The holding of credible elections in Madagascar is nearly impossible as the country has suffered from a protracted political crisis since 2009, following the unconstitutional transfer of power from then president, Marc Ravalomanana, to Andry Rajoelina. The country has been unable to move forward since, given the ongoing political deadlock between the two rivals and the torturous mediation path towards restoring legitimacy in the eyes of foreign powers. Madagascar has further seen a gradual deterioration of state capacity and worsening of socio-economic conditions. Presidential elections are now scheduled for 24 July 2013, where the overarching objective is to end the political impasse and resurrect state authority. For this to happen, however, the elections must not only be conducted in a credible, ‘free and fair’ manner, but must also address the root causes of the political instability plaguing the country, particularly the loss of state legitimacy. The elections are therefore absolutely critical for the political, social and economic future of Madagascar.

This discussion paper examines the prospects of the upcoming elections as a solution to the political crisis in Madagascar. It offers a conceptual understanding of the crisis as one fundamentally concerning the lack of political legitimacy. From this perspective, it considers the many challenges facing the implementation of credible polls in July and to what extent these might contribute to the restoration of political legitimacy and state authority. In doing so, it also provides some reflection on the potential tension between the dogmatic emphasis on elections as advocated by the international community and the need for long-run effective governance for the Malagasy people.

Political crises and the long road to elections

The current political crisis originated with the unconstitutional transfer of power that took place in early 2009, from then president, Marc Ravalomanana, to Andry Rajoelina, the mayor of the capital city, Antananarivo. Tensions between the two started in 2008, following, among other things, the decision by Ravalomanana to shut down a TV station owned by Rajoelina. The conflict escalated during the first few months of 2009 as Rajoelina led a series of public anti-government demonstrations in the capital, ultimately leading to the death of over 100 people.⁽²⁾ Elements of the military eventually intervened and forced Ravalomanana to step down.⁽³⁾

On 17 March 2009, Ravalomanana handed power over to a military directorate, which in turn quickly passed it on to Rajoelina. He declared himself president of the newly established High Transitional Authority (HTA) and was officially recognised as president by Madagascar’s Constitutional Court on 18 March 2009.⁽⁴⁾ Ravalomanana, who went into self-imposed exile in South Africa, was later sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for the killings of a number of protesters outside his presidential palace during the protests in 2009.⁽⁵⁾ It is worthwhile noting that South African authorities are now investigating whether this conviction constitutes a crime against humanity in conjunction with the country’s obligations as laid out in the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

At the time of the transfer, the international community reacted with a unanimous condemnation of what was seen as an illegal seizure of government by Rajoelina. This led to the suspension of Madagascar from the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Organisation international de la Francophonie (OIF), along with the halting of aid from many foreign donors.⁽⁶⁾ Against this background, the crisis soon deteriorated into a firmly entrenched political impasse, characterised by an intense rivalry between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina, in addition to a number of failed attempts at mediation lead by the United Nations (UN), AU, SADC and OIF.⁽⁷⁾

An agreement was finally reached on 17 September 2011, known as the SADC roadmap. With the objective of “returning the country towards constitutional normalcy through free and fair elections,”⁽⁸⁾ the roadmap stipulates a number of measures to be taken towards this end, including the creation of an Independent National Electoral Commission of the Transition (CENIT), tasked with planning and conducting the elections.⁽⁹⁾ Following UN recommendations, elections were initially set to take place in May 2013 but were later postponed to 24 July 2013, reportedly due to logistical setbacks and a political deadlock between Rajoelina and the opposition.⁽¹⁰⁾

Although not specified in the roadmap, SADC also proposed that neither Ravalomanana nor Rajoelina should stand in the elections.⁽¹¹⁾ This ideal situation was realised earlier in 2013 when both leaders announced that they would not contest the upcoming polls for the sake of peace and stability. However, with the release of the list of the 41 approved candidates by the Special Electoral Court in May 2013, it became painfully clear that this deal had been broken as not only did Rajoelina’s name appear on the roll, but so did that of Ravalomanana’s wife, Lalao. This has left the electoral process as fragile as before.

