While the danger of nuclear terrorism remains globally palpable, leaders of only two of six African nations, Algeria and Morocco, but not Egypt, Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa, in March 2014 pledged their commitment to a far-reaching multilateral declaration titled Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation.⁽²⁾ Once countries incorporate voluntary guidelines into national legislation, compliance with the United Nation’s (UN) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rules becomes mandatory and legally-binding for government, the private sector and the research community alike. Supported by 35 countries, the pledge vowed to “realise or exceed” the standards set out in a series of guidelines laid down by the IAEA to safeguard nuclear materials; and was delivered in March 2014 at the third of four biennial Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) which aims to push states to take greater and transparent responsibility for worldwide nuclear security. It also obligates signatories, inter alia, to ensure that those responsible for nuclear security are demonstrably competent. Also noticeably absent from the agreement were China, India, Russia and Pakistan, which make up nearly half of the world’s countries with large stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

Part 1 of this CAI paper briefly examines Africa’s notably low participation in the 2014 NSS held at The Hague, Netherlands. The NSS gathered 53 leaders from around the world in order to draw attention at the highest possible level for the need to secure nuclear material and prevent nuclear terrorism. An apparent problem persists that states insist on their absolute sovereignty in keeping nuclear materials secure and still disagree on what is vulnerable, thus first summit’s deadline to secure all vulnerable material in four years has still not been met. Non-participation by African leaders in pertinent global issues such as nuclear security may contradict the goal of the NSS process, and result in more self-reliant and internationally unaccountable approaches to nuclear energy and subsequently, to nuclear security. This exposes disconcerting gaps in global nuclear security and nuclear non-proliferation. Part 2 explores African countries’ nuclear security progress reports submitted at the 2014 summit.

South Africa’s baffling stance

South Africa’s reluctance to support the pledge perhaps relates to a declaration in its national report to the NSS that it has made its own provision for developing countries to store “high-activity radioactive sources.”⁽³⁾ This implies that South Africa has agreed to import radioactive waste which has not been announced domestically. South Africa’s programme in this respect involves the recovery, consolidation and storage of radioactive sources “throughout Africa and some non-African countries” through the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (NECSA). South Africa also shunned the NSS’s aim to establish a new legally-binding global nuclear security system or “architecture” by 2016 to supplement gaps in the world’s current nuclear security regime which lobbyists want written into permanent international law. Instead, South Africa leans on a greater leadership role for the IAEA to produce measurable, enforceable progress in global nuclear security. However, growing recognition exists that the IAEA – which is at the behest of the UN regarding disarmament issues - is largely deficit of resources and its ultimate role in the NSS initiative remains to be seen. Justifying its position by listing support for an array of international instruments related to nuclear security, the South African report to the 2014 NSS stated that its new “hot cell facility” was developed by NECSA with the assistance of the IAEA.

South African president Jacob Zuma, who attended the previous summits, may purposefully have avoided the international event in 2014 by sending his foreign minister, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane. This is an odd development at a time when South Africa intends to forge the path for Africa’s nuclear renaissance as a global competitive nuclear power, and is represented in a range of international nuclear regimes, including the secretive multinational Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) set up in 1975 to ensure civilian nuclear exports are not diverted for military purposes. After the 2012 NSS, Zuma received backlash from his controversial comments that South Africa’s obligations to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) allowed for the “enrichment of uranium for peaceful purposes only, irrespective of the enrichment level.”⁽⁴⁾ This sentiment was reiterated by Mashabane in an interview after the 2014 NSS in which she maintained South Africa's “inalienable rights” to use highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and beneficiate uranium.⁽⁵⁾ United States (US) Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman has stated the frustration of the rest of the world which had hoped South Africa would start down blending its HEU sooner.⁽⁶⁾

Africa’s disparate participation

African nations espoused disparate levels of eagerness to participate in the NSS initiative, tending to be more participatory in other international forums related to nuclear disarmament of the world’s superpowers. In contrast to an increased attendance from previous years ⁽⁷⁾ of 27 African countries and the African Union (AU) at a meeting of the NPT in May 2014, the NSS on 24-25 March at The Hague saw only one additional African country, Gabon, since the first summit in 2010. This is a notably low number of African participants considering the presence of 13 aging nuclear reactors in 10 of Africa’s 54 countries and widespread uranium; a fact that is compounded by the burgeoning nuclear energy ambitions of nations like Kenya and Ghana, significantly, among others. Moreover, Africa’s own compliance body set up in 2009 by the Pelindaba Treaty, the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) is still not operational. It remains unclear whether more than six African countries were invited to the NSS which, according to Nkoana-Mashabane, was attended by a “self-selected” group.⁽⁸⁾ It remains to be seen whether a resentful stance towards Western initiatives will impact the US-African Leaders Summit set for August 2014 in Washington DC.⁽⁹⁾ Likely to be discussed is the Obama administration’s attempt to make a difference by turning around the energy poverty of the continent through a US$ 7 billion Power Africa Initiative through its Electrify Africa Act.⁽¹⁰⁾ While some US congressmen propose to power African cities with nuclear power, the initiative appears to exclude the option while, controversially, the US Export-Import Bank may support private companies to start nuclear power plants in Africa.

