Political developments in 2024 were largely extensions of events from the previous year and further back into the past. Key elections, though presenting what appeared to be political ‘surprises’, were actually predictable.

Wars and coups d’état are events that often appear to break out suddenly. However, long-term observers of political developments recognise that such acts always have antecedents. This was the case in 2024, when no surprises startled political and economic observers closely following African trends. Looking at the year, it is apparent that seeds for 2025’s developments have been sown across every field of human endeavour, just as the events of 2024 were rooted in the recent past or in decades-long but ongoing developments.

Opposition parties come to power

Elections are often the only time the world’s media notices the politics of a country. As a result, the media frequently expresses surprise at outcomes based on ill-timed assumptions, such as the perceived invincibility of liberation parties that have ruled since national independence. The press described the ‘shocking outcome’ in Botswana when the Botswana Democratic Party, in power for 58 years, was displaced by a landslide victory by the opposition Umbrella for Democratic Change on 30 October. Similarly, on 13 November 2024, Somaliland’s election ended with the opposition leader winning nearly twice as many votes as the incumbent, once again flummoxing the press. Just three days earlier, on 10 November, a coalition of Somali opposition groups achieved a major rejection of the incumbent government when they took every seat in parliament.

The reason these elections garnered more media attention than, say, Senegal’s 17 November election – where the ruling party retained its parliamentary majority – is because, if you don’t pay attention to political trends, you won’t see changes coming. So-called parachute journalists arrive in countries for elections and leave soon after, only returning for the next polling cycle. Meanwhile, important underlying issues remain underreported. For example, the corruption scandals that roiled Mauritius’ presidency and factored into his defeat were not followed. Nor did the media foresee the election results in Somaliland, as they would have by following how frustrated voters were blaming government for the inadequate progress towards global recognition for its independence from Somalia. Similarly, the long-standing poor economic conditions in Botswana from its high inflation and a stagnant economy had been festering for so long that voters felt their government had no new ideas to bring about change. Similarly, in South Africa, dissatisfaction against government that had been brewing for years culminated in the May 2024 elections that saw the African National Congress, in power for 30 years, lose the outright parliamentary majority it had held since the end of apartheid.

South Africa’s score on the Global Economy’s Human Rights and Law Index reached an all-time high in 2024
Source: Global Economy.com

Observing underlining issues gives an informed view of political trends that are more involved than the apparent stability of leadership’s longevity. One indicator of this is migration patterns. The number of African migrants within and outside of the continent continued to rise in 2024, indicating political instability and a lack of economic opportunities, both of which are results of ineffective governance.

Authoritarian leadership old and new will remain

2024 saw the entrenchment of military juntas in Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali. Russia orchestrated coups d’état of the democratically elected governments in those countries in 2022, using local military officers as front men and citing issues like corruption as justification. Promises for elections scheduled for 2024 were made and dates were set, but as these dates drew near, the juntas indefinitely postponed the elections and extended the timelines for transitions to democracy.

These developments were foreseen. Russia, through its mercenaries, has been securing Africa’s natural resources for itself while ensuring those resources remain out of the hands of the West. Sowing discord and chaos are at the heart of Russia’s foreign policy, and nothing changed that in 2024. The year saw the solidification of Russian influence in Africa with no counter-pressure against its presence, entrenching this status quo for these three junta-led Sahel countries into 2025. Meanwhile, Russia is further securing diplomatic alliances and co-operation as more African countries join the BRICS alliance, despite Russia’s ill-defined purpose. Movement toward establishing a BRICS alternative to the US dollar will likely continue. With a new administration in the US that aligns with Russian interests, the US will likely tolerate Russia’s influence over Africa.

There is also no counter-pressure against Africa’s long entrenched leaders, such as Cameroon’s President Paul Biya, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni, along with Zimbabwe’s and Mozambique’s long-ruling political parties. Elections in these non-democratic countries exist for public relations value, with predetermined outcomes. According to Human Rights Watch, democratic indicators in Africa have steadily deteriorated over the past decade, and there are no signs for improvement in 2025. However, while still lacking a sufficient degree of influence, popular discontent is growing continentally in response to the current rise in authoritarianism. This trend warrants attention to see how popular desire will influence political change in the latter half of the decade.

As a prognostic tool, politics deserves scrutiny

The year ahead will be filled with political, economic and other developments. Economic policy is rooted in the desires of political leadership, as is transportation policy, environmental strategies and urban planning. As 2025 unfolds, the key lesson of 2024 – that popular discontent with incumbencies can lead to the success of opposition parties in elections – suggests that even the long-entrenched status of Africa’s autocratic class may not be infinite.

The critical points:

• Political events in 2024 were no surprises as they were rooted in on-going developments
• The election victories of opposition parties in 2024 elections validate observations that mass discontent in political status quos are building toward change
• Politics remains the best barometer of change in Africa because progress in all sectors is rooted in governmental policies

Submitted by In on Africa