A crisis of legitimacy

The crisis in Madagascar can effectively be understood as one concerning a lack of political legitimacy of the current regime and large parts of the political system. The significance of the upcoming elections will thus depend not only on the quality of the elections themselves, but also on the extent to which they can contribute to the general restoration of political legitimacy.

Political legitimacy, however, is a complex phenomenon. Despite often being equated with legality, or, more specifically, constitutionality, it is at its root a psychological phenomenon.⁽¹²⁾ In simple terms, it can be described as a psychological relationship between the governed and their governors, which engenders a belief that the state’s leaders and institutions have a right to exercise political authority over the rest of society.⁽¹³⁾ More specifically, it is commonly held that the exercise of political power is legitimate when “it is in accordance with existing rules justified by shared beliefs and when citizens consent to the arrangement.”⁽¹⁴⁾ In Madagascar, the ‘existing rules based on shared beliefs’, that is, the constitution, prescribes electoral democracy. This suggests that Rajoelina’s rule is inherently illegitimate.

Formally, in electoral democracies, legitimacy is derived from the input side of the political system or from the procedure through which governors have been selected.⁽¹⁵⁾ However, the perceived legitimacy of a democratic regime is also affected by measured outputs or effective governance.⁽¹⁶⁾ For example, citizens are simply unlikely to support a political system or particular government that does not provide for their basic needs. A perceived lack in quality of government can in turn be expressed either in the form of dissatisfaction with how existing governors are handling the mandate given to them based on the existing rules, or in the form of diminished support for the existing rules themselves. Input and output levels are therefore closely correlated where, even within electoral democracies, elections come off as perhaps a necessary, yet insufficient, condition for the realisation of political legitimacy.

Moreover, although strictly speaking political legitimacy concerns the social contract between the governed and their governors, external actors also play a role in the perceived legitimacy of a state. Countries like Madagascar, heavily dependent on foreign aid, are of course particularly vulnerable to this kind of external judgment. Since Rajoelina’s takeover in 2009 and the subsequent reaction of the international community (clearly based on a perceived violation of ‘the existing rules’), Madagascar has essentially been without both electoral democracy and effective governance. It is no wonder then that there is a need to reinstate political legitimacy. However, the question remains as to whether the upcoming elections can do the job. 

The international community and the prospect of free and fair elections

From the perspective of the international community, the conduction of free and fair elections is a necessary condition for the restoration of political legitimacy in Madagascar. The ‘thumbs up’ from the international community is in turn critical for the resurrection of Madagascar’s international relations, for sanctions to be lifted and for foreign assistance to be resumed. However, despite the repeatedly stated commitment by all major political stakeholders in Madagascar towards the hosting of free and fair elections within the current timeframe, there are many significant challenges that need to be overcome. Most of these stem from a combination of, on the one hand, the political polarisation and entrenched rivalry between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana and, on the other hand, the implications of a number of key provisions provided for in the roadmap.

The question of funding for the elections and lifting of sanctions imposed after the coup d'état has long been a contentious but fundamental issue. It reveals a major contradiction embedded in the roadmap in that for sanctions to be lifted, the milestones outlined in the roadmap, including the holding of elections, must be adhered to.⁽¹⁷⁾ At the same time, however, in order to hold the elections, funding is needed.

In January 2013, following the announcements by Rajoelina and Ravalomanana that they would not stand in the elections, Catherine Ashton, European Union (EU) High Representative for Foreign Affairs, issued a statement that echoed this contradiction, saying “the EU will be providing major political and financial assistance – conditional on compliance with the roadmap – encompassing pre- and post-electoral support.”⁽¹⁸⁾ The official message conveyed in this statement becomes even more ambiguous considering that during the same month the EU decided to make a financial contribution to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to support the CENIT in the organisation of the polls.⁽¹⁹⁾ The mixed messages testify to the difficulties of securing the quality of the polls without compromising the hard-line stance on the issue of democratic legitimacy. In fact, following a recent statement by the AU calling the candidacies of Rajoelina and Lalao Ravalomanana illegitimate, the EU and France have now declared that funding might even be suspended.⁽²⁰⁾ This announcement casts serious doubts on previous statements by the CENIT and the UN that they are technically ready to implement the polls.⁽²¹⁾ Given these recent developments, it becomes increasingly difficult to see how the elections can be conducted at all – not to mention in a credible fashion.

