Reopening its liaison office offers a narrow, but real, opportunity for the African Union to help achieve a ceasefire.

The African Union’s (AU) decision to reopen its Sudan liaison office signals a commitment to resolving the war that has ravaged the country for over three years. It also shows that the organisation is unwilling to cede ground in the crisis to external actors.

The AU and many international and regional organisations withdrew their staff in April 2023 when fighting erupted in Khartoum. AU personnel were relocated to its headquarters in Addis Ababa, forcing the organisation to conduct virtual shuttle diplomacy with Sudan’s warring parties.

While AU liaison offices typically focus on conflict prevention, peacebuilding, regional integration and advocacy, the key objective now is to provide on-the-ground technical support and maintain open communication channels between Sudan and the AU Commission. Could this move cement AU peacemaking efforts and bring a lasting end to hostilities?

The AU has a long history of mediating and managing conflicts in Sudan. The liaison office was established to advance the 2005 peace agreement that ended over two decades of war between North and South Sudan.

The 2003-2006 Darfur war and South Sudan’s secession in 2011 led to the office’s mandate being extended following the formation of two AU high-level panels on Darfur, and on Sudan and South Sudan. The office was crucial in transmitting AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) decisions to local authorities for implementation and in keeping the PSC and AU Commission informed of and engaged in political dynamics.

Since May 2019 the office has been led by the AU Commission Chairperson’s Special Representative to Sudan, Ambassador Mohamed Belaiche. After the coup in April that year that toppled Omar al-Bashir, it facilitated meetings between transitional authorities, AU officials and political and civil society groups, culminating in the August 2019 power-sharing agreement.

After the 2019 and 2021 military coups, the office advised the PSC to suspend Sudan from the AU. It has continued to respond to the current war – albeit from a distance. Most recently, Belaiche has been involved in mediation and state-building efforts of the Quintet (AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, League of Arab States, European Union and United Nations (UN)).

A physical presence offers unique benefits. It would secure the AU’s role as the primary interlocutor in Sudan’s peace processes and as the only Quintet member with a political presence on the ground. The UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan closed in February 2024, and most diplomatic missions relocated their embassies to neighbouring countries, limiting direct information and exchange with Sudanese stakeholders.

Securing a leading role in diplomacy is important, but what are the strategic objectives of reopening the office? In the past, a fundamental aim was to oversee implementation of peace agreements, but the current warring parties have yet to agree on a ceasefire. That said, the liaison office could enhance information exchange and exert new pressure on adversaries to commit to good-faith dialogue.

Despite these advantages, the AU’s return to Khartoum faces significant hurdles. Belaiche visited General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council and chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), on 8 July to discuss reopening the office. Although the meeting was fruitful, political and pragmatic concerns were raised.

First, to avoid being seen as partisan, the AU needs political backing from all sides, not just the Sovereign Council. The plethora of armed groups, civilian and political actors, requires nuanced consultations and support to validate the AU’s approach to the Sudanese conflict.

Second, the AU is engaged in multiple mediation efforts to stabilise Sudan, which may be jeopardised if its position is perceived as negatively affecting peace processes. These include mainly the Quintet and the AU’s intra-Sudanese dialogue between the warring parties’ political wings, namely the SAF-led transitional government and the Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasis), which is allied with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Al-Burhan recently announced a national dialogue facilitated by an independent mechanism. The AU could help coordinate a broad-based national convening, but only if it mitigates concerns of inclusivity and neutrality, and can leverage progressive and meaningful outcomes from the transitional, military-aligned government.

Third are security concerns for staff if the liaison office’s return to Khartoum is perceived as indicating the AU’s bias towards the de facto government that controls the capital. Several diplomatic missions were targeted when fighting began, particularly embassies with genuine or perceived allegiance to either side.

Beyond the safety and security of personnel and infrastructure, other practical concerns abound. After the SAF recaptured Khartoum in April 2025, the transitional government has sought to rebuild the capital, yet there are significant limitations in water, electricity and internet services. The constant shift in battle frontlines also increases Khartoum’s vulnerability, particularly to drone attacks.

To be effective, the office needs a clear mandate and commitment to neutrality. A physical presence will translate into impact only if clear objectives are developed in line with the AU’s roadmap for resolving Sudan’s conflict.

To fully maximise its presence, the liaison office should engage Sudan’s many professional unions as well as civil and political formations. A significant factor leading to the current conflict is the lack of inclusion and diversity of political views in governance processes. A presence on the ground allows the AU to meet with and integrate the voice and vision of all Sudanese actors.

The AU must also maintain a neutral mediation posture and avoid symbolic and partisan diplomacy. That includes consulting the conflicting parties to ensure the safety of AU personnel.

The transitional government could also benefit from the AU’s return. Continental and international diplomatic recognition is paramount and is part of its strategy to defeat the RSF on all fronts. Also, the liaison office may offer pathways for the transitional government to influence AU decisions.

The AU’s response in Sudan has been tested by years of competing and stalled processes. By returning to Khartoum, the continental body could reassert its relevance and contribute meaningfully to ending hostilities.

Written by Maram Mahdi, Researcher, African Peace and Security Governance, ISS

This article was first published in the ISS’ PSC Report