On 31 August 2014, the Lesotho army attempted to stage a coup d’état. The Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) took over several police stations across the country as well as the nation’s radio and television services. Lesotho Prime Minister, Tom Thabane, fled to South Africa fearing for his safety. Although the incident immediately affected the stability of Lesotho itself, the army’s power play also presented a crucial political challenge to SADC in relation to the handling of conflicts and crises as well as the peaceful resolution thereof.

The SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (2001) recognises “the principles of strict respect for sovereignty, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, good neighbourliness, interdependence, non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs of other States.” This Protocol also seeks to “prevent, contain and resolve inter- and intra-state conflict by peaceful means” and to safeguard that any intervention to normalise a situation is “in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed.” Notwithstanding the laudable objectives of this protocol, the reality is that SADC does not have a clear and consistent policy on resolving conflict within its sphere of influence.

Another near coup d’état emerges from another contested election

Lesotho held peaceful elections in May 2012, which resulted in a non-violent transfer of power, although the results failed to produce an outright winner and resulted in a power-sharing agreement between the main political parties. However, these steps towards a sustainable democracy suffered a substantial setback from the attempted military coup d’état of 31 August 2014 and its aftermath. The incident represented the culmination of a power struggle between Prime Minister Tom Thabane and the Deputy Prime Minister Mothetja Metsing. Thabane and Metsing were part of a coalition government that was created after the 2012 elections. The Prime Minister had the support of the police, who are officially known as the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS). The Deputy Prime Minister was backed by the military. In June 2014, with the approval of Lesotho’s King Letsie III, Prime Minister Thabane suspended parliament for nine months following the tabling in parliament of a motion of no-confidence against him. Already cracks were fissuring Lesotho’s democratic facade, and the military intervened bluntly to do more damage.

Conflict broke out on 30 August 2014 when the army militarily engaged the police outside two police stations. Whether a pretext or actual intelligence was in fact obtained, the military claimed to have received word that the police were planning to arm supporters of Metsing ahead of protests that had been planned for 1 September. The army took over LMDS headquarters and several police stations as well as the radio and TV stations. This resulted in a total blackout of broadcasting. 

After the LDF’s show of force which went to the brink without pulling off a coup d’état as a fait accompli, leaving the army generals in charge as if the tiny kingdom were Egypt after the military ouster of President Muhammad Morsi, South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma as chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation met Lesotho coalition leaders in Pretoria on 1 September. This meeting set a deadline of two weeks for Lesotho to reconvene its parliament. However, with no sign of either parliament reconvening or the political stalemate being resolved, SADC heads of state convened an extraordinary meeting in Pretoria on 15 September. The regional leaders agreed that an observation mission would be sent to Lesotho to ensure peace and stability. There was also a call for early elections in the hope of resolving the current political impasse but military intervention was not being considered by SADC. Even after almost two decades of fast-moving conflict developments in Southern Africa, a 1998 SADC military intervention in Lesotho has not been forgotten by policy makers or the media. Pakalitha Mosisili led the government in 1998 when national election results were found to be tainted by fraud. Opposition parties sued in court, and when the law suit failed, rioters took to the streets. A coup d’état was feared as violence escalated, the capital Maseru was vandalised and chaos spread. An improperly-planned SADC military intervention - led and composed of soldiers from the South Africa National Defence Force (SANDF) - resulted in at least 60 local casualties and eight South African military personnel dead. The intervention was a public relations set-back for the post-apartheid South Africa, then only four years after its first democratic election that choose Nelson Mandela as president.

Replacing a habit of ‘blundering in’ with coherent strategic policy

The latest near-coup d’état in Lesotho and the need for a regional response highlights the need for SADC to move beyond simple mediation. It is time for SADC to craft and adopt harmonised and consistent strategies for resolution of political turmoil within its member states.

SADC’s conflict resolution and security collaboration efforts demand adept policies that are underpinned by political commitment of member states to honour decisions by SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation when the Organ’s rulings apply to them. For instance, SADC is unable to have coalition leaders in Lesotho respect the recommendations mediated by the Organ. After brokering a timeline of milestones that had to be achieved in order to restore the functioning of parliament and the restoration of security within Lesotho, the Organ could not obtain the cooperation of coalition leaders when it came to actually adhering to the agreement. SADC must develop functional, consistent and efficacious frameworks on security and intervention to oversee the handling of conflicts within the member states. Such development of common frameworks must be conducted in a broad engagement with civil society and NGOs. A harmonisation of strategies by SADC will also ensure that, in the future, the regional organisation will act and react consistently with little possibility of discrepancies in opinions on policy issues by the 15 member states. Harmonisation of member states’ foreign policies in the specific matter of SADC interventions in those states is essential. SADC needs to be more than just reactive to conflict and security issues. Through fostering principles of good governance as a conflict prevention mechanism, SADC can also help boost democratic institutions in a region where these are still unsettled in most countries.
Authoring regional peacekeeping initiatives in Southern Africa              

Although Southern Africa in 2014 remains generally peaceful compared to the tumult found in other regions of the continent, individual members of SADC continue to face numerous challenges, both internally in terms of maintaining democratic systems and resolving political conflicts and collectively in terms of regional conflict management via SADC. Differing political agendas and the enormous egos of such leaders as South Africa’s Jacob Zuma and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe who both wish to be the region’s supreme influential leader, complicates mutual agreement on SADC political intervention policy. The crisis in Lesotho highlighted the need for SADC to at last formulate intervention strategies that can be used in resolving similar crises in the region. The success of initiatives on the resolution of political crises and peacekeeping depends on the political will of the members states to not only create solutions but to honour these when such intervention is applied to their countries. That no progress has been made in formulating an intervention strategy should come as no surprise when the challenges of accommodating 15 national egos are considered.  However, the latest turmoil in Lesotho casts a spotlight on a canvas that, while now empty, still needs to be filled.

This article is extracted from the October 2014 edition of CAI’s Africa Conflict Monitor (ACM) –. The essential +/-70 page monthly report that dissects conflict developments and trends across the African continent to guide businesses, governments, academics and other stakeholders in Africa’s growth and stability.

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Written by By Gibson Ncube and Sandile Lukhele ⁽¹⁾

Notes:

(1)   Gibson Ncube is a senior analyst with Consultancy Africa Intelligence (CAI) and is widely published on Africa, with more than 15 peer reviewed journal articles. He has worked in various academic capacities in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Sandile Lukhele is an ACM analyst and has written extensively on African affairs in African and international publications.
(2)   Data source: ‘Conflict trends in Africa 1946-2004’, Monty Marshall