In addition to the problem of funds, the most aggravating challenge to the credibility of the polls is arguably the candidacy of Rajoelina. His candidacy has been unanimously condemned by the international community and the AU has explicitly stated that it will not recognise him as president should he come out victorious. His mere presence in the race also increases the risk of the electoral playing field being tilted to his advantage, which would affect the ‘fairness’ of the elections and distort the perceived consensual and neutral character of all transitional institutions. The fact that Rajoelina is running in the polls while Ravalomanana cannot further shatters the illusion of these elections being ‘a new beginning’ or ‘fresh start’ for the country. Moreover, Rajoelina’s refusal to withdraw his candidacy only serves to undermine his alleged commitment to restoring political legitimacy through a credible electoral process. Indeed, his unwillingness to compromise reinforces prior suspicions among analysts that his ultimate objective since the outbreak of the crisis has been to legitimatise his power through de facto control – by playing for time and preventing Ravalomanana from returning to the country, hoping that the international community will eventually accept the situation.⁽²²⁾

Another contentious issue is that of Ravalomanana’s return and his indirect presence in the electoral process. Due to various interpretations of a number of articles in the roadmap, the legal questions regarding his return and amnesty remain largely unresolved.⁽²³⁾ Although his decision not to contest the polls or return to the country before the elections provided some relief to an otherwise tense pre-election setting, the candidacy of his wife demonstrates that he still exerts influence from behind the scenes. Moreover, with Ravalomanana’s impending return being sidelined to move forward with the electoral process, it is clear that Madagascar is torn between short-term pragmatics, on the one hand, and a commitment to long-term principles, on the other. Nevertheless, the issue of Ravalomanana’s legal status is unlikely to remain under the radar for long as the trade-off seems to have done little to enhance the prospect of holding credible elections.   

All in all, these issues are indicative of the general problem facing the international community in the run-up to the elections. The heavy emphasis on the adherence to the roadmap and conduction of ‘free and fair’ elections to restore political legitimacy needs to be balanced with the very real possibility of the elections being either postponed again or severely flawed. Both of these scenarios would likely prolong the crisis and possibly undermine the continued credibility of the reconciliation process

Concluding remarks

At its core, political legitimacy concerns the social contract between citizens and their governors. Ultimately, therefore, the restoration of political legitimacy and state authority in Madagascar depends on the judgement of the Malagasy people. In contrast to the international community, the majority of the Malagasy people are likely to judge the legitimacy of their political leaders not based on the procedure by which they have come into office, but based on their capacity to provide effective governance. In the environment of growing poverty and deteriorating socio-economic conditions,⁽²⁴⁾ the procedural requirements of liberal democracy are probably not of the highest priority to most citizens. Furthermore, considering the recent history of postponed elections and the general inability of the political stakeholders in the country to put their personal grievances and power aspirations aside, the Malagasy people will be forgiven for viewing the current promises of credible elections in July with a fair amount of scepticism.

In the end, the virtual absence of the voice of the Malagasy people is troubling because it undermines the shared beliefs that constitute the foundation of political legitimacy. The need to incorporate local perceptions and account for the highly contextual character of many new and transitional democracies in Africa highlights the need to ‘democratise democracy’. This involves the recognition that “the real measure of democracy is the extent to which governance conforms to the visions of democracy worked out by the governed.”⁽²⁵⁾ It is these visions that should form the foundation of political legitimacy and state authority in Madagascar. If not, it seems highly unlikely that the July polls will lead to the long-term restoration of political legitimacy and state authority in the eyes of the Malagasy people, no matter how ‘free and fair’ the elections are considered to be.