Why the NSS matters

Established in 2010 by US president Barack Obama and likely to be finalised in 2016, the NSS initiative was, and comprised of, a four-year effort endorsed in UNSC Resolution 1887. Obama’s main aim has been to facilitate through consensus a legally binding global nuclear security regime – a mechanism for extracting nuclear-security commitments from partner countries. The first NSS was held in Washington DC, and brought together world leaders to discuss the need to enhance security culture and the recognition of states’ rights to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Unlike the NPT, however, the NSS does not intend to focus on nuclear disarmament as a primary pillar but instead places greater emphasis on the potential for attainment of nuclear materials by non-state actors in recognition of ever-increasing global risks. In 2012, the ensuing NSS held in Seoul, South Korea, extended its focus to developing a global nuclear security architecture, which touts the importance of membership in global conventions such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).⁽¹¹⁾ The 2012 NSS also encouraged participation in international initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), as well as compliance with IAEA.

The 2014 NSS Communiqué, a summary report agreed upon by summit participants, inter alia, recognised the need for a strengthened and comprehensive international nuclear security architecture; for states to build a security culture, and national and international confidence; education awareness; supporting intensive dialogue between operators, government bodies including the national regulator which “should be functionally independent;” enhanced security in domestic and international transport; taking into consideration national, regional and international levels. The communiqué acknowledged nuclear security was the “fundamental responsibility of states” and the central role of the IAEA.⁽¹²⁾ The IAEA has not prevented the spread of nuclear weapons and indeed supports a greater role of self-regulation which has pitfalls for nuclear non-proliferation.

Nuclear disarmament overshadows Africa’s interest in nuclear security

With four of Africa’s participating nations abstaining from the NSS pledge, most African leaders are more resolutely focussed on nuclear disarmament of superpowers than on global nuclear security. Consequently, international cohesion on the issue of global nuclear security remains far from solid, with risks of polarisation rather than unity, as nuclear geopolitics deepens the divide. Africa, as the world’s largest nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in terms of the Pelindaba Treaty and a potentially significant growth area for nuclear development, has made continual calls for global nuclear disarmament, a topic typically avoided in discussion by the nuclear weapons states (NWS). The so-called P5, or permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), retain nuclear weapons as a core component of their military capabilities 45 years since the NPT came into force. The P5 also boycotted the Second Conference on the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons⁽¹³⁾ (hereafter the HI) held in Nayarit, Mexico in February 2014, which was well supported by 43 African nations. Adding to the complexity of global nuclear security politics, tensions and disagreements continue to escalate around the four ⁽¹⁴⁾ other nuclear-armed states which remain outside the NPT. Thus, the current tally of states armed with atomic weapons is now nine since the NPT entered into force in 1968.

Concerns also periodically surface about the focus of several current non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) that previously developed nuclear weapons programmes independently of the NPT. For example, Brazil, Libya and South Africa, which retains its six defunct atomic bombs dismantled with the end of apartheid, today sit alongside three nuclear armed states in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping which has a mission to reconfigure the world politically and economically as a “multipolar world.” While BRICS countries staunchly defend NNWS’ rights to peaceful use of nuclear technology, including enrichment, the BRIC countries are emerging as fast growing countries within the nuclear energy industry and had a total market value of US$ 12.2 billion in 2012.⁽¹⁵⁾ The “S” in BRICS – South Africa – has also stated aims of becoming a globally competitive nuclear power. Several other countries, including Iran, want to join BRICS and thus far the group has been less than forthcoming on how it reconciles its aims for nuclear development in developing countries alongside the continued retention of nuclear weapons by three of its members.

