Twenty years since the withdrawal of American troops from Somalia following the ill-fated United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), the assassination of Al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Godane by a United States (US) drone strike in September 2014 and the announcement of a new drone base in Niger reflect the pivot back to the African continent in recent years.⁽²⁾ A once unthinkable prospect following UNOSOM II, this reorientation has been driven by the emergence of a regional arc of instability incorporating large swathes of North, East, West and sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel, creating a vacuum that has allowed groups such as Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Sharia and Al-Shabaab to thrive.⁽³⁾

In comparison to the US military campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and, since September 2014, against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, the operations and initiatives of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) since its 2007 founding remain comparatively understudied, with only a handful of experts uncovering the expanding covert “shadow” war using drones, Special Forces and proxy allies rather than American boots on the ground.⁽⁴⁾ This paper begins by outlining the geographical scope of US counterterrorism operations in Africa, before assessing the strengths and potential pitfalls of the two key components of US strategy in Africa - host nation assistance and capacity-building, supplemented by more direct kinetic methods such as targeted strikes.⁽⁵⁾ It concludes by discussing the lessons AFRICOM’s experience may have for the ongoing US-led aerial campaign against the IS.

AFRICOM’s continent-wide presence

At the continental level, US military involvement in Africa is staggering, with 49 of 55 African countries possessing varying military relations with Washington.⁽⁶⁾ In East Africa, much of which falls under the responsibility of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA),⁽⁷⁾ the US has a major base in Djibouti as well as supporting bases in Ethiopia and the Seychelles that cater for drone reconnaissance across East Africa and drone strikes within Somalia. Furthermore, it is supported by an East Africa Response Force and a 700-strong Africa-wide US Marine Corps crisis response force, designed to protect US embassies in the light of the 2012 Benghazi attacks. This gives the US significant resources in the region if required.⁽⁸⁾ Furthermore, military advisors have been deployed to the African Union (AU) force in Somalia since early 2014, while other civil capacity-building and hearts-and-minds initiatives in the region add a significant non-military footprint.⁽⁹⁾

Green markers: US military training, advising, or tactical deployments during 2013
Yellow markers: US military training, advising, or tactical deployments during 2012
Purple markers: US “security cooperation”
Red markers: Army National Guard partnerships
Blue markers: US bases, forward operating sites (FOSes), contingency security locations (CSLs),
contingency locations (CLs) airports with fuelling agreements and various shared facilities
Green pushpins: US military training/advising of indigenous troops carried out in a third country
during 2013
Yellow pushpins: US military training/advising of indigenous troops carried out in a third country
during 2012

The US military’s pivot to Africa, 2012-2013 ⁽¹⁰⁾

In North and West Africa and the Sahel, the scope of US operations includes two drone bases in Niger that have been used to provide aerial intelligence to French forces in Mali, while Niger’s strategic location, sandwiched between Mali, Libya and Nigeria, further enhances the significance of this deployment. Small training missions have assisted the security forces of Nigeria, Mali, Libya and Mauritania,⁽¹¹⁾ while logistical assistance has been provided to French forces as Operation: Barkhane extends France’s operational reach in the Sahel.⁽¹²⁾ Further south into Central and southern Africa, US operations range from a two-man sniper team in Burundi, advisory contributions to the Ugandan Army’s pursuit of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and counterterrorism coordination and humanitarian exercises with South Africa.⁽¹³⁾ Clearly, while manpower deployments pale in comparison to the 166,000 peak in Iraq,⁽¹⁴⁾ the US nonetheless has a remarkably broad presence in Africa.

