's years in business and out of politics meant that he had not formed the type of constituency on the ground that was now needed. 

But what was understood by building a constituency? Evidently, it was not meant to be a highly politicised political base, as those who were involved in rebuilding the ANC after 1990 had in mind, and Jeremy Corbyn and Bernie Sanders understand their campaigning today.

Those involved in the campaign denied that they paid any money to delegates, but the CR17 campaign "had paid for all their accommodation, transport, food and evening engagements during the Nasrec conference.  ‘Unless you protect your delegates, other camps can use them in a way that is factional," he explained. "You have to cloister them.'" [My italics. See Ferial Haffajee  https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-08-26-how-ramaphosas-campaign-spent-r400-million-and-why-it-matters/ and Marianne Thamm  https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-08-27-payment-of-membership-fees-shows-just-how-moribund-the-anc-has-become/ ).

In short, the level of commitment to any specific political values of those who had their membership fees paid is unknown, and certainly, it was not rock hard, and they needed to be monitored in places of accommodation and "protected" or "cloistered" from being poached by supporters of other camps.  There was a sense of insecurity over the base that they were building, that unless carefully watched, they could slip over to another grouping. That could happen easily insofar as political loyalties bound no one in the sense of shared values.

In the course of the Zuma era it was reported  that ANC membership ballooned in some areas notably those of what was known as the Premier League, Free State, Mpumalanga, North West  -led by Ace Magashule, DD Mabuza and Supra Mahumaphelo as well as KZN, which was not formally part of the Premier League but engaged in a range of irregularities and murders to expand an ANC membership that supported Zuma.  The killings in KZN continue, though not so much to expand membership and support for individuals but people competing for resources entailed in holding specific offices in an ANC-led government. 

It may well be that some of what was done in winning over branches to support one or other set of candidates by the Premier League and in CR 17, is not breaking any law or done within the ANC regulations. But it nevertheless leads through financial expenditure to the harnessing of human beings to the cause of a specific individual.  Is that not buying of support?  That question needs to be asked not only of the Zuma period but also of the CR17 campaign. 

From what is reported, this was not a feature of ANC life before Polokwane. It was only then that the ANC presidency was contested, though there may well have been buying of members in provincial and branch campaigns before that conference.

The consequences of lacking a political component

There is no doubt that the election of Ramaphosa to the ANC and state presidency represented a democratic victory, insofar as it immediately set in motion some crucial steps towards re-establishing legality and eradication of corruption and state capture.  Whatever the limitations may be, we see important developments in the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), Special Investigating Unit (SIU), and the (Deputy Chief Justice Raymond) Zondo Commission, unthinkable in the Zuma period. For that, all democrats ought to be pleased.  We have a rights-based constitution, and it needs to be defended. 

It remains under attack in various ways and from multiple quarters, including some within the ANC.  That needs to be halted. The gains of the Ramaphosa 2017 Nasrec victory have regrettably not been consolidated. If anything, the "fightback" has weakened Ramaphosa and endangered his presidency.

The Ramaphosa leadership needs to act more boldly against its opponents but also in advancing a clear political programme.  Unfortunately, the Ramaphosa victory ensured through non-political means emerges as a project without political vision.  Those whose membership fees and accommodation and entertainment were paid, join others already in the ANC, including in leadership positions, who are not concerned with the quality of democracy. 

That politics is not a serious concern, beyond (the very important question of cleaning up and addressing debt), is clear in the repeated resort to xenophobia to divert attention from the crises that engulf the country and the ambiguities if not fawning over Traditional Leaders, some of whom stand in a similar relationship to villagers as that under apartheid. 

It will not work for Ramaphosa leadership to act with "charm" alone.  It is important to choose sides and act out a democratic vision.  The balance of forces in the ANC may constrain any such option, even if that were the inclination of the Ramaphosa leadership. That means that those who value democracy need to strengthen the will required to advance those values and bring their power to bear into the public domain, in public manifestations advancing democratic power. 

The Ramaphosa leadership will perhaps then be emboldened, knowing that it has this power, to take firmer steps in advancing democratic practices and values.  Whatever the ANC and state leadership decides, the public needs to enter this debate and make its power known, in support of these values and become a force to be reckoned with in debating, safeguarding and strengthening an emancipatory project. 

Raymond Suttner is a visiting professor in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, a senior research associate at the Centre for Change and emeritus professor at UNISA.  He served lengthy periods in prison and house arrest for underground and public anti-apartheid activities.  His writings cover contemporary politics, history, and social questions, especially issues relating to identities, gender and sexualities.  He blogs at raymondsuttner.com and his twitter handle is @raymondsuttner