African support for the disarmament of nuclear weapons, evident in the participation in Pelindaba Treaty ⁽¹⁶⁾ and the NPT,⁽¹⁷⁾ appears to support concern about the hesitancy in several African leaders to back Western driven non-proliferation initiatives, such as the NSS. While several African nations called for a ban of nuclear weapons at the HI conference in Mexico, a variety of Western nations like Australia, Turkey, Germany, and the Netherlands as well as non-NPT NWS, India and Pakistan, remained sceptical about the feasibility of such a ban. Notably, Morocco, Tanzania, Malawi, Tonga, Nigeria, and Zambia joined 14 other world nations in supporting the Mexican conference call for a ban on nuclear weapons.⁽¹⁸⁾ NWS and nations that fall under nuclear weapons umbrellas avoidance of completely eliminating their nuclear arsenals, has likely created a point of contention among the majority of African states that tend to align more with the strident support of nuclear weapons disarmament of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) which is currently led by Iran.⁽¹⁹⁾ Indeed, in May the two-week final Preparatory Conference (PrepCon) for 2015’s crucial review of the 189-member NPT agreement, ended without consensus on final recommendations due to problems associated with the disarmament by nuclear weapon states and the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free-zone in the Middle East.

African contribution to the 2014 NSS

The six participating African states made clear at the 2014 NSS that despite regional threats and economic hardship, they maintain a vested interest in inhibiting nuclear terrorism and increasing nuclear security. Notably, the joint statement with the most African signatories (Algeria, Egypt and South Africa) was the Comprehensive Approach to Nuclear Security, which deems the most viable approach to increasing nuclear security to be to eliminate nuclear weapons completely.⁽²⁰⁾

Algeria, Morocco, and Nigeria, at the 2014 NSS were the most vocal African nations which mostly sent prime ministers this time instead of their presidents. The presidents of Gabon, Ali Bongo Ondimba, and Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, attended while the prime minister of Algeria, Yousef Yousfi, took the place of Algeria’s president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who had attended the previous summit. Ministers from Egypt have attended all three NSSs in place of the nation’s transitioning leadership, while Morocco’s former Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi attended the 2010 NSS but has since sent other ministers to the 2012 and 2014 summits. As stated above, South Africa’s International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane took the place of President Zuma, who attended the two previous NSSs.

Aside from Morocco, African countries did not participate extensively in joint statements; agreements made at the 2014 NSS by international partners on common interests related to improving nuclear security. This may be as a result of minimal outreach to African states on issues like countering nuclear smuggling, or because the African participants purposefully withheld their support for key statements issued at the 2014 NSS. Additionally, no accurate figures exist on HEU stocks currently held by any African country. However, there was a slight increase in African participation from the 2012 NSS “gift baskets,” which are joint statements that become mechanisms through which groups of states collaborate on multilateral actions in particular areas of nuclear security to build on individual country commitments. Joint statements are an important indicator of international consensus on nuclear security, which so far, have not alluded to overarching perspectives that can lead to the sought after global nuclear security architecture. Part 2 of this discussion paper separately highlights country-specific nuclear security progress reports from African states that were submitted to the 2014 NSS.

Africa’s nuclear industry was largely absent from discussions

Despite the growing nuclear power ambitions across the African continent, there was surprisingly minimal African participation in the Nuclear Industry Summit (NIS) held alongside the NSS in Amsterdam. The NIS seeks to connect industry representatives on a global level to discuss nuclear security and establish its own set of security commitments. African participants only included the Algerian Atomic Energy Commission, NECSA, and the Nigeria Atomic Energy Commission. This is problematic considering the NSS’s purported goal of a global nuclear security architecture, which seems implausible if so much of the world’s largest NWFZ is not involved. South Africa, as a member of NIS Working Group 3, shared in the agreed principles that acknowledged nuclear and radiological terrorism is a public concern and that the minimisation of HEU is important for all industry stakeholders.⁽²¹⁾ There were no Algerian or Nigerian representatives included in the working groups though a joint statement was issued by all NIS participants who recognised their responsibilities for implementing security arrangements within national regulatory frameworks.⁽²²⁾ Significantly, the statement also stated that industry organisations and commercial companies should consider engaging with appropriate non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – an aspect sorely lacking in Africa.

Conclusion

Given the strong efforts of African states like Algeria, Morocco and Nigeria to draw attention to their commitment to nuclear security via their participation in the 2014 NSS, it is unclear why other African nations have remained seemingly non-committal or absent entirely from the process. Whether this is derived from complacency or a widening resentment between the nuclear “haves” and “have nots,” a global nuclear security architecture cannot be effectively established in the current international environment. Those participating in the NSS process as well as the three African participants at the NIS, most of which are seeking greater access to nuclear energy, have seemingly given support to the summits, albeit disparate support.