African solutions to African problems

In a 2013 interview, then-AFRICOM commander General Carter Ham outlined one of the core components of US strategy in Africa ̶hat the host nation should be placed firmly at the centre of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts,⁽¹⁵⁾ giving the US an indirect role focusing on training, capacity building and intelligence-gathering to be passed on to local ground forces, described by analysts as “partnering” or, in more cynical analyses, “proxy warfare.”⁽¹⁶⁾ A noticeable benefit of this approach for American policymakers is that it is essentially “counterinsurgency on the cheap:”⁽¹⁷⁾ the May 2014 Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund pledged US$ 5 billion towards assisting allies, considerably cheaper than the estimated US$ 6 trillion bill for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁽¹⁸⁾ Indeed, the assumption that “capacity building” serves a preventative, “upstream” function can be seen in the 2009 Stability Operations doctrine, which states that “early involvement and commitment to prevent a downward spiral in a fragile state will be considerably less onerous for intervening forces than the scale necessary to facilitate recovery of a failed state.”⁽¹⁹⁾ Moreover, supporting local ground forces such as AU and Ugandan forces conveys a degree of legitimacy and local ownership to local populations, again in stark contrast to the unilateral Iraq invasion, which fuelled a major backlash against a perceivably illegal occupation.

Like any state, however, African states are complex political entities defined by various competing interest groups. As such, local interests may not always operate in harmony with those of the US, with insurgent-sympathetic or corrupt government officials, local power struggles and a disregard for human rights potentially damaging both the effectiveness and legitimacy of assistance missions.⁽²⁰⁾ In 2013, for example, US-trained forces in Mali defected to Islamist militias, while in Libya, US assistance was withdrawn in 2014 after US-issued equipment, including armoured vehicles, was seized by Libyan militias, reportedly tipped off by Libyan Army personnel.⁽²¹⁾ US training to Nigerian forces has meanwhile been constrained due to the Nigerian military’s record of human rights abuses, meaning the Nigerian Army lacks the counterinsurgency training to combat Boko Haram.⁽²²⁾ Indeed, Professor Hussein Solomon, a leading expert on African counterterrorism, warns that supporting states such as Nigeria threaten to reinforce the grievances that have served as a recruitment tool for groups such as Boko Haram.⁽²³⁾ Therefore, while supporting African ownership of counterterrorism represents a positive departure from US unilateralism, it should not be considered a panacea.⁽²⁴⁾

Retaining direct operations

While “partnering” is the bedrock of AFRICOM’s counterterrorism approach, the September 2014 drone strike that killed the Al-Shabaab leader, as well as the Special Forces raids in Libya and Somalia against suspects implicated in the 1998 Embassy bombings and the 2013 Kenyan Mall attacks, respectively demonstrate that the US retains both the capabilities and the willingness to conduct unilateral operations where the opportunity arises.⁽²⁵⁾ Indeed, the hotly debated use of drone strikes, and targeted killings more generally, which in Africa primarily focus on combating Al-Shabaab, offers the advantages of “terrorising the terrorists,” shortening horizons, fuelling mistrust and breaking internal cohesion,⁽²⁶⁾ while providing an air strike capability driven by intelligence from local allies such as the AU task force.⁽²⁷⁾ The extent to which Godane’s assassination has had this impact upon Al-Shabaab is yet to become clear. However, after a series of retaliatory attacks in Mogadishu during September 2014,⁽²⁸⁾ reports that internal factions are pressing for reforms and seeking to rehabilitate members isolated by Godane suggest an emerging rift between conservative and reformist elements of the group.⁽²⁹⁾ Moreover, it is unclear how far Somali public support extends to US targeted strikes, especially since previous attacks, such as the 2006 bombardment against Islamist forces, resulted in the deaths of civilians.⁽³⁰⁾ Any repetition in Somalia of the May 2014 blundered drone strike against a civilian wedding convoy in Yemen would threaten US credibility, potentially providing Al-Shabaab with a useful recruitment tool while damaging the legitimacy of local “partners.”⁽³¹⁾

Walking a tightrope

Clearly, therefore, the two-pronged US strategy in Africa rests on a tightrope: too much faith in sometimes brutal host nation governments can produce counterproductive results, while overemphasis on US operations may damage the perception that the host nation is in control of its own affairs. A careful balance has been employed, tailoring to country-specific political and security requirements. However, it is important to proceed with caution when analysing this approach, since it is essentially tailored by a domestic political requirement to distance itself from the large-scale counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Islamic State conflict: Lessons from AFRICOM?

The rise of IS in Iraq and Syria, and the US and allied response in the form of airstrikes from September 2014, is unlikely to divert significant US resources away from the African continent towards the Middle East in another pivot, since the US role in Iraq and Syria appears to follow the same, albeit more intensified, strategy. Indeed, as AFRICOM has essentially served as a laboratory for whole-of-government host nation capacity augmentation and assistance strategies on various scales since 2007,⁽³²⁾ its experience may provide useful lessons for the IS conflict. These may include displaying caution when supporting potentially unstable proxy allies like the Free Syrian Army, and corrupt and sectarian bodies, such as the Iraqi government; empowering local populations, such as the Kurds; and using intelligence-driven targeted air strikes against known leadership and preventing IS from exploiting this as a recruitment tool. All of the above are issues that the US and its local allies have faced in Africa, suggesting that the defeat of IS may rest upon the requirement to learn these lessons.

Written by Alex Waterman ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Alex Waterman is a Research Associate at CAI with a focus in insurgencies, civil wars and counterinsurgency strategy. Contact Alex through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Conflict & Terrorism Research Unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Nicky Berg. Research Manager: Leigh Hamilton.
(2) Turse, N., ‘The U.S. Military’s new normal in Africa’, Tom Dispatch Blog, 15 May 2014, http://www.tomdispatch.com.
(3) ‘Global trends 2025: A transformed world’, United States Director of National Intelligence, November 2008, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., http://www.dni.gov; Solomon, J. and Lee, C., ‘Obama contends with arc of instability unseen since ‘70s’, Wall Street Journal, 13 July 2014, http://online.wsj.com.
(4) Axe, D., ‘Hidden history: America’s secret drone war in Africa’, Wired, 13 August 2012, www.wired.com; Taylor, A., ‘MAP: The U.S. military currently has troops in these African countries’, Washington Post, 21 May 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com.
(5) Schmitt, E., ‘U.S. strategy to fight terrorism increasingly uses proxies’, New York Times, 29 May 2014, http://www.nytimes.com.
(6) Turse, N., ‘AFRICOM’s gigantic “small footprint”’, Tom Dispatch Blog, 5 September 2013, http://www.tomdispatch.com.
(7) ‘Combined joint task force Horn of Africa’, United States Department of Defence report, http://www.defense.gov.
(8) Lyman, P., 2009. “The war on terrorism in Africa”, in Harbeson, J. and Rothchild, D., (eds.). Africa in world politics: Reforming political order. Westview Press: Boulder.
(9) Axe, D., ‘Hidden history: America’s secret drone war in Africa’, Wired, 13 August 2012, www.wired.com; ‘Combined joint task force Horn of Africa’, United States Department of Defence, http://www.defense.gov.
(10) Turse, N., ‘The startling size of U.S. military operations in Africa’, Mother Jones, 6 September 2013, http://www.motherjones.com. For a more recent, albeit less detailed, map of US military presence in Africa, see Taylor, A., ‘MAP: The U.S. military currently has troops in these African countries’, Washington Post, 21 May 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com.
(11) Taylor, A., ‘MAP: The U.S. military currently has troops in these African countries’, Washington Post, 21 May 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com; Schmitt, E., ‘U.S. training elite antiterror troops in four African nations’, New York Times, 26 May 2014, http://www.nytimes.com.
(12) Whitlock, C., ‘Pentagon set to open second drone base in Niger as it expands operations in Africa’, Washington Post, 1 September 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com.
(13) Choppin, A., ‘An eagle’s nest in Niger and the political economy implications of the U.S. military strategy in Africa’, Consultancy Africa Intelligence Africa Conflict Monthly Monitor, April 2013; Schmitt, E., ‘U.S. strategy to fight terrorism increasingly uses proxies’, New York Times, 29 May 2014, http://www.nytimes.com; Firsing, S., 2014. South Africa, the United States, and the fight against Islamic extremism. Democracy and Security, 8(1), pp. 1-27.
(14) ‘Chart: U.S. troop levels in Iraq’, CNN, 21 October 2011, http://edition.cnn.com.
(15) ‘General Ham: Small, tailored U.S. military presence best for supporting African nations’, U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs, 26 March 2013, http://www.africom.mil.
(16) Johnson, R., 2014. Upstream engagement and downstream entanglements: The assumptions, opportunities and threats of partnering. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25(3), pp. 647-668; Schmitt, E., ‘U.S. strategy to fight terrorism increasingly uses proxies’, New York Times, 29 May 2014, http://www.nytimes.com.
(17) The term was coined in Alex De Waal’s work concerning the financing of proxy militias by the Sudanese government during the civil war. See: De Waal, A., 2006. Counter-Insurgency on the cheap. Oxford University Press: New York.
(18) Londono, E., ‘Iraq, Afghan wars to top $4 trillion’, Washington Post, 28 March 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com.
(19) ‘Stability operations’, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 September 2011, http://www.dtic.mil; Johnson, R., 2014. Upstream engagement and downstream entanglements: The assumptions, opportunities and threats of partnering. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25(3), pp. 647-668.
(20) Johnson, R., 2014. Upstream engagement and downstream entanglements: The assumptions, opportunities and threats of partnering. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25(3), pp. 647-668.
(21) Schmitt, E., ‘U.S. training elite antiterror troops in four African nations’, New York Times, 26 May 2014, http://www.nytimes.com.
(22) Warner, L. A., ‘U.S. military aids Nigeria on Boko Haram’, Christian Science Monitor, 23 January 2014, http://www.csmonitor.com; For the latest report on Nigeria’s human rights record, see: ‘Welcome to hell fire: Torture and other ill-treatment in Nigeria’, Amnesty International, 18 September 2014, http://www.amnesty.org.
(23) Solomon, H., 2013. The failure of counter-terrorism initiatives in Africa. Research on Islam and Muslims in Africa, 1(6), muslimsinafrica.wordpress.com.
(24) Johnson, R., 2014. Upstream engagement and downstream entanglements: The assumptions, opportunities and threats of partnering. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25(3), pp. 647-668.
(25) Kirkpatrick, D., Kulish, N. and Schmitt, E., ‘U.S. raids in Libya and Somalia strike terror targets’, New York Times, 5 October 2013, http://www.nytimes.com; Bachmann, J., 2014. Policing Africa: The U.S. military and visions of crafting ‘good order’. Security Dialogue, 45(2), pp. 119-136.
(26) Young, R., ‘Enter the drones’, Somalia Report, 6 July 2011, http://www.somaliareport.com.
(27) Axe, D., ‘Hidden history: America’s secret drone war in Africa’, Wired, 13 August 2012, www.wired.com.
(28) Nor, O., ‘Top Somali antiterrorism officer shot dead in Mogadishu’, CNN, 14 September 2014, http://edition.cnn.com; Nor, O., ‘Suicide bombing kills 16, Somali official says’, CNN, 8 September 2014, http://edition.cnn.com.
(29) Abukar, H., ‘Somalia: Al-Shabaab’s new leadership fights internal reform’, Garowe Online, 2 October 2014, http://www.garoweonline.com.
(30) Lyman, P., 2009. “The war on terrorism in Africa”, in Harbeson, J. and Rothchild, D., (eds.). Africa in world politics: Reforming political order. Westview Press: Boulder.
(31) Alwazir, R., ‘Yemenis seek justice in wedding drone strike’, Al Jazeera, 21 May 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com; Aldrich, D., 2014. First steps towards hearts and minds? USAID’s countering violent extremism policies in Africa. Terrorism and Political Violence, 26(3), pp. 523-546.
(32) Shin, D., 2009. Narrowing the gap: DOD and stability operations. Military Review, 89(2), pp. 23-32.