Written by Fredrik Bruhn ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Contact Fredrik Bruhn through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Elections and Democracy Unit (elections.democracy@consultancyafrica.com). This CAI discussion paper was developed with the assistance of Keri Leicher and was edited by Liezl Stretton.
(2) Connolly, L., ‘The troubled road to peace: Reflections on the complexities of resolving the political impasse in Madagascar’, Accord, Issue 021, February 2013, http://www.accord.org.za.
(3) Dewar, B., Massey, S. and Baker, B., ‘Madagascar: Time to make a fresh start’, Chatham House and Coventry University, January 2013, http://www.chathamhouse.org.
(4) Connolly, L., ‘The troubled road to peace: Reflections on the complexities of resolving the political impasse in Madagascar’, Accord, Issue 021, February 2013, http://www.accord.org.za.
(5) Dewar, B., Massey, S. and Baker, B., ‘Madagascar: Time to make a fresh start’, Chatham House and Coventry University, January 2013, http://www.chathamhouse.org.
(6) Ibid.; Call, C.T., ‘UN mediation and the politics of transition after constitutional crises’, International Peace Institute, February 2012, http://www.ipinst.org.
(7) ‘Madagascar leader Rajoelina scraps power-sharing deal’, BBC, 21 December 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(8)  ‘Madagascar: Press statement of the organ troika’, allAfrica, 17 September 2011, http://allafrica.com.
(9) Connolly, L., ‘The troubled road to peace: Reflections on the complexities of resolving the political impasse in Madagascar’, Accord, Issue 021, February 2013, http://www.accord.org.za.
(10) ‘Madagascar postpones general elections’, African Elections Project, 2 April 2013, http://www.africanelections.org.
(11) Massey, S. and Baker, B., ‘Madagascar’s political crisis: How SADC saved the day?’, Think Africa Press, 22 February 2013, http://thinkafricapress.com.
(12) Clark, J.F., 2007. The decline of the African military coup. Journal of Democracy, 18(2), pp. 141-155.
(13) Thomson, A., 2000. An introduction to African politics. Routledge: London.
(14) Moehler, D.C. and Lindberg, S.I., 2009. Narrowing the legitimacy gap: Turnovers as a cause of democratic consolidation. The Journal of Politics, 71(4), pp. 1448-1466.
(15) Rothstein, B., ‘Creating state legitimacy – five basic models’, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 28 August – 2 September 2007.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Connolly, L., ‘The troubled road to peace: Reflections on the complexities of resolving the political impasse in Madagascar’, Accord, Issue 021, February 2013, http://www.accord.org.za.
(18)  ‘Statement by the spokesperson of Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative, on Madagascar’, European Union, 19 January 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu.
(19) ‘EU and UNDP to support elections in Madagascar’, UNDP, 16 January 2013, http://www.undp.org.
(20) Iloniaina, A., ‘Madagascar’s Rajoelina not eligible to run in election: AU’, Reuters, 17 May 2013, http://www.reuters.com.
(21)  ‘Madagascar elections postponed after political standoff’, France24, 29 March 2013, http://www.france24.com.
(22) Dewar, B., Massey, S. and Baker, B., ‘Madagascar: Time to make a fresh start’, Chatham House and Coventry University, January 2013, http://www.chathamhouse.org.
(23) Connolly, L., ‘The troubled road to peace: Reflections on the complexities of resolving the political impasse in Madagascar’, Accord, Issue 021, February 2013, http://www.accord.org.za.
(24)  ‘Madagascar: Domestic violence rises as incomes fall’, IRIN, 6 November 2012, http://www.irinnews.org.
(25) Koelble, T.A. and Lipuma, E., 2008. Democratising democracy: A postcolonial critique of conventional approaches to the ‘measurement of democracy. Democratisation, 15(1), pp. 1-28.