The call for nuclear disarmament that remains prevalent throughout Africa should not dissuade African governments from contributing to forums aimed at establishing a system for global nuclear security despite the polarising effects that prioritising nuclear security in favour of nuclear disarmament has had in the global nuclear dialogue. The dangers associated with the absence of a comprehensive move towards global nuclear security continue. Political squabbling overlooks the hypocrisy that support for initiatives centred on the “humanitarian consequences” of nuclear terrorism could be countered by the perverse mixture of arrogance that leaves unchecked any mitigation or mechanism that exposes the world to any risk of nuclear disaster. Increased polarisation could lead to self-reliance in nuclear development in Africa and other developing regions of the world, albeit with tacit help of the resource-deficient IAEA, at a time when the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism need to be met with a global stance against such threats.

Written by Dominique Gilbert and Donald Stewart ⁽¹⁾

Click here to read part 2 of this discussion paper.

NOTES:

(1) Dominique Gilbert is the Research Manager of the Counter-Proliferation (CP) unit at Consultancy Africa Intelligence (CAI). Donald Stewart is a Research Associate with CAI with a particular interest in nonproliferation and terrorism. Contact Dominique and Donald through CAI's Counter-Proliferation unit ( counter.proliferation@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Kate Morgan.
(2) ‘Strengthening nuclear security implementation’, 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, March 2014, https://www.nss2014.com.
(3) ‘National report of the Republic of South Africa’, 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, March 2014, https://www.nss2014.com.
(4) ‘Statement by President of the Republic of South Africa HE Jacob Zuma, at the Leaders’ Working Dinner’, Nuclear Security Summit 2012, March 2012, http://www.thepresidency.gov.za.
(5) ‘Min Maite Nkoana-Mashabane NSS interview’, Department of International Relations & Cooperation (DIRCO), 3 April 2014, https://www.youtube.com.
(6) Davenport, K. and Horner, D., ‘Controlling proliferation: An interview with Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman’, Arms Control Association, May 2012, https://www.armscontrol.org.
(7) ‘African states’ participation in the Preparatory Commissions of the 2015 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)’, Consultancy Africa Intelligence, June 2013, http://www.consultancyafrica.com.
(8) ‘Min Maite Nkoana-Mashabane NSS interview’, Department of International Relations & Cooperation (DIRCO), 3 April 2014, https://www.youtube.com.
(9) Kimenyi, M., ‘United States- Africa Leaders Summit: Seizing the opportunity to reposition Africa-U.S. Relations’, Brookings Institute, January 2014, http://www.brookings.edu.
(10) Mbanda, G., ‘Nuclear Energy: Africa has better alternatives’, New Times (Rwanda), 18 March 2014, http://www.newtimes.co.rw.
(11) ‘National progress report: Algeria’, Nuclear Security Summit 2014, March 2014, https://www.nss2014.com.
(12) ‘The Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué’, Nuclear Security Summit 2014, March 2014, https://www.nss2014.com.
(13) The Conference on Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons resulted from the recognition of the deep concern for the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. By the 2013 First Committee, 125 governments had joined in statements addressing humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, subsequently leading to a conference specifically focused on these issues. 146 participants joined in Mexico including states and NGOs like the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, see http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
(14) Israel, India, North Korea, and Pakistan.
(15) ‘Nuclear Energy – BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) Industry Guide’, MarketLine, 1 August 2013, http://www.fastmr.com.
(16) The Pelindaba Treaty first opened for signature 11 April 1996 and entered into force 15 July 2009, making Africa a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, with 54 signatories but only 35 ratifications, see http://disarmament.un.org.
(17) Every African nation, except South Sudan, is party to the NPT, see http://www.nti.org.
(18) ‘Chair’s Summary’, Second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, February 2014, http://www.sre.gob.mx.
(19) NAM consists of 120 developing countries and seeks to represent the political, economic and cultural interests of the developing world, see http://news.bbc.co.uk; NAM stated its support for nuclear weapons disarmament as early as 1992 at the 1992 Jakarta Summit, see http://cns.miis.edu.
(20) ‘In larger security: A comprehensive approach to nuclear security’, 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, March 2014, https://www.nss2014.com.
(21) ‘Report of Working Group 3: Managing materials of concern,’ 2014 Nuclear Industry Summit, March 2014, https://www.nis2014.org.
(22) ‘Joint statement of the 2014 Nuclear Industry Summit,’ March 2014, https://www.nis